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ABSTRACT 
This thesis sets out to explore the much overlooked phenomenon of non-union 
employee representation (NERs). The work is concerned with both the utility of 
these structures from a workforce perspective and the managerial motivation 
underpinning the presence of these bodies. Further to the exploration of the above 
themes case study research was carried out in three organisations possessing 
relatively mature non-union representative structures. 
In terms of managerial goals it is suggested that that the extant literature affords a 
partial account; commentators characteristically depict a manifestly defensive 
intent, with goals evinced in terms of trade union exclusion. This study advances 
knowledge in this area by providing a more discriminating analysis exploring the 
contingent factors differentially shaping the managerial response to employee 
representation. Over and above union avoidance, evidence is presented of certain 
managerial actors pursuing a more proactive set of goals aimed at securing the co- 
operation of employees via the legitimacy imbued though the process of 
consultation. The necessity for such a response is tracked to factors relating to 
demands in and around the nature of the production regime/mode of service 
delivery. 
With regard to the theme of employee empowerment the thesis broadly supports 
the extant literature in demonstrating that the institutions under review represent 
largely unavailing vehicles for the furtherance of employee interests. A distinct 
feature, however, is that in contrast to these predominantly descriptive studies the 
theme of `voice' is ensconced within a theoretically informed analysis, allowing the 
study to move beyond this somewhat bland conclusion. The shortcomings are 
tracked to the key areas of power, autonomy and competence - ultimately manifest 
in a marked legitimacy gap. 
In the final analysis it is argued that there are inherent tensions unleashed by this 
mode of intervention precluding beneficial outcomes for both parties. Specifically, 
topics relating to the irreconcilability of the pursuit of both corporate and 
workforce goals through a managerially derived format are considered. Similarly, 
the rationality and coherence of a managerial agenda pursuant of `rival logics' of 
action, relating to both issues of workplace control and employee empowerment, is 
afforded critical scrutiny. 
vii 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
It has become commonplace in recent years for industrial relations commentators 
to posit the presence of a `representation gap' (Freeman and Rogers, 1993; Towers, 
1997; Weiler, 1990). Given the scale of trade union decline that has continued 
largely unabated since the late 1970s the empirical foundation of such accounts is 
broadly treated as beyond reproach. In one sense, however, the above orthodoxy is 
problematic as declining trade union coverage is pressed ipso facto as evidence of 
wholesale employee disenfranchisement. It is considered axiomatic that non- 
unionism equates to an emasculation of employee voice while a closer analysis of 
the data problematises such an assertion. As Millward et al. (2000: 124) 
acknowledge, drawing on the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
(WERS), the decline in trade union coverage has been matched by `a major shift to 
non-union forms of voice". While such non-union arrangements can take a variety 
of forms, the 1998 WERS survey is again instructive in advising that a significant 
number of non-union firms - 22 per cent - possess workplace level joint 
consultative committees2 (Cully et al. 1999: 224), i. e. non-union modes of 
employee representation (NERs) - the theme of this study. As Terry (1999: 18) has 
argued, this number of non-union establishments these days, `represents a lot of 
workplaces and a large number of employees'. This might suggest that the absolute 
magnitude of the purported representation gap characteristically `read-off ' from 
statistics relating to trade union coverage has been somewhat overplayed. At the 
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very least in view of the decline in both union recognition and the coverage of 
collective bargaining, as depicted in successive WERS data sets, questions 
concerning the effectiveness of alternative modes of representation become ever 
more pertinent. 
Notwithstanding its current numerical significance the non-union sector remains 
grossly under researched. McLoughlin and Gourlay's (1994: 163) assertion that 
`how employees are managed without unions and the nature of relations with 
employees where unions are absent is an area ripe for further study', is well worth 
rehearsing, and still carries resonance almost a decade later, sentiments echoed 
more recently by Borgers and Lint (cited in Troy, 1999: 3): 
The organized sector offers industrial relations researchers increasingly 
narrow and stagnant areas of exploration. Alternatively the non-union 
sector provides the industrial relations researcher with vast, exiting and 
unexplored terrain (emphasis added). 
One corollary is that the widespread preponderance of NER structures has not had 
its counterpart in academic analysis. Terry (1999: 27) makes the point succinctly: 
The data show that there is still a great deal more research to be done. We 
know virtually nothing about how these bodies are composed, the detailed 
machinery of election and its independence from managerial influence, the 
`representativeness' of such systems... about accountability procedures of 
representatives, or the training and other assistance provided. Still more 
elusive are data concerning the effects of such systems - with regard either 
to the managerial objective of securing consent to change or the employee 
objective of influencing managerial decisions. 
A plausible rationale for the evident lacuna is that the study of these structures sits 
uneasily with either of the dominant trajectories taken by the discipline of 
industrial relations over the last 50 years or so. Following Godard and Delaney 
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(2000), one might usefully counterpose the old and the new research paradigms. 
The former, representing the post-war orthodoxy, was based on an overly narrow 
and confining conception of the employment relationship; industrial relations 
theory and practice predominantly focused on formal national institutions and the 
practice of collective bargaining. Declining trade union coverage, the shift in power 
that is implied, with the increasing ability of management to seize the initiative 
betokened a marked modification in terrain, and re-definition of the subject matter - 
enter the new `high performance' (ibid: 482) paradigm. The switch to a research 
agenda which `fundamentally challenges the traditional focus of the field of 
industrial relations' (ibid), was manifest in a move away from the standard 
Donovan focus on the relationship between institutions and agencies, placing 
managerial practices and strategy under ever more careful scrutiny. As Godard and 
Delaney (Ibid: 484) note: `in the new paradigm the study and promotion of new 
work and HRM practices replace research on unions and collective bargaining as 
the field's core'. NER structures, being managerial emanations, fall outside the 
reach of the standard institutional discourse as they do not in any way accord with 
the core subject matter: independent trade unionism. Superficially their managerial 
genesis would appear to provide them with coverage under the rubric of the new 
paradigm; however, as noted, the kernel of the latter counter orthodoxy is HRM. 
While the precise nature of the term remains somewhat elusive, it is generally 
conceptualised as encompassing a strategic collection of individually focussed HR 
techniques (Blyton and Turnbull, 1994: 9). Conceptually, therefore, given that NER 
structures represent managerially formulated collective modes of representation, 
their hybridised nature has positioned them as outliers sitting beyond the ambit of 
either the traditional or more avant-garde research agendas. 
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The above myopia has ensured that the study of non-union forms of representation 
has suffered from a strong element of institutional blindness. Such data as exists is 
limited and piecemeal, consisting of a handful of isolated case studies, along with 
some more impressionistic Incomes Data Services (IDS) and WERS data sets. As 
Millward et al. (2000: 108) argue, given the decline in trade union coverage `it is 
now ever more pertinent to examine the incidence of other forms of employee 
voice'. Incidence per se, however, tells us little if anything about effectiveness. 
Ultimately there is a need for in-depth qualitative data to ascertain if such 
structures ameliorate, or indeed contribute to, the aforementioned `representation 
gap'; this study seeks to make a significant contribution to this problematic. 
Conversely, and relatedly, the thesis is not singularly concerned with the theme of 
employee enfranchisement and empowerment. Indeed, a major criticism levelled at 
extant data sets is their narrow focus and privileging of worker outcomes that leave 
important questions untouched. As a corrective to such an attenuated research 
specification, the work additionally seeks to explore the theme of causation, i. e. the 
managerial raison d 'etre underpinning the creation and enduring presence of 
NERs. It is only via a problematic framed in terms of both employee outcomes and 
managerial motive that the workings of these bodies, and the resultant tensions 
unleashed can be comprehended. As such the thesis provides additional theoretical 
depth and breadth to our understanding of these structures. The above twin themes 
represent the substantive empirical and theoretical contributions of the thesis, 
which is based around three case studies in organisations possessing relatively 
mature forms of non-union employee representation. Two are manufacturing 
4 
organisations, MediCo and FridgeCo, while the third, FinanceCo, is based in the 
banking sector. 
This introductory chapter is sub-divided into three sections. Firstly, NERs are 
placed within the wider context of developments in labour law; developments that 
will inevitably further bolster the numerical significance of systems of non-union 
voice, underscoring the imperative for informed and critical scholarship. Following 
on from this a formal conceptualisation of the NER phenomenon is then 
undertaken. This leads into a fuller discussion of the academic rationale 
underpinning the thesis and the anticipated theoretical contributions of the study. 
The chapter closes with a broad outline of the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 The Changing Context of Non-Union Consultation 
It is important to ally the present study with recent and ongoing changes within the 
industrial relations landscape. The decline in coverage of trade union representation 
outlined above is clearly pertinent; unless one subscribes to a secular shift away 
from a collective dimension to the employment relationship -'the fracturing of 
collectivism' - (Bacon and Storey, 1996: 43), this demands an evaluation of the 
efficacy of alternative emergent modes of collective voice. The study of non-union 
voice must additionally, however, be located within a discussion of the erosion of 
voluntarism within UK industrial relations. Over the last decade or so a range of 
provisions have been enacted serving to juridify a system formerly marked by 
significant legal abstention. As Terry (1999: 19) argues, such legal developments 
are likely to bestow greater significance on these structures than has hitherto been 
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the case. The legal stimulus has emanated from both the European and domestic 
level. Within the context of the former the engine of European dirigisme has 
activated a burgeoning collection of Directives requiring organisations to consult 
with their employees or representative agents, regardless of trade union status; 
specifically the provisions relating to collective redundancies (1992); transfer of 
undertakings (1992) and health and safety (1996). In these instances non-union 
consultative bodies are a permissible channel for consultation provided their 
membership is elected (Hall, cited in Terry, 1999: 19). Additionally, the working 
time regulations (1998) and parental leave Directive (1999) require consultation, 
adding to the necessity for some form of dialogue. Taken together there is now a 
clear statutory requirement for consultation to take place in non-union 
organisations in a myriad of areas. More significant, however, is the Directive on 
national level information and consultation, adopted by the EU member states in 
Spring 2002, that affords universalistic rights of information and consultation on 
economic and strategic issues (Sargeant, 2001: 492) in organisations with 50 or 
more employees. This `radical development' (Terry, 1999: 20) is of significance 
because it formally presages the creation of standing rather than ad hoc non-union 
vehicles of consultation3, a permanent consultative machinery being implicit within 
the Directive (Sisson, 2002: 5), suggesting some form of works council 
arrangements (ibid). With the European legislative stimuli gathering pace it is 
inevitable that the next few years will of necessity presage a significant increase in 
structures of non-union consultation, albeit of a more standardised and formalised 
nature than the current voluntaristic variant that forms the topic of this thesis. 
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The study of NERs additionally needs to be ensconced within legislative changes at 
national level. Of significant relevance is the1999 Employment Relations Act 
(ERA), that provides a statutory formula for trade union recognition. As will be 
discussed, extant analyses of NERs typically approach the subject from within a 
trade union problematic; the broad prognosis for union influence in an era where 
managerially imposed channels of communication are increasingly prevalent. This 
is not an agenda with which this thesis is overly occupied, indeed it is argued that 
epistemologically there is much to commend Guest and Hoque's (1994: 29) 
assertion that: 
Since non-unionism is the norm for new establishments, we have arguably 
reached the point where we should get away from studying non-union 
establishments in relation to unionism and propensity to become unionised. 
The above legal development does warrant consideration, however, within the 
context of this study, because it is an important dynamic that may have the curious 
epiphenomenal effect of increasing the importance of non-union modes of 
representation. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the utilisation of such structures 
as tools of union avoidance has been well documented, notwithstanding the fact 
that in the last 20 years or so the law has operated to facilitate de-recognition and 
trade union exclusion (Terry, 1999: 18). With a formalised recognition procedure 
now in place it may be expected that the use of NERs, as both explicit and implicit 
strategies of union substitution, will increase in response to such a legislative 
`shock'; a proposition afforded strong empirical support in recent work by Gall 
(2003: 88). Indeed, employer interest in such structures is likely to be sharpened 
given that somewhat paradoxically the ERA for the first time similarly affords 
legal status, and hence legitimacy to `employer sponsored, non-independent 
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workers' associations' (Smith and Morton, 2001: 127). There is speculation 
amongst legal scholars that an application for recognition by an independent trade 
union may be defeated by the presence of a corporate NER structure (cf. Ewing, 
2000; Smith and Morton, 2001; and also Gollan, 2002; 328-329). In sum, taken 
together, the above dynamics placing ever greater significance upon non-union 
consultation suggest a growing need for academic scrutiny of what can no longer 
be regarded as a peripheral field of study. 
1.2 Conceptual Issues 
Given that this thesis is wholly concerned with the theme of non-union modes of 
representation it is necessary at this early stage to deal with the topic of `construct 
validity' (Glew et al. 1995: 400), i. e. the issue of which organisational entities 
should be labelled as NERs and so be admissible topics of study. This involves 
dealing with certain points of potential conceptual confusion. Generically these 
structures are components of the wider phenomenon of employee participation. 
However, being representative structures NERs embody (by definition) indirect 
employee participation. Such institutions, therefore, perform an agency function 
and must consequently be distinguished from direct forms of employee voice, for 
instance, briefing and problem solving groups. They may be viewed as a sub- 
species of the works council format which Rogers and Streeck (1995: 6) have 
defined as `institutionalized bodies for representative communication between a 
single employer ("management") and the employees ("workforce") of a single 
plant or enterprise ("workplace")'. As Hespe and Little (1971: 329) observe, 
however, `works councils can mean different things in different countries', and 
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indeed within the UK the traditional lack of legal prescription renders the NER 
phenomenon particularly amorphous. Consequently in terms of form a 
heterogeneity of permutations are possible. Following Biagi's (1998: 484) 
modelling, workplace representative bodies may be analysed along two dimensions 
relating to their structural and functional properties. With regard to the former 
aspect NERs may, for example, represent both managerial and non-managerial 
grades, or as is common solely the latter grouping. In respect to function the terms 
of reference of the bodies might extend to issues distributional in character (e. g. 
wage bargaining) and/or items more integrational in nature such as productivity 
matters. Additionally, and crucially, competence is similarly apt to vary from the 
right to information through to negotiation. Depending upon context such councils 
may consequently be redolent more of a mode of `top-down' communication than a 
vehicle for the genuine expression of employee voice. Notwithstanding the above 
ambiguities and rather complex reality Gollan (2001: 378) has usefully identified 
six common elements appertaining to NERs and this allows us to sketch out a 
broad conceptualisation: 
First, only employees at the organisation can be members of the 
representative body. Second, there is no or only limited formal linkage to 
outside trade unions or external employee representative bodies. Third, a 
degree of resource is supplied by the organisation in which the employee 
representative body is based. Fourth, there is a representation of employees' 
interests or agency function, as opposed to more direct forms of individual 
participation and involvement. Fifth, such structures predominantly deal 
with a range of issues at a workplace and/or organisation. Sixth, there is no 
independent membership criterion based on individual employee 
contributions. 
While such a conceptualisation is technically correct and represents a useful point 
of entry, it nevertheless fails to emphasise the pre-eminent characteristic of these 
institutions: traditionally within a UK context, in contrast to the European variant, 
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such structures have lacked legal institutionalisation. They have hitherto been 
exclusively managerial emanations existing solely under the suffrage of employers. 
It is important, therefore, to stress that the institutions under review are not neutral 
structures and emphasise the primacy of management as both architect and 
initiator4. Given their managerial genesis there is consequently a strong prima facie 
presumption of a lack of independence5. Such evidence as there is suggests that 
these bodies do not have the power to alter their own rules without the concurrence 
of the parent organisation. They would appear, therefore, to various degrees to be 
under the control or domination of the employer. Such an absence of regulation, 
either by legislation or through industrial agreements, as will be discussed in 
chapter 5, has profound implications for the autonomy and thus efficacy of these 
structures. 
This more thorough conceptualisation, emphasising the pre-eminent role of 
management as both the gate keeper and patron of such schemes, gives rise to two 
principal theoretical issues. Firstly, given that the creation of these entities 
represents considered and purposeful managerial motive, how are we to best 
understand the rationale that underpins their significant incidence? Secondly, in 
view of the aforementioned constraints on independence, how effectively do such 
institutions serve to articulate the interests of their constituents? It is these two 
core theoretical debates relating to managerial motive and employee outcomes that 
occupy the two substantive chapters of the thesis. 
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1.3 The Theoretical Contribution of the Study 
As noted, characteristically commentators have approached the topic of NERs from 
within a very circumscribed remit. To date the dominant framework of analysis has 
been based upon what might broadly be termed democratic theory - the rights of 
employees to have some say in their working lives. Thus, extant analyses have 
largely been preoccupied with implicitly counterposing the utility of NERs against 
orthodox trade unionism as a bargaining medium. Within such a research agenda 
NERs are both viewed and judged solely as a means of advancing worker interests. 
This narrow research specification is inadequate as no account is taken of 
competing interests and divergent definitions of success. The managerial goals and 
gains sought are liable to differ from those of employees, and are unlikely to stem 
from the above democratically inspired perspective, with production and efficiency 
issues, or more subtly, designs relating to the very legitimacy of the management 
function (cf. Ramsay, 1985: 58-60) dominant. Indeed, the likelihood of a 
specifically managerial agenda is a theme that the wider generic literature on 
employee participation has been sensitive to: 
The key lies in understanding the differing and contradictory interpretations 
held by the two sides of this notion of participation. Typically, the 
representatives of capital have their minds set on a unitary conception of `the 
company' in which all change must be orientated to the goal of efficiency 
(Ramsay, 1977: 498). 
A distinctly managerial set of priorities is likewise acknowledged by Robert 
Mason: 
Management is unlikely to recommend worker participation beyond the 
point at which they perceive the greatest marginal utility in terms of their 
own objectives (Mason, 1982: 178). 
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The corollary to the above is that these bodies may plausibly be successful from a 
managerial perspective, while failing to satisfy the tests relating to organisational 
pluralism implicit within extant accounts. 
In view of the predominant focus on employee interests the theme of managerial 
motive is characteristically approached from a somewhat tangential position. 
Nevertheless, the tenor of existing studies is that such bodies represent explicit or 
implicit components of union evasion strategies. An integral facet is, thus, a focus 
on NERs as defensive responses by management to perceived labour pressures. 
Intellectually and theoretically these analyses have their provenance in Ramsay's 
(1977) `cycles of control' thesis, while lacking the latter's historicist dimension and 
implications. Although Ramsay's account was more broadly related to the generic 
phenomenon of employee participation, indirect forms represented the central 
components of the analysis. Ramsay's principal assertion was that managerial 
interest in such schemes was only invoked when capital's control over labour was 
perceived to be under threat in some way, the ultimate purpose being to incorporate 
the workforce through the provision of `phantom participation' (ibid: 1980). From 
this perspective, far from bestowing meaningful authority on employees, such 
schemes were viewed as means by which management sought to maintain and 
extend a relationship of dominance and control. To be sure, Ramsay's account has 
a coherent symmetry and has served to usefully cast light on certain issues, viz. the 
potential tendentious use by management of schemes ostensibly participatory in 
nature as a means of reinforcing prerogative. However, as will be discussed in 
chapter 4, Ramsay's thesis is based upon an unsatisfactory and overly narrow set of 
assumptions with regard to the nature of the management function. There are 
12 
likewise methodological and theoretical flaws in the work. Suffice to say at this 
stage that, in particular, the waning of trade union influence and authority that has 
occurred over the last 20 years or so problematises a narrow focus on issues of 
workplace control (cf. Ackers et al. 1992). Set within such a context a more 
discriminating account has to explore the possibility of a more complex causality. 
Indeed other critical, but less narrowly framed literatures, acknowledge the 
potentially multifarious ends that both direct and indirect participation might serve 
as a component of any managerial toolbox. For example, Marcel Bolle De Bal 
(1992: 607) has stressed five main functions: ideological (e. g. union weakening); 
economic (improvement of the workforce); psychological (e. g. motivation); 
organisational (e. g. de-bureaucratisation) and sociological (e. g. co-operation and 
control) (cf. also Ackers et al. 1992; Marchington et al. 1992). In keeping with this 
more thorough theorisation, and in contradistinction to extant accounts, it is argued 
in later chapters that NERs may serve varied managerial ends and that the 
presence of these phenomena is not reducible to any simple universal rationale or 
grand theory. Through in-depth micro analysis it is additionally demonstrated that 
disparate goals may be pursued by organisational actors operating at differing 
hierarchical levels, and that managerial motive may similarly vary over time in 
relation to external shocks and exigencies. 
As discussed earlier, existing accounts have been largely preoccupied with the 
second substantive theme of the research concerning the efficacy of NERs as 
institutions for the expression of collective employee voice. (cf. Broad, 1994; 
Gollan, 2001; Lloyd, 2001; Watling and Snook, 2001). While the studies have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of NER voice provision the 
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accounts are nevertheless largely descriptive and atheoretical in their analyses - 
specifically the concept of `voice' remains under-articulated and has not been 
satisfactorily unbundled. Ultimately, there is a need to develop a set of analytical 
tools that will further the systematic evaluation of NERs as mechanisms of 
employee voice, particularly important in comparative work such as this. This task 
is additionally undertaken: the three NER structures in this study are exposed to a 
thorough and searching examination through the lens of a conceptual framework 
that operationalises voice in an intellectually rigorous and systematic manner. 
Characteristically the principal defect of this mode of voice provision is 
conceptualised in terms of an absence of power. However, the above studies 
actually explain little in terms of why NERs lack recourse to this particular 
resource. Within wider studies of trade union representation the generation of 
manifest workforce power is classically viewed as a function of latent power 
resources, i. e. the ability to impose collective sanction. The NER literature 
suggests, however, that the potential to coerce employers into accepting employee 
demands through combined workforce pressure is generally lacking. The thesis 
again transcends existing research by re-connecting issues of apparent workforce 
passivity to the themes of leadership and workforce mobilisation, ultimately 
tracking issues appertaining to the efficacy of voice to wider workplace cultural 
and social dynamics. 
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
The main body of the thesis is divided into five chapters. In the following chapter a 
methodological synopsis is provided. This argues the suitability of an in-depth case 
study approach as a tool for both capturing issues of complex causality, and themes 
appertaining to the empirical assessment of voice provision. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the organisational context of the constituent study companies providing important 
background material. It explores and summarises the principal contextual variables, 
a necessary task if we are to shed light upon the presence of NERs and issues of 
wider corporate strategy. In each instance this is followed by an outline of the 
structure and terms of reference of each of the representative bodies. This both 
provides further contextual data and serves as an essential input to the later 
evaluation of the efficacy of the voice process. 
Chapters 4 and 5 represent the two substantive data sections. The former explores 
in detail the theme of managerial motive. Following work by Ackers et al. (1992) 
it draws upon contingency theory to unravel the managerial agenda. Firstly, 
echoing existing accounts, it is argued that via this mode of intervention the various 
management actors are responding to pressures relating to issues of workplace 
control. More specifically, the desire to direct issues both of workplace change and 
pay policy, without reference to a potentially obstructive external representative 
agency, is seen to inform managerial thinking. In contradistinction to extant 
accounts, however, in two of the organisations managerial interest is seen to 
embody a more complex causality. This extends beyond a simple industrial 
relations logic, to matters in and around the generation of employee engagement 
and involvement. It is argued that issues relating to the nature of the 
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production/service regime and labour market considerations are driving such a 
differential response. 
Within chapter 5 the empirical field of analysis is switched to the employee side, 
and here the topic of the effectiveness of the voice process is considered. Given the 
comparative nature of the research design, this raises important issues relating to 
the definition and operationalisation of the voice construct. To advance systematic 
cross case comparison, a framework for empirical analysis is crafted comprising 
four principal dimensions: power, autonomy, competence and legitimacy. These 
four vectors of voice become the principal axes for the presentation of the material 
that highlights a variety of defects in the actual operation of this mode of 
representation. As noted, extant accounts conceive of the deficiencies of these 
structures predominantly in terms of the first concept - power. The more sensitive 
treatment afforded by the importation of the above schema makes an important 
theoretical contribution, both by more thoroughly exploring the complex topic of 
power, and by demonstrating that the problems encountered by this mode of voice 
are only fully explicable with reference to other fundamental difficulties. 
A novel feature of the study is that each of the above chapters is preceded by a 
discrete review of the literature germane to the topic. This is essential because 
these represent somewhat disparate fields of analysis often drawing upon distinct 
bodies of work. If the former chapter is predominantly concerned with 
theorising the managerial motive underpinning the NER response in terms of core 
environmental contingencies, the latter is preoccupied with more fundamentally 
empirical issues relating to the operation and measurement of voice. This 
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differential focus does not lend itself to a conventional discretely positioned 
literature review, a facet reflected in the structure of the thesis. 
While the body of the thesis comprises two chapters that are largely self contained, 
each operating within the confines of its own theoretical boundaries, the 
concluding chapter sets out to both reflect upon the major findings and provide 
articulation by placing them on a broader theoretical canvas. Within this final 
chapter the inherent tensions unleashed by this mode of intervention are 
contemplated. Specifically, topics relating to the theoretical irreconcilability of the 
pursuit of both corporate and workforce goals though a managerially derived 
format are considered. Thus, for example, the theoretical nexus between 
managerial goals in and around the maintenance of prerogative and the creation of 
institutions formally `soft' on power is afforded coverage. Furthermore, the 
rationality and coherence of a managerial agenda, often pursuant of `rival logics' of 
action related to issues of both workplace control and employee empowerment, is 
subject to critical scrutiny. It is ultimately argued that there are inherent 
contradictions and tensions unleashed by this mode of managerial intervention, 
manifest in a marked degree of dysfunctionality that undermines the generation of 
beneficial outcomes, not simply for employees but also for management. 
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Notes 
1. Data applies to workplaces with over 25 employees. 
2. The nomenclature utilised to describe such bodies varies: joint consultative 
committee; company council; works council; staff council and employee 
consultative committee are all widely utilised. As Gollan (2001: 378) acknowledges 
`the varieties in terminology do not equate to differences in form and function'. 
3. Thus, for example, under the terms of the Collective Redundancies (Protection 
of Employment Legislation) (Amendment) Regulations 1999 employers may 
consult with employees specially selected for statutory consultation purposes. 
However, health and safety consultation is an ongoing requirement (James, cited in 
Terry, 1999: 20). 
4. This likewise applies to consultation arrangements irrespective of union status. 
For example, the 1998 WERS survey indicates that fewer than 10% of managers 
said the creation of such bodies followed an agreement with employees or trade 
unions. Fewer than 5% said it happened at the request of staff (Millward et al. 
2000: 111). 
5. Lack of independence also has profound legal implications. Specifically, it 
represents grounds for a refusal of a certificate of independence under the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. These provision are of 
significant importance for those employers seeking to pass off NERs as bona fide 
trade unions (cf. Gollan's ((2002)) account of News International). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY 
The introduction set out the academic rationale underpinning the study and 
afforded a preliminary indication of the conceptual architecture that will be utilised 
to organise and evaluate the core themes outlined. This chapter details the principal 
means of data capture employed along with a brief epistemological sketch. The 
latter synopsis is necessary in order to afford a degree of meta-theoretical 
transparency, providing the reader with an indication of the a priori commitments 
utilised to structure the empirical data. Building away from such philosophical 
issues a justification is made for the core methodological tool - the case study 
approach and the constituent research techniques utilised. Inevitably when a case 
study methodology is selected the issue of generalisability must be confronted; the 
discussion tackles this theme articulating both a defence of the case study approach 
and the utilisation of qualitative methodology more generally. The review moves 
on to provide an account of the rationale for site selection including a sketch of the 
principal variables of the case study organisations. The chapter closes with a brief 
account of the means of data analysis. 
2.1 Epistemological Matters 
Given that one research aim is to explore and account for the managerial 
motivation underpinning the presence of NER structures, the work may be seen as 
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following within the positivist tradition that has informed much industrial relations 
research. As Burrell and Morgan (1979: 50) note, positivism is `based upon 
epistemological assumptions dominated by a concern to search for and explain the 
underlying regularities and structural uniformities which characterise the natural 
world'. Positivism, however, represents an extremely broad church and my own 
epistemological position embodies a relatively soft philosophical variant. This is to 
be contrasted with more dogmatically positivist stances such as behaviourism and 
what Little (1991: 224) terms `predictive theory naturalism'. Thus, the assumption 
underpinning the research is that while unquestionably explanation should be 
striven for within the social sciences, the notion of very precise forecasting and 
modelling akin to that encountered within the natural sciences is regarded as 
untenable. Hence, the conclusions forged with regard to the managerial rationale 
underpinning these structures, for example, must be regarded as indicative rather 
than conclusive. 
It is argued that a broadly positivist approach may be justified on the grounds that 
the search for causal explanation represents a legitimate role for social scientific 
research, an assertion that many anti-positivists, e. g. those advocating what Little 
(1991: 232) describes as an anti-naturalist posture, would no doubt reject. 
Adherence solely to the latter epistemology, finding its apotheosis in post- 
modernism, would preclude the important role that the social sciences play within 
social policy formulation, given that the overtly subjective focus provides minimal 
scope for theorisation on social causation (cf. Kelly, 1998: 108-125). Certainly 
within the discipline of industrial relations the positivist approach has been put to 
effective use, and this has in turn informed public policy contributing to the design 
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and implementation of policies and practices (cf. Kochan, 1998). In particular 
industrial relations agencies and institutions have been the focus of much theorising 
and accordingly our understanding of the essential elements of the industrial 
relations system, such as trade unions and collective bargaining, has been greatly 
enhanced. It is ultimately within such a tradition of positivism that the study is 
positioned. 
2.2 The Case Study Approach 
As discussed, this thesis is concerned with two core themes: the managerial 
motivation underpinning the presence of NERs and (relatedly) the efficacy of 
employee voice. As will become evident in chapter 4, with regard to the former 
theme of causality there are detailed processes at work, processes that can only be 
comprehended and described through the medium of complex concepts. Likewise, 
in chapter 5 the topic of efficacy is broached through a theoretical schema that 
draws upon similarly rich conceptualisations. The interpretation and evaluation of a 
textured reality through the agency of such intricate and multi-faceted constructs 
lends itself naturally to a rigorous qualitative case study methodology. As Kitay 
and Callus (1998: 104) have noted: 
The case study is particularly well suited to researching motives, power 
relations or processes that involve understanding complex social 
interaction, 
- these represent integral facets of the study. 
Within the introductory chapter criticism was made of the unsophisticated nature of 
theorising in this area, and the over reliance upon unicausal explanations of 
21 
managerial motive or `grand theory'. Developing this theme it was suggested that 
the re-configuration of power resources to a situation considerably more conducive 
to management renders a simple focus on control issues less than convincing. One 
corollary implicit in such a critique is that the goals pursued by management are 
likely to be conditional upon organisational context, rather than reducible to 
a priori specification. The implications for research design are evident; there is a 
clear need for NER structures to be observed holistically, i. e. embedded within 
their socio-economic and historical context. Again this is a task to which the case 
study is particularly well suited: 
A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In other words 
you would use a case study method because you deliberately wanted to 
cover contextual conditions - believing they might be highly pertinent to 
your phenomenon of study (Yin, 1994: 13). 
The fit and suitability of a case study methodology - highly sensitive to context - 
will become apparent within the two substantive chapters. Firstly, with regard to 
managerial motive it is evident that the goals pursued are indeed multifarious and 
contingent upon broader managerial strategies beyond those appertaining to the 
management of the employment relationship per se. Similarly, within the context 
of the efficacy of the voice process a notable facet is the extent to which the 
flourishing economic health of an organisation can serve to mask deficiencies, 
while a more laggardly financial performance serves to throw any shortcomings 
into sharp relief. 
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2.2.1 The Ethnographic Dimension 
As various commentators usefully remind us (e. g. Yin, 1994: 1; Kitay and Callus, 
1998: 103), a case study must be regarded as an overarching research strategy, 
rather than a technique. In this sense the particular research tools selected (see 
below) are predominantly qualitative, indeed they combine in effect to provide 
three ethnographic studies'. From this standpoint the thesis follows in the Warwick 
industrial relations tradition of fine grained micro-level research utilising, inter 
alia, the technique of non-participant observation (see below) (cf. Batstone, 
Boraston and Frenkel, 1978; Batstone, Ferner and Terry, 1983). Such an approach 
was considered particularly apposite given the limited existence of textured 
research rendering NERs largely unchartered territory. As Friedman and McDaniel 
(1998: 118) note, `the role of ethnography in discovery, and its focus on inductive 
learning, make it especially important as a vehicle for entering new domains of 
study'. This is particularly so where the researcher is seeking to decode issues 
appertaining to the collective nature of labour relations, since certain qualitative 
techniques including face-to-face interviews `entail an inherent methodological 
individualism' (Hodson et al. cited in Friedman and McDaniel, 1998: 119). It is 
perhaps, however, the sensitivity to context that renders ethnography a particularly 
apt tool for this sort of research focusing on micro-level institutions, a full 
understanding of which requires an appreciation not simply of the external business 
environment, but more subtly corporate ideology: 
Ethnography is ... uniquely suited to addressing certain research questions, 
such as those that require an understanding of culture, social interaction, or 
other aspects of complex social systems that cannot be reduced to 
individual actions or attitudes (Friedman and McDaniel, 1998: 117). 
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The power of the ethnographic approach will be demonstrated at various junctures 
within the thesis, not least in chapter 5, where the conditioning influence of 
organisational culture upon the efficacy of NER voice provision is considered. 
2.2.2 The Constituent Research Tools 
Within each organisation four core approaches were utilised as part of the data 
gathering exercise: semi-structured interviews; non-participant observation of 
council meetings and other corporate events; documentary analysis; and more 
informal discussions with employees. This accords with various prescriptions for 
the use of multiple data collection methods: 
If each method leads to different features of empirical reality, then no single 
method can ever capture all the relevant features of that reality; 
consequently, sociologists must learn to employ multiple methods in the 
analysis of the same empirical events (Denzin, 1970: 30; cf. also Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Likewise the convergence of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994: 93) 
facilitated by such data `triangulation' performs an important corroboratory 
function. 
The preliminary stage of the research in each instance involved a thorough analysis 
of a wide range of documentary data. This included the relevant constitutions of the 
representative bodies; training manuals; company newsletters; and access to the 
corporate intranet. Most importantly, however, minutes of council gatherings for 
the previous two years were requested for evaluation. Such an analysis served a 
dual purpose. Firstly, it facilitated some early appreciation of the lexicon that 
organisational actors utilise to structure their working lives. Specifically in this 
regard the fashion for acronyms can prove somewhat daunting and impenetrable to 
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outsiders. Through the minutes it was possible to become immersed in the `native 
language' of each organisation prior to entry into the field, allowing the interviews 
to move immediately beyond laborious and time consuming matters of clarification 
in terminology. This is important because in conducting exhaustive qualitative 
research there is inevitably a limited amount of time available. Most significantly, 
however, the minutes were invaluable in constructing a chronology of recent key 
events, the detail of which would provide the `structured' element of the interview 
protocols. The interview schedules were drawn up in all three instances following a 
trawl through the minutes, with questions strongly informed by the documentary 
analysis - predominantly framed around critical events, i. e. a variant of `critical 
incident technique' (cf. Chell, 1996; Patton, 1990: 342). The utility of this approach 
is that in contrast to a standard semi-structured interview, often comprising 
predominantly abstract questions, `there is a focus which enables the researcher to 
probe aptly and which the interviewee can concentrate upon -a "hook" upon 
which they can "hang" their account' (Chell, 1996: 55). In Patton's (1990: 326) 
terms, `something to push off against. Developing this point Chell (1996: 68) has 
argued that under such a research methodology: 
The linkages between context, strategy and outcomes are more readily teased 
out because the technique is focussed on the event which is explicated in 
relation to what happened, why it happened, how it was handled and what the 
consequences were. 
Thus the data gleaned from the minutes functioned as a very powerful aide- 
memoire giving rise to the re-telling of accounts rich in narrative detail. Such 
highly focussed questioning allowed impressions to be gained of how and why 
management were utilising the representative bodies during various significant 
episodes or `organisational dramas' (ibid: 71). Furthermore, it facilitated the 
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longitudinal tracking of the decision making process. It was possible, therefore, to 
build up an accurate picture of the influence of the constituent bodies; their ability 
to reign-in managerial prerogative, and hence the overall efficacy of the voice 
process. As Patton (1990: 294) has argued, such `knowledge and skill questions' 
typically need a concrete context given that they can be quite threatening, adding 
that it is, `helpful to ask them in conjunction with specific questions about activities 
and experiences that have a bearing on knowledge and skill' (ibid). To be sure, as 
Scott (1994: 38) advises within this sort of ethnographic, and indeed all forms of 
qualitative research, `there are clear difficulties in understanding the past by means 
of personal recollections and reflections', not least due to the possibility of 
systematic bias (cf, also Kitay and Callus, 1998: 108). Developing this theme, 
Godard and Delaney (2000: 490) have observed that cognitive dissonance theory 
suggests that if an interviewee is supportive of an innovation he or she may tend to 
explain any appearance of dysfunction as a reflection of incomplete 
implementation. Conversely, attribution theory (ibid) suggests a tendency to inflate 
the success of innovations, particularly those `owned' by various managerial 
players. Herein, therefore, lays the necessity to interview a wide range of corporate 
actors, giving the researcher numerous measures of the same phenomenon, 
reducing the influence of bias imbued through inaccurate and selective accounts. 
Consequently, at all three research locations interviews were conducted with 
managerial actors representing a range of functional specialisms and hierarchical 
position, as well as with both current and former representatives (see Appendix 1). 
Interviews varied in length from one to thee hours and were of a standard structure. 
Initially interviewees were probed regarding their biography before the discussion 
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moved into the formal interview schedule. Additionally, where appropriate, actors 
close to the representative process were quizzed regarding their task and function. 
Inevitably, given the exploratory nature of the research, adjustments were made to 
the interview protocol allowing for the development of emergent ideas and new 
thematic areas of inquiry. 2 Thus data capture was a fluid and iterative process with 
each new interview building and expanding upon those already done through a 
process of elucidation and elaboration. The interviews were generally concluded 
with more unstructured discussions moving beyond the representative process per 
se, aiding the desire to present a holistic account of the relevant institutions. 
Given that a core theme of the research seeks to gauge the efficacy of the 
representative process it was considered essential that attention should not be 
focussed solely on those actors directly engaged within the consultation/negotiation 
process; there was a clear need to canvass wider rank and file opinion. Such an 
analysis is integral to an evaluation of the perceived legitimacy of the institutions 
which in turn feeds into broader issues of efficacy discussed fully in chapter 5. The 
desire at the outset was to conduct a series of focus group sessions; a request which 
the `gatekeepers' at each organisation initially agreed to in early exploratory 
meetings. Production (MediCo and FridgeCo) and service delivery (FinanceCo) 
imperatives however, dictated that once on site supervisors proved to be less than 
amenable. In the final event while such sessions were indeed held at MediCo, 
wider employee opinion at the other locations was canvassed through more 
informal means. Permission was granted at FridgeCo to speak with production 
workers during both their `smoke' and lunch breaks. While not an ideal scenario, a 
sustained period on site resulted in employees becoming less aware of a `foreign 
body'. The assurances made to employee representatives in the formal interviews 
regarding impartiality and confidentiality appeared to be diffused laterally, 
inspiring confidence in their work mates resulting in the forthright expression of 
views as the research progressed. Similarly, at FinanceCo formal interviews at head 
office were generally concluded with coffee in the canteen where representatives 
would routinely invite colleagues to air their own personal views. Likewise, out in 
the high street branches interviews were typically held in the staff room, facilitating 
the 'piggybacking' of more informal discussions onto the interview schedule. A 
further useful data source utilised at FinanceCo was an employee ballot, 
commissioned by the organisation and undertaken by the Involvement and 
Participation Association (IPA), into The Future of Representation within the 
company. In total 2,543 papers were disseminated attracting a crude response rate 
of 56.15%. The centre piece was an employee poll (discussed in chapter 4) that 
sought to gauge, inter alia, the level of trade union support within the company. 
Much of the value of the report, however, lies in the comments provided within the 
open section where many employees took the opportunity to remark, often at some 
length, on the current non-union representative model. 
While the principal instrument of data capture was the aforementioned set of 
interviews, an important and novel feature of the study was the direct observation 
of the actual functioning of all three of the representative bodies. This served an 
important supplementary function (the dates and details of such meetings are 
recorded in Appendix 2). Given the limited literature, little information is available 
concerning how such gatherings actually influence the decision making process. 
The technique of non-participant observation was considered essential as 
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documentary analysis and interviews can only take us so far. In the final analysis 
there is a need to view the dynamics of group discourse and observe patterns of 
behaviour in their natural setting if the researcher is ultimately to obtain a `feel' for 
the manner in which these institutions operate. Marchington (1980: 135), for 
example, has argued that this particular tool allows the researcher to, 
examine the way in which communication and consultation may serve to 
strengthen rather than weaken management's control by virtue of social and 
technical expertise and greater access to relevant information. 
During the monitoring of council gatherings it was possible to observe the 
interchange between management and representatives, and track the manner in 
which espoused managerial beliefs with regard to participation operated at the 
behavioural level. These and other important observations were similarly used 
iteratively to inform subsequent interview protocols forming a second tranche of 
critical events that representatives were requested to reflect upon. 
With regard to observation techniques Patton (1990: 235-237) has argued that what 
people say, what they do, and how they interact are all of consequence. 
Significantly, however, it is likewise stressed that `it is also important to observe 
what does not happen' (emphasis in original). This is an important point, and a 
number of comments are made within the data chapters with regard to things that 
did not occur. Hence, such observation served to cross validate emergent themes 
generated from within the interviews regarding deficiencies in and around the skill 
of representatives, group autonomy and cohesion. Ultimately such detailed 
monitoring of the bodies revealed genuinely novel insights with regard to the 
constraints the institutions work under. 
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It will be evident from the above account that this study is essentially qualitative in 
nature. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there are strong `synergies' 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 538) to be realised from the complementary use of both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques - not least the broader reach of the latter. 
Indeed, the original research specification envisaged the dissemination of a survey 
within each of the relevant study sites. Organisations, however, are not 
laboratories; while the proposal for a questionnaire was raised early on in access 
negotiations, the `gatekeepers' at both FridgeCo and FinanceCo were less than 
enthusiastic - in hindsight with good cause. The personnel manager at FridgeCo 
regarded the suggestion as somewhat futile given that previous questionnaires 
originating from his office into `important' issues, such as the hours for shift 
working, had met with a negligible response. Likewise, at FinanceCo in the period 
immediately prior to research commencing, the organisation had conducted its own 
annual employee survey as well as the aforementioned employee ballot. It was 
politely suggested by the head of group HR that the organisation was consequently 
suffering from an element of `survey fatigue'. In the final analysis, however, the 
research was not significantly handicapped by such an omission. At FinanceCo the 
organisation's own survey data provides a rich and useful means of canvassing 
employee opinion on key issues and is utilised where appropriate. Although at 
FridgeCo the study is devoid of a quantitative dimension, as will become evident, it 
is within this organisation that employees expressed the strongest and most 
forthright opinions in informal group discussions regarding the representative body 
- virtually unanimous were are espoused. It is therefore unlikely, had a survey been 
conducted, that the opinions evinced would not have been echoed in a wider 
sample. 
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In contrast to the other study organisations, at MediCo a survey was conducted. An 
interview protocol was agreed with the HR director with one question regarding 
trade union support removed at his request. In total 227 survey sheets were 
distributed to the 330 production workers (see Appendix 3). Dissemination was 
incomplete because one supervisor failed to respond to the internal memo outlining 
the procedure and rationale behind the activity. In the final event 68 questionnaires 
were returned. While statistical significance cannot be imputed due to the level of 
response, the data does conform tightly to the more qualitative focus group data 
suggesting that the findings may be extrapolated with a degree of confidence. It is 
worth stressing again, however, that overall the quantitative data is to be 
considered very much secondary and auxiliary to the qualitative analysis. Issues of 
managerial motive, causation and the efficacy of voice, as argued above, may only 
be analysed and captured via an ethnographic approach sensitive to workplace 
culture. The quantitative approach is, nevertheless, a useful adjunct to an 
evaluation of the legitimacy of these structures; a factor, as noted above, that 
likewise conditions efficacy. Such data will accordingly be introduced in support of 
the more qualitative findings where applicable. 
2.2.3 The Issue of Generalisability 
The classic concern regarding case study research relates to threats to `external 
validity', i. e. `the extent to which the research findings can be extrapolated beyond 
the immediate research sample' (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 46). This 
controversy has its philosophical roots in wider academic fratricide regarding 
epistemological leanings; a debate that occasionally spills over into the column 
inches of the mainstream social scientific and industrial relations journals (cf. the 
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lively discussion between McCarthy, 1994 and Millward and Hawes, 1995). Within 
this altercation the commonplace criticism levelled at case studies is that they are 
situationally grounded, concerned with specific instances at the expense of the 
general. One corollary is that such `depth studies' are perceived as being of little 
value as generalisable inferences cannot be made regarding broader populations. 
As Scott (1994: 29) argues, however, `this is based upon a narrow understanding of 
what it means to "generalise" from the particular to the wider situation'. Expanding 
upon this theme Scott (ibid) argues that case studies are about `using the evidence 
of behaviour in particular enterprises to shed light upon issues which are common 
to a wider range of business organisations'. Ultimately, to borrow from Yin's 
(1994: 10) technical terminology, we are concerned with `analytical' not `statistical 
generalisation', the objective being to generalise theories `rather than enumerate 
frequencies' (ibid). Thus, for example, with regard to managerial motive the 
relevance and utility of the studies is to a large extent contingent upon whether the 
structural factors conditioning managerial behaviour, and the normative values 
held, mirror those in wider organisations with functioning NERs. As will become 
clear when the analysis is merged with extant data, there are resemblances 
suggesting that the novel insights afforded are likely to have wider applicability to 
the social processes in other organisations. 
At another level of analysis the very notion of generalisation and extrapolation 
must be regarded in any event as a misnomer within this kind of exploratory 
research. At various junctures within the thesis heuristic analytical frameworks are 
positioned in order to distil and comprehend the evidence. For example, within 
chapter 5 voice is conceptualised and evaluated along the dimensions of power, 
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autonomy, competence and legitimacy. The utility of such analytical tools lies not 
in any generalisation of findings per se, but in their penetrative ability to let us 
more fully understand the complex situation under review. Once developed and 
refined they may be employed in other studies of the same phenomenon where the 
findings may or may not be replicated. The utility of such devices, however, is 
ultimately conditioned by their analytical power to generate novel and interesting 
findings. 
2.3 Site Selection 
A problem with case study research is the strictly limited number of cases that can 
be dealt with. If nascent theory is to be significantly developed, site selection is a 
crucial exercise. In effect this calls for what Eisenhardt (1989: 537) terms 
theoretical, rather than random sampling: `thus the goal of theoretical sampling is 
to choose cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory' (ibid). 
In this respect some of the notable variables as between the three case study 
organisations are highlighted below (Table 1). 
Table 1. Significant Organisational Variables 
MediCo FridgeCo FinanceCo 
Ownership US Malaysian Irish 
Sector Manufacturing Manufacturing Banking 
(Healthcare (Refrigeration) 
Products) 
Mode of Predominantly Recently introduced Increasingly sales 
Production/ flow-line and cellular format, orientated. 
Service Delivery Taylorised, very enhanced cycle Predominantly face- 
short (3 second) times now extending to-face customer 
cycle times up to 120 seconds interaction 
History of 
Unionisation 
Formal 
Competence of 
Representative 
Body 
No Yes 
Consultation 
No 
Negotiation 
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Consultation 
How then do these variables tie in with the existing literature? As noted within the 
introduction this area of industrial relations has attracted minimal theoretical input 
to date, with what evidence there is pointing to the use of NERs as explicit or 
implicit tools of union avoidance (cf. Terry, 1999 for a meta-analysis). However, as 
similarly argued, a whole series of more creative reasons can be advanced 
justifying the necessity for formal consultation, not least the potential commitment 
and co-operation, and enhanced `moral authority' (Scott, 1994: 154) engendered 
through elements of joint regulation. Fundamentally, therefore, these broad themes 
informed the research protocol, i. e. the aim was to both more rigorously test 
elements of an emergent theory relating to an essentially defensive rationale, while 
simultaneously exploring the possibility of a more creatively inspired set of goals. 
While there is no readily available directory of organisations operating NER 
structures, the Incomes Data Services (IDS) series of studies (IDS; 1989; 1994; 
1999) provides a modest data base of such bodies, along with a sketch of 
organisational structure and context. With regard to the theme of union evasion, in 
view of the widespread clustering of trade union representation in manufacturing 
establishments with 200 or more employees (Millward et al. cited in Terry, 1999: 
22), a shortlist was drawn up of organisations with NERs conforming to size and 
sector on the basis that, a priori, if union avoidance does indeed form some 
element of managerial motive it is in these very organisations that we would expect 
to find it operative. Interestingly, following a cursory inspection it became evident 
that several such organisations were wholly owned subsidiaries of US multi- 
national organisations (MNCs). The visceral objection of American business to 
trade unionism has been well documented. Reviewing the terrain Almond et al. 
(2001: 19) observe that extant data suggests that US MNCs are usually unwilling to 
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recognise trade unions within their UK subsidiaries, adding that recent studies 
indicate `lower levels of both union recognition and union density among US 
MNCs compared with either MNCs of other national provenance, or local firms'. It 
was evident that access to such an organisation would consequently represent a 
`critical case' (Yin, 1994: 38) within which to refine and extend, or indeed 
challenge emergent theory. Consequently three US MNCs were approached for 
research access. Two declined the invitation to take part, while the last of the trio, 
MediCo, expressed interest. Following preliminary discussions with the personnel 
manager research access was granted. 
If union avoidance has preoccupied commentators, the presence of NER structures 
within some significant players within private sector services (e. g. Marks and 
Spencer and John Lewis) where unionisation has traditionally been sparse 
(Waddington and Whitson, 1997), would appear to render the union avoidance 
thesis a less than convincing universal explanation - plausibly a different set of 
motivational processes are at work here. At the outset, therefore, it was considered 
essential to conduct a more exploratory case study within a non-manufacturing 
environment. Again due to the lack of an encompassing directory recourse was 
made to the IDS data sets. Ackers et al. (1992: 278-279) have pointed to the use of 
participative structures generically in such service sector settings as tools towards 
employee involvement, often ensconced within schemes of `customer care'; such 
initiatives have been particularly prominent within the finance sector (cf. Cressey 
and Scott: 1992). Accordingly again drawing on the IDS data sets an approach was 
made to FinanceCo, a former building society that had recently undergone 
de- 
mutualisation into a fully fledged high street bank. Given the desire to explore 
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issues of causality beyond the framework of union evasion it could be argued on 
theoretical grounds that this organisation was a less than ideal candidate. Unusually 
within the service sector, financial services has a tradition of extensive trade union 
coverage, and this arena has likewise been the site of relatively recent trade union 
militancy (cf. Gall, 2001). There was an inherent risk that the study might simply 
again corroborate existing data sets and offer few novel insights, and as Eisenhardt 
(1989: 548) has agued, `theory building which simply replicates past theory is, at 
best, a modest contribution'. Put less prosaically: `it is, after all, not very creative 
to rediscover the wheel' (Coffey et al. 1996: 147). Given the assurances made by 
the head of group HR, however, regarding the quality of research access, such a 
potential hazard notwithstanding, a research protocol was submitted and agreed 
upon. 
The generation of theory from case studies is very much an iterative process; the 
potential flexibility of this particular methodology is beneficial in that it facilitates 
improvements to be made to the research design on an ongoing basis, and likewise 
allows the researcher to exploit alternative and potentially fruitful avenues of 
investigation. Commenting upon this theme Eisenhadt (1989: 539) acknowledges 
that `these adjustments allow the researcher to probe emergent themes or take 
advantage of special opportunities which may be present in a given situation'. 
Within this context other research openings were actively being pursued. Early on 
in the project contact had been made with FridgeCo, a manufacturer of both 
domestic and commercial refrigeration, and some time had been spent on the plant 
conducting preliminary investigations as to suitability. As will be discussed in 
chapter 3, however, the company was experiencing something of a financial crisis. 
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This meant that my presence coincided with a tense atmosphere and the invitee (the 
personnel manager), proved a somewhat reluctant host. Nevertheless, following the 
research periods at both MediCo and FinanceCo the potential importance and 
utility of this site was evident. The organisation had recently moved from a flow- 
line format to a total quality management (TQM) regime, complete with cellular 
production - in early talks the production director had hinted at the use of the 
representative body as a component of the wider TQM culture. In view of, by then, 
interesting emergent FinanceCo findings, further exploration of the use of NER 
structures towards proactive, as opposed to defensive, managerial goals appeared to 
be an avenue worth rigorously pursuing. Council minutes revealed that my original 
contact, the personnel manager, had moved on. Consequently an approach was 
made directly to the production director, the champion of the consultative process, 
for further research access. The request was granted and a series of further visits 
were arranged. This proved to be invaluable: access to both MediCo and FridgeCo 
facilitated the comparison of two NER structures operating within a manufacturing 
context - but as adjuncts to very different production regimes. The two settings 
juxtaposed allowed the further development and refinement of emergent ideas 
concerning the relationship between the managerial motivation underpinning NERs 
and the labour process variable3. 
The above rationalisation of research sites has focused largely on the theme of 
managerial motive. Nevertheless, the study protocol was developed similarly with 
one eye on the other principal theme of study - the efficacy of NER voice. Hence, 
the initial pairing of MediCo and FinanceCo was likewise chosen partly on the 
basis that preliminary contact with the organisations confirmed that the terms of 
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reference of the representative institutions were at variance. While within the 
former organisation the council was ostensibly involved in wage negotiation, 
within the latter competence extended no further than consultation. In an earlier 
meta-analysis Terry (1999: 24) had suggested that in such settings the distinction 
between consultation and negotiation needed to be `interpreted with considerable 
caution'. It was anticipated, therefore, that such a matched pairing would facilitate 
an evaluation of the extent to which the differences in nomenclature were actually 
translated into genuine differences in employee leverage. Likewise, within the 
context of voice the assimilation of FridgeCo into the research design was seen to 
add an important extra dimension to the project. The representative structures at 
both MediCo and FinanceCo were inserted into mature non-union settings; neither 
organisation had any prior history of trade union recognition. By way of contrast 
the FridgeCo company council had been expressly created following the de- 
recognition of the then AEU. This suggested two important research opportunities. 
Firstly, it was envisaged that the efficacy of non-union voice might be usefully 
benchmarked and mapped against the earlier union variant throwing into sharp 
relief any shortcomings, a tactic successfully, albeit implicitly, employed by 
another commentator (Lloyd, 2001). Furthermore, the study would facilitate some 
further exploration of the effect of residual de facto trade union linkages on 
efficacy, a theme similarly touched on in earlier studies. As will become evident in 
chapter 5, the legacy of trade union presence is of particular significance when the 
autonomy of these structures is considered. 
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In the final analysis it was deemed that three case studies provided the optimum 
balance in terms of potentially informative variables, set against the inevitably time 
consuming nature of this form of rich qualitative research. 
2.4 Analysis and Presentation of Findings 
Various references have been made above to Kathleen Eisenhardt's (1989) 
approach to inductive case study research. Thus, while the early stages of the 
research process conformed to Eisenhardt's prescriptive model involving the 
definition of broad research questions, rather than specification of hypotheses; 
theoretical rather than random sampling; multiple data collection methods and 
flexible and opportunistic data capture, Eisenhardt's model similarly informed 
elements of the later data analysis phase. The first step of this process was `within 
case analysis' (ibid: 540), i. e. the writing up of individual reports from the study 
sites. As Eisenhardt notes such practice both helps the researcher to prune an 
enormous volume of data and similarly `gives investigators a rich familiarity with 
each case which, in turn, accelerates cross case comparison' (ibid). This latter 
process involves the `iterative tabulation of evidence' (ibid: 533), a function neatly 
captured within Pierce's notion of `abduction' (cited in Coffey et al. 1996: 155- 
162). This is a form of data analysis that facilitates a more `dynamic interaction 
between data and theory' (ibid: 156) than orthodox approaches based upon either 
inductive or deductive logic. Thus, a principal element within this approach is that 
when an anomalous finding is encountered an attempt is made to account for it by 
relating it to broader concepts; consequently strange phenomena are not used only 
to disconfirm existing theories, as within an orthodox hypothetico-deductive 
methodology, but utilised to `come up with new configurations of ideas' (ibid). 
There is ultimately a `repeated interaction amongst existing ideas, former findings 
and observations, new observations and new ideas' (ibid). The discussions at the 
end of each of the two substantive chapters and the final conclusions forged are 
ultimately the result of this iterative endeavour. 
The substantive body of the thesis is presented as thematically based chapters 
rather than individual case studies. This affords both analytical and theoretical 
clarity and facilitates the systematic cross case tabulation of the various 
comparative issues raised. The two core chapters are introduced via a battery of 
pertinent research questions that are subsequently used to structure and frame the 
overall presentation. Having approached the subject of NERs from two 
thematically distinct directions, it is the job of the concluding chapter to lend 
holistic articulation to the study. This is achieved in two principal ways; firstly, the 
implicit linkages contained within the constituent discussions relating to 
managerial motive and the efficacy of voice are further teased out and made 
explicit. Secondly, the constituent discussions are linked to broader theoretical 
issues. 
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Notes 
1. As Friedman and McDaniel (1998: 115) observe `some stricter definitions of 
ethnography include only participant observation'. The delineation utilised here is 
based upon the above scholars' more embracing definition that includes `research 
based on direct field observation but excluding research based on only formal 
interviews or company records' (ibid). 
2. Eisenhardt (1989: 539) cautions that such alterations raise questions regarding the 
extent to which it is legitimate to alter data collection methods during a study. 
Eisenhardt, however, comes out in favour of such `controlled opportunism' within 
theory building research because `investigators are trying to understand each case 
individually and in as much depth as is feasible' (ibid: 539). 
3. This term is used here in a descriptive sense as shorthand for `the nature of the 
production/service regime'. By inference its subsequent usage within the thesis is 
divorced of the connotations associated with that body of work known as labour 
process theory, unless indicated otherwise. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THREE NON-UNION REPRESENTATIVE STRUCTURES IN THEIR 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
Some preliminary information regarding the study organisations was provided in 
the previous chapter. This chapter builds upon this and furnishes further contextual 
information, particularly pertinent to an appraisal of the managerial genesis and 
causation of these structures. 
Ambitious strides have been made over the years to link the management of the 
employment relationship to various contextual pressures e. g. the volatility of 
product markets; desire for price leadership; technology; extent of market 
dominance and degree of monopsony power (cf. for example, Arthur, 1992; 
Thomason, 1984; Thurley and Wood, 1983 and for a more sophisticated example 
of this genre Marchington, 1990). One corollary is that any credible account of the 
causation of corporate industrial relations institutions has to be informed by data 
relating to various environing factors or influences. Within this context it became 
evident during the field-work that two factors were inducing respectively `push' 
and `pull' effects on the managerial attitude to collective representation: externally 
derived business pressures, and a more endogenously derived set of influences 
relating to the nature of the labour process. Accordingly this framework shapes the 
configuration of much of this chapter in terms of the provision of contextual data. 
A note of caution needs to be inserted at this point. It should be stressed that the 
aim of the summary that follows, and the derivative chapter 4 analysis, is not to 
formally model the linkages between various structural determinants and the 
presence of non-union representation. The more modest intermediate goal is to 
explore the presence of these structures within the context of wider corporate 
strategy, i. e. to connect so-called `third order' choices (Colling and Clark, 
2002: 302) concerning the management of the employment relationship to broader 
business goals. So embedding the analysis firmly within corporate context is an 
important corrective; too often the purpose of such structures is couched in terms of 
`union avoidance' which is depicted as some `free floating' end state, with no 
attempt made to explore the contribution of such status to wider corporate 
strategies. The positioning of the contextual data is intended to facilitate a more 
nuanced understanding of the perceived complementaries between particular 
institutional preferences relating to voice, and wider managerial priorities. 
Following on from the more structurally orientated data, some rudimentary 
information is provided regarding corporate culture and the derived managerial 
style. Within Purcell's (1987: 549) terms, `style' may be broadly viewed as 
originating philosophies and policies that influence managerial actors. This 
synopsis serves two functions; firstly, it allows us to further shed light on the more 
subtle influences upon corporate HR policy beyond direct structural imperatives. 
Secondly, the summary is especially pertinent to chapter 5; as will become evident, 
corporate culture has important indirect ramifications for the autonomy of the 
representative bodies and hence the efficacy of the voice process. Additional to the 
above information, an outline of the individual council structures along with an 
account of their formal terms of reference is provided. This data forms an essential 
backdrop to the chapter 5 appraisal of employee voice. As much of this latter 
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discussion is given over to an exploration of the relevant institutions through the 
concepts of power and autonomy, the constitutional basis and formal remit of the 
institutions of necessity warrants close inspection. 
3.1 MediCo 
3.1.1 Contextual Data 
MediCo is a US headquartered company employing over 40,000 people in 100 
countries world wide, with a very strong European presence. Towards the corporate 
mission of providing `critical medical therapies for life threatening conditions', the 
company manufactures a range of products, most notably fluids and drugs to 
patients both within and outside the hospital environment. 
Within a UK context Medico supply over 7,500 medical products servicing almost 
every hospital in the country. In total around 1200 people are employed at three 
UK locations; the majority (600) being based at the study site - the UK production 
facility. The study plant, which opened in 1965, is a dedicated site for the 
manufacture of intravenous (IV) solutions. The saleable product consists of the 
actual IV solution (e. g. glucose, amino acids and salts) along with the relevant 
housing, generally plastic containers or bags. 
An overview of the industry suggests a market that is becoming increasingly 
competitive. Consolidation amongst competitors and reductions in margin driven 
by, what were described by one production manager as, `more financially aware' 
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health care service providers, have served to impinge upon corporate growth - 
especially at a European level. Under central budget setting these demands have 
created an imperative upon the plant to reduce costs annually by 5%. Regulatory 
shocks have in recent years additionally exacerbated the financial pressures faced 
particularly by UK operations. Prior to 1999 MediCo (UK) had a virtual monopoly 
on the supply of blood packs to the NHS for transfusion purposes. Following the 
CJD crisis it became necessary under revised legislation for the product to have a 
special integral filtration system inserted. Modification to the manufacturing 
system at MediCo (UK) was deemed too costly by European operations in view of 
spare capacity at other European sites. Production was accordingly transferred to 
continental Europe with the resultant loss of 68 jobs. This episode similarly 
highlights the adverse consequences that can follow corporate divestment 
decisions, pressures that in turn have given rise to intense competition between 
European satellite plants for the securing of inward investment. 
In terms of the status of the workforce the 600 MediCo workers may be sub- 
divided into two discrete groupings: euro grade (management and supervisory 
staff), and plant grade (manufacturing operatives); the majority (430) comprising 
the latter grouping, predominantly female (280). The collective body, the 
Employee Consultative Committee (ECC), represents only plant grade employees. 
Manufacturing operatives undertake a range of tasks including packing, warehouse 
work, cleaning and quality assurance, however, the vast majority are process 
workers. The mass of the MediCo output takes place on five ('viaflex') production 
lines involving a largely unskilled set of tasks. The finished product is a plastic bag 
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containing a solution (the ubiquitous hospital `drip') - more than 42,000 one-litre 
bags are filled every day. The central production task is clearly visible to the visitor 
and operatives average between 20 and 30 bags per minute (field notes), i. e. a cycle 
time of around three seconds. Notwithstanding the monotonous nature of the work, 
at the time of the research recruitment for such positions was unproblematic, not 
least due to the solid local reputation of the firm as a `good employer' (see below). 
In terms of the management of the employment relationship the pervasive, not to 
say intrusive, nature of the parental managerial style may be gleaned from the 
corporate intranet which outlines the organisation's `total compensation 
philosophy'; a philosophy that is unashamedly paternalistic demonstrating a wide 
array of welfare-based personnel policies - the touchstones of orthodox 
paternalism. 
The tendency for US multi-nationals (MNCs) to `diffuse' their overriding 
managerial philosophy and employment practices out to subsidiaries has been well 
documented (cf. Hamill, 1984; Edwards et al. 1999). The MediCo (UK) employee 
relations model accordingly exhibits a strong paternal-unitary ethos, tailored to the 
domestic legal and cultural framework. Accordingly while a familial culture is 
actively cultivated, the paternalism exhibited is less munificent and more subtly 
understated than the US variant. The core orthodox tenets of paternalism are 
nevertheless present with, for example, the company supporting both a pension and 
share ownership scheme for all employees. Within the context of the latter, 
employees receive a 15% discount off the market price of MediCo stock. Likewise, 
a production bonus is paid twice yearly to employees, the quantum being 
dependent upon `favourable variations to budget'. Dependent upon performance 
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the amounts can be significant; just prior to the research production workers were 
awarded an amount in excess of £600. Paternalism is likewise demonstrated in the 
guise of responsibility outside of the core employment relationship emphasising the 
parental nexus with medical and educational provision to the fore. All MediCo 
employees are given health screening with on-going checks on cholesterol level, 
lung function and eye tests; the provision of a full-time nurse is complemented by 
weekly visits from the company doctor. Such a paternalistic approach to the 
management of the employment relationship is classically treated as the visible 
manifestation of a unitary ideology (cff, for example Poole, 1978: 55); the related 
tendency for US companies to engage in `welfare capitalism' to specifically 
mediate union involvement has of course been well documented (cf. Jacoby, 1997 
and for a more critical account Edwards, 1979). The role that the representative 
body likewise plays within such a strategy of union avoidance is a key theme 
explored in chapter 4. 
3.1.2 The MediCo Employee Consultative Committee: Form and Function 
The origins of the Employee Consultative Committee (ECC) can be traced back to 
the early 1970s. Outlining the genesis of the body, the in-house journal candidly 
observes that the institution was `predominantly formed to appease pressures from 
the then Labour Government'. This is an oblique reference to the `Social Contract' 
legislation of this era that sought to regularise the trade union recognition 
procedure. Notwithstanding this hint that the institution was reactively formulated, 
the formal council constitution nevertheless positions a more benign proactive 
foundation: 
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The company has for many years recognised the importance of good 
communications between employees at all levels. It also recognises 
that this becomes more difficult as we move down the structure of 
the organisation. Additionally there is a belief that each employee 
has a right to be aware of the future plans and direction of the 
company and to be allowed to express an opinion on those decisions 
which have an impact on them and their working life. There will be 
many methods of providing the communication and one of these is 
the Employee Consultative Committee (ECC). 
In pursuance of the above goals, the constitution provides for the convening of a 
forum of 19 members comprising a chairman, vice chairman and 17 representatives 
from the employee side to represent `plant grade' personnel, i. e. process workers 
up to, but not including, supervisory level, along with 5 senior managers. 
Representatives are drawn from specific work areas, representation is thus 
functionally based. The rules provide for election by secret ballot with each 
candidate required to be both proposed and seconded; the period of tenure is 
formally designated as two years with candidates eligible for re-election. 
The constitution provides for representatives to be given reasonable time off for 
training to undertake their representative duties, which are detailed as 
encompassing both collective and individual dimensions. Accordingly the presence 
of representatives (if required) at disciplinary hearings is provided for. An 
addendum deals with the role of the ECC chairman; over and above his or her 
representative duties, the post is deemed to be one involving that of coordinating 
the body with weekly meetings scheduled with the personnel manager `to ensure a 
continuous dialogue over pertinent issues'. Facilities for the post include the use of 
an ECC office complete with computer and telephone. 
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It is important to note that the constitution, along with the relevant amendments, 
dates back to 1984, consequently - perhaps unsurprisingly - by the time of the 
research there had been considerable slippages from the above prescription. The 
number of representatives stood at six. While this was partly a reflection of a 
reduction in production workers during the intervening period, which the 
constitution had not been amended to reflect, it was largely a legacy of the last pay 
talks but one that gave rise to a series of resignations (discussed at length in 
chapters 4 and 5) - this had initially seen the number of delegates plummet to just 
three. Similarly, elections were largely uncontested and the provision relating to the 
need for re-election after two years service appeared to have fallen into disuse. 
With regard to the communication of outcomes, information relating to the content 
of meetings was fed back to constituents via the ECC notice board in the foyer of 
the plant. There was no direct systematic mechanism in place to facilitate contact 
between representatives and their constituents. 
The format of meetings had evolved into a tiered structure whereby twin 
departmental (fluids and support) meetings were held bi-monthly with plant level 
meetings convened quarterly. The remit of the former was more parochial 
involving issues such as working conditions, canteen and general production 
issues. The tendency was for senior production managers only to be present at the 
plant meetings, where the agenda was broader and more strategic in nature, 
focusing on areas including pay; manufacturing performance; plant financial 
performance, and future business objectives. Formal competence extended to 
consultation with regards to working conditions; holidays; hours of work; health 
and welfare; manpower policies and procedures, and education and training. 
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Somewhat anomalously, however, in view of both the title of the committee and 
the paternal managerial style, the body was additionally charged with the task of 
ostensibly negotiating the annual pay review. 
3.2 FinanceCo 
3.2.1 Contextual Data 
FinanceCo currently employs around 2,800 staff within its head office and network 
of 132 branches. Up until the 1980s the organisation fulfilled the role of a typical 
medium sized building society providing mortgages and a narrow range of savings 
and in-house investments. As with MediCo the onset of the 1990s betokened an 
increasingly inhospitable trading environment partly due to regulatory shocks. 
Such change facilitated the entrance of new players in the form of traditionally 
non-bank businesses such as Marks and Spencer and Tesco into the financial 
services arena. Likewise, technical change stimulated more cost effective customer 
delivery channels, notably telephone banking, which was exploited by a further 
influx of lean new entrants such as First Direct (Storey et al. 1998: 131). Largely in 
response to such pressures, in 1996 an amicable agreement was concluded whereby 
the then Society became a wholly owned subsidiary of a major Irish banking group 
- 'EireCo'. The move was seen as providing a much needed cash 
injection allowing 
the bank to refashion the delivery channels of its traditional product range. A call 
centre based operation offering a range of deposit and savings based accounts and 
employing 200 people was opened in 1999. Expansion continued with the purchase 
of a dot-com advisory company in 2000, offering advice and guidance on a range 
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of products, confirming the bank's belief in both a `bricks and clicks' strategy. The 
re-modelling of the company was given formal underpinning in mid-2001 when the 
bank, again following the wider sectoral trend, split into four autonomous business 
units: Consumer (the retail network), Secured Lending (mortgage processing) and 
two separate divisions dealing with internet banking and high net-worth client 
accounts. 
The subsequent move to de-mutualisation and the re-balancing of stakeholder 
interest, due to the consequent need to deliver shareholder value, served to 
reinforce the transition underway to greater commerciality and a more sales 
orientated market-driven culture. Perhaps inevitably the bank followed the wider 
sectoral trend towards a cost containment strategy focusing on the rationalisation of 
the retail network. As with all the major clearing banks, a branch closure 
programme was undertaken in the late 1990s in response to a profits squeeze across 
the industry as a whole; the cull took place in two phases involving the closure of 
29 sites. 
The realignment in corporate priorities has had a particular bearing upon branch 
employees. The role of the branch structure has undergone a marked 
transformation from a transaction based cash-in cash-out format, to a more sales 
driven orientation - symbolically captured with the re-titling of customer service 
assistants (CSAs) to customer service advisors. In recent years the required skill 
profile of such customer facing employees has altered immeasurably. The 
reduction in paper transactions, due in large part to the proliferation of the ATM 
network, has been offset numerically by the re-alignment of branches essentially 
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into finance shops. The traditional cashiering role is largely defunct, with the core 
activity becoming one of lead generation to the burgeoning cadre of regulated 
specialist sales professionals that proliferate at branch level. 
In terms of managerial style, the former FinanceCo Building Society is best viewed 
as an archetypal model of a finance centre business tradition that has been 
described as conservative, paternalistic, and bureaucratic (Cressey and Scott, 1992; 
Storey et al. 1998). Automatic cost of living and incremental pay increases based 
on length of service have been the norm buttressed by an array of welfare benefits, 
including final salary pension provision; generous sickness benefits; private 
medical cover, and a profit share and share purchase plan. It is clear, however, that 
competitive pressures and the need to move to a more performance orientated 
culture have triggered various changes. This has been manifest in the inculcation of 
an array of individually centred policies over and above orthodox paternalism, 
conforming to elements of Purcell and Sisson's (1983) `sophisticated' paternalist or 
human relations model. Such individually focussed practices have included internal 
training, promotion ladders, attitude surveys, and appraisal and assessment 
techniques. 
3.2.2 The FinanceCo Partners' Council: Form and Function 
The genesis of the partners' council (PC) may be traced back to 1992; the scheme 
was originally piloted in the south-west retail network and over the course of the 
next three years rolled out to the remainder of the organisation. Partners' councils 
are structured to mirror the overall corporate model; hence, in recent years there 
have been a number of modifications and refinements as the organisation has 
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conterminously rationalised certain areas of the business while expanding into 
growth sectors. 
The PC model now consists of six divisional councils, two being retail, the other 
four head office based. Each of the divisional councils consist of representatives 
who are elected for a period of two years. While elections are widely publicised by 
the internal communications department the reality is that most representatives 
stand unopposed. Nominees may be full or part-time employees and on a standard 
or temporary contract - there is seemingly no minimum qualification period. 
Although representatives ostensibly represent all non-executive grades (A to E), the 
practical reality is that senior managers (first line reports - grade A) see little need 
for collective representation. Hence, de facto the councils represent employees up 
to middle management (grade B) level. 
Representatives are allocated 10 hours per month to devote to PC business; there is, 
however, no formal monitoring of this. The constitution provides that the council 
members select a chair from amongst themselves and requires that a ballot be 
conducted with 75% participation. The research, nevertheless, suggests some 
slippage from the prescription with an absence of formal ballots. Corporate policy 
provides for PC meetings to be held every 4 to 8 weeks although the preferred 
frequency is monthly. In addition to the representatives and chair, a member of the 
HR team is present at meetings; this is an essential requirement due to the rolling 
HR policy review programme that dominates much of the council agenda (see 
below). Additionally guest speakers, e. g. members of the senior management team, 
address the councils on a regular basis. 
53 
Under the terms of the partners' council charter the competence of the body is 
expressly limited to consultation. An additional policy document released in 
October 2000 affords practical guidance on what the company will and will not 
consult on. Hence, strategic decision-making is deemed off limits. While the size of 
the annual pay award is likewise beyond the scope of the terms of reference, the 
document does nevertheless add the rider that `the executive/senior management 
will seek the views from staff as to how best to distribute the money and take 
account of this feedback in drawing up guidelines for managers'. Similarly, the 
`broad shape' of structural change is exclusively an executive decision with the 
qualification added that `advice and guidance will be sought from staff 
representatives on the resolution of detail and implementation issues'. The 
document expressly states that consultation will take place on health and safety 
issues, proposed changes to benefits and other local and organisation wide issues. 
The scope of consultation is, however, again potentially circumscribed by the 
caveat in the charter that the nature of employee involvement will depend upon 
both time scales for decision making and, `the degree to which confidentiality is an 
issue'. 
In practical terms while the remit of the institution is potentially wide, the councils 
have evolved over the years predominantly into HR policy review bodies. The total 
corporate portfolio of around 30 policies, from whistle blowing and criminal 
activities outside work, through to pensions and pay, is reviewed on an annual 
rotating basis by each of the councils, the whole process being co-ordinated 
centrally by group HR. The final ratification to HR policy is made at the group 
organisational development policy forum (GODPF). The body comprises senior 
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personnel from a range of functional areas as well as the divisional council chairs. 
Here the recommendations of the divisional PCs are considered. This heavy and 
detailed focus on all HR policy areas dictates that much of the PC agenda is of a 
fairly anodyne nature - nevertheless inevitably the issue of pay policy invokes 
strong feeling. 
Because the FinanceCo PC comprises a total of six divisional councils logistically 
within the given time frame it would not have been possible to interview a 
sufficient quantity of representatives from each body to yield reliable data sets. In 
consequence, a decision was made at the outset to focus predominantly on two 
councils, one retail (consumer-west), and the other head office based (professional 
services). The former comprises customer facing cashiers and sales staff, while the 
latter is a diverse mix of employees ranging from lawyers and IT specialists 
through to filing clerks. The key factor that favoured an evaluation of these bodies, 
over and above the other four contenders, was that they are the most mature of the 
group having survived recent re-structuring relatively unscathed. This facilitated 
the framing of questions in and around a wide range of issues. 
Given that the study seeks to focus on these divisional councils, both of which are 
distinct in a number of ways, there is a need to provide some additional information 
on both the composition of the bodies and to elucidate more fully on their 
organisational context. 
55 
The Retail Council 
The retail branch structure has undergone a series of transformations in recent 
years. This has most significantly entailed the separation of the in-house sales force 
into two distinct entities: the advice and guidance (A and G) and customer service 
(CS) teams. The CS component comprising the two lowest gradings (D and E), is 
made up of customer service advisors (CSAs) and their immediate report - the 
customer service manager (CSM). The role of CSAs has become increasingly 
commercially orientated as the company has sought to obtain greater fee income 
via cross selling to its customer base. Thus, a key task is that of increasingly 
generating `referrals' to the specialist A and G sales team (grade D) in areas such 
as pensions, mortgages and life assurance. In common with the industry in general, 
CS posts are predominantly female and there is a marked reliance on part-time 
employees, often returnees, to cover demand peaks. 
In total this council contains 13 representatives servicing 520 employees in 65 
branch locations. Representation is both geographically and functionally based, 
thus there are 10 CS representatives covering both the CSA and CSM population 
by region. The numerically smaller A and G team has two delegates and the 
remaining place is occupied by a representative for CS area management. 
A marked feature is the geographical dispersal of constituents. Contact between 
representatives and constituents is maintained largely via the corporate intranet. 
Representatives mail out details of council meetings e. g. minutes, proposed 
amendments to HR policy and requests for feedback, either to the branch CSM or a 
designated `Pal' - effectively the eyes and ears for the representative at branch 
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level. As noted, this body is actually one of two retail councils; a recent 
development has been the convening of an informal group whereby both the 
`consumer' bodies meet with members of the senior management team. This allows 
for serious matters of concern to be given further detailed consideration. 
The Head Office Council 
This body comprises employees who provide a range of shared services to the 
newly autonomous business units. Broadly these fall under the functional areas of 
IT, marketing, compliance, HR, training and branch control. This council may be 
contrasted with its retail counterpart in two respects; firstly, the constituency is 
densely located within the new corporate headquarters; secondly, constituency 
sizes are smaller. While typically a CS retail representative would be responsible 
for 50 employees this drops to around 28 within the head office council - at the 
time of the study there were 22 representatives for around 600 staff. As a result of 
the smaller constituency size there was no formal mechanism in place to facilitate 
contact between representatives and constituents, although in some instances team 
briefings had been utilised, with e-mail being popular. Due to the closer proximity 
of representatives to their constituency very often contact would be of an informal 
face-to-face nature. 
Similarly, in contrast to the retail council, the inclusively of this body is 
immediately apparent; the council represents employees throughout most of the 
corporate hierarchy from the lowest grade, E, through to B. Typically, therefore, a 
quorum would contain an eclectic occupational mix. While the retail 
representatives are clustered amongst the lower gradings and tend to be female - 
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often part-time - conversely within the head office body there is a more even 
hierarchical dispersal. One important aspect of the FinanceCo study is the more 
career driven nature of the head office environment: this distinction has clear 
implications for various outcomes of the representative process; more particularly 
the linkages to autonomy and competence are explored in chapter 5. 
3.3 FridgeCo 
3.3.1 Corporate Context 
FridgeCo manufacture a range of refrigeration products employing around 900 
workers at their south-coast plant from where appliances are designed, 
manufactured, marketed and sold. While both commercial and domestic products 
are assembled, the mainstay is the latter market. The majority of the combined 
workforce, some 700 employees, comprises semi and un-skilled production 
workers - predominantly male. In 1994 the firm was acquired by a Malaysian 
conglomerate. During the period of study a £40m programme of capital 
expenditure had recently been completed. This involved moving production from 
the old manufacturing facility to an adjacent site utilising `state of the art' 
manufacturing technology. The above cash injection notwithstanding it is 
important contextually to note that the research coincided with corporate fortunes 
being at their historical nadir. The electronic `white goods' market is notoriously 
competitive; the study organisation has traditionally operated within the bottom 
segment where competition is at its most intense, positioning itself as a `no frills' 
value for money brand. The retail sector for domestic appliances is dominated by a 
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small number of large players; indeed 80% of company output goes into just three 
retail groups. Given this degree of monopsony power, these retailers are able to 
exert immense pressure to drive factory gate prices down, effectively playing off 
one supplier against the other. Pressures have been compounded of late by a recent 
influx of imports. As the technology is predominately `low-tech', there are few 
barriers to entry and the strong pound had served to suck in goods from various low 
labour cost countries, manifest in a decline in UK market share from 16 to 8%. In 
consequence the company had been a loss maker for a number of years, resulting in 
both a wage freeze and 64 production workers being made redundant in 1999. 
As a direct result of the above pressures a decision had been made to equip the new 
factory with cellular production technology, replacing the traditional flow-line 
format. This was perceived as complementing a strategy where the focus would 
increasingly be on the more customised, as opposed to the `cut price', end of the 
market with the more flexible format facilitating smaller production runs. The 
move to cellular production, nested within a broader just-in-time production 
philosophy, was envisaged as additionally resulting in savings due to reduced stock 
holding and inventories. It was anticipated that this would aid the need for 
competitive pricing of the ongoing budget lines running concurrently to the new 
upmarket range. It is important to note, however, that the change in strategy was 
beset with an array of problems including increased `down-time' due to 
commissioning problems, and a poorly received new product launch. Consequently 
by the time of the research the company was continuing to lose money month-on- 
month, testing the patience of the parent company. 
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One important consequence of the move to cellular production was the introduction 
of team working. The precise specification of the latter was relatively modest in 
that there remained a separation of maintenance from production tasks, and there 
was no integration of craft expertise into the constituent teams. Nevertheless, multi- 
tasking and job rotation were evident. One implication of this was that greater 
demands were placed on production workers than had hitherto been the case under 
the previous flow-line format; not least because cycle times under the cellular 
regime had been extended to 120 seconds as compared to the previous 23 seconds 
per task. Similarly, production operatives under the new TQM regime were 
responsible for the intra-cellular inspection of work `delivered', as opposed to the 
previous more formalised mode of quality assurance. Hence, the demands of the 
production regime contrast markedly with that of the other manufacturing 
organisation under review: MediCo. 
Significantly, the accompanying introduction of shift work had led to an exodus of 
many long serving employees, replaced largely by temporary agency workers, 
mostly foreign. Indeed, at the time of the research, from a total of 700 production 
employees some 150 were temporary. As will be discussed in chapter 5, changes in 
workforce composition have had a variety of consequences, impacting not least 
upon managerial-representative power dynamics. 
Within the context of managerial style FridgeCo may again be contrasted with both 
MediCo and FinanceCo in that there was no historically derived cultural template 
from which a specific FridgeCo model of employee relations could be invoked by 
the management team. Immediately following the take-over by the Malaysian 
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conglomerate a new board had been appointed comprising three English functional 
directors responsible for production, finance and technical matters reporting into a 
Malaysian managing director. The MD was shared with another subsidiary with his 
presence limited to one brief visit of two days per month. While in all matters of 
finance the autonomy of the domestic management team was negligible, no attempt 
had been made to impose any sort of uniform ideology from above. Likewise, there 
was minimal interference with detailed HR policy provided it was conducted 
within the confines of the financial limitations imposed by the annual `management 
plan'. Consequently the overarching managerial `style' was brought to bear by the 
dominant personality on the board: the production director. The ideological outlook 
of this actor had been greatly influenced by his experience of the Japanese 
production model while on secondment to Honda from Rover in the early 1990s. 
The resultant style exhibited was consequently unitary in outlook with a heavy 
focus on informality - within the production areas there was an open 
door policy 
complemented by `shirt sleeves management' - buttressed by extensive 
communications. This much having been said, the other key managerial players, 
the finance director and personnel manager, were keen to imbue their own 
particular fiefdoms with a more `old school' formalised approach, making 
it more 
appropriate within this organisational context to talk in terms of managerial styles, 
rather than style. 
3.3.2 The FridgeCo Company Council: Form and Function 
An important contextual distinction between FridgeCo and the other study 
organisations is the previous history of trade union presence on the plant. 
Prior to 
1995 FridgeCo had a recognition agreement with the then AEU, covering terms 
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and conditions for all production workers up to and including supervisory level, 
with plant level bargaining taking place between management and senior shop 
stewards. Following the purchase of the company by the Malaysian parent, action 
was taken to swiftly withdraw from collective bargaining with the union's 15 shop 
stewards given three months notice of de-recognition. Shortly after the de- 
recognition a new company council was crafted largely by the production director 
with additional input provided by the then Industrial Society, the broad purpose of 
the body being to, 
give employees an opportunity to make a contribution towards decisions 
taken by management; particularly those decisions affecting the continuing 
viability of the company and hence the job security of all employees. 
(Council Constitution) 
Thus, on the employee side provision was made for the appointment of 15 
delegates based upon function up to, but not including, supervisory level with two 
seats reserved for non-production workers, i. e. clerical staff. Management 
representation was led by the production director acting as the formal chair of the 
committee; stipulation was likewise made for the presence of both the finance 
director and personnel manager, with the managing director's secretary attending in 
a minute taking capacity. The constitution provided for delegates to represent 
between 50 and 70 employees `subject to the practicalities of constituency 
formation'. The rules likewise allowed representatives to have up to eight hours of 
time off each month from their `normal jobs' (excluding attendance at council 
gatherings) to communicate with their constituents. In terms of tenure, the formal 
policy prescribed that delegates be elected by secret ballot on a simple majority 
basis with elections held annually. All representatives were required to have at least 
one year of service with no written disciplinary record. Meetings were scheduled 
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on a monthly basis with provision made for the convening of extraordinary 
gatherings; these have been called in the past, for example, to comply with the 
redundancy legislation. 
As within the other study organisations there has been an element of slippage as 
between actual practice and the prescribed formalities. By the commencement of 
research in 2000 three of the designated seats on the council had been vacant for 
some time, and likewise the tendency was for representatives to be `elected' 
unopposed - mirroring the position at both MediCo and FinanceCo. On the 
managerial side the finance director was characteristically absent, reflecting the 
positioning of the body increasingly as a conduit to the production side of 
operations (see below). More fundamentally, for employees the move to the new 
factory and the concomitant switch to cellular production from the previous flow- 
line format had not been reflected in the lay out of the constituencies that remained 
unamended. The previous production model based upon four production lines in no 
way accorded with the move to eight production cells. This, allied to the random 
dispersal of representatives throughout the new facility, dictated that the precise 
domain of delegates was somewhat haphazard. It was evident, likewise, that there 
was no formal mechanism in place to facilitate the feedback of council 
deliberations to the wider workforce. Representatives were further handicapped in 
that no resources (e. g. office and computer) were put at the disposal of the body. 
With regard to the formal powers of the council the constitution somewhat 
ambiguously provides that: 
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The function of the council shall be to discuss matters affecting the operating 
efficiency of the company, and matters affecting the interests of employees. 
The council shall, therefore, act as an advisory body. 
In effect the above provision has given rise to the formal competence of the 
institution extending into the broad terrain of consultation, but stopping well short 
of negotiation. Likewise, while the constitution provides that the chairman of the 
council has the discretionary power to ask for a vote to be taken on any subject 
under discussion, it is evident that no great significance can be attached to this in 
terms of any influence upon the decision making process. Constitutionally the 
formal scope of such discussions is, however, potentially wide and may include 
company performance, working conditions, training and development, and general 
conditions of employment and benefits. Nevertheless, for practical purposes the 
financial plight of the company, and the ongoing wage freeze, has ensured that in 
recent years the vast majority of council time has been taken up with issues in and 
around plant performance and pay, with other matters placed on the back burner. 
Given the numerical dominance of representatives from the factory side and the 
inherent focus on manufacturing themes, the committee has similarly evolved 
de facto into a forum for the playing out of issues in and around the production 
process. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of the above synopsis has been to provide the contextual foundations 
for the analytical body of the work that follows - the immediate task in chapter 4 
being an exploration of the managerial motive behind the presence of these non- 
union representative bodies. As will become evident, while it is not possible to 
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impute a uniform rationale, a coherent explanation is nevertheless possible; more 
specifically product market pressures and the nature of the production regime have 
had significant ramifications for managerial behaviour. Armed with some basic 
contextual data it is to this topic of causation that we now turn. 
65 
CHAPTER FOUR 
NON-UNION FORMS OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: 
AN EVALUATION OF MANAGERIAL MOTIVE 
The principal theme of this chapter relates to the managerial motivation and logic 
underpinning the introduction of NERs; this is a topic that has received scant 
attention even within the limited array of in-depth micro-level studies. In contrast 
to orthodox trade unionism, employee representation via the agency of these 
structures is generally initiated or suggested by management; the presence of NERs 
thus represents deliberate and purposeful managerial behaviour. So, why do 
management seek to utilise this mode of representation and what benefits do they 
seek? Furthermore, are the anticipated goals ultimately realised? 
As noted in the previous chapter, advances have been made in recent years in 
theorising the links between the management of the employment relationship and 
various contextual factors. Within the relevant literatures the core components of 
corporate industrial relations policy are thus related to broader business goals - but 
what in practice is the theoretical nexus specifically between NERs and wider 
corporate strategy? This question is similarly afforded attention within this chapter. 
A danger within this type of research is of slippage into a crude reification of the 
management function and an assumption of cross functional consistency. Hyman 
(1987: 30) usefully reminds us that management is itself, like labour, a collective 
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labour process and, therefore, `internal coherence cannot be assumed a priori'. On 
a similar theme, specifically within the context of employee participation, Brannen 
et al. (1976: 42) note that managerial philosophies or `frames of reference' tend to 
be congruent with particular structural positions giving rise to variations in 
emphasis. Narrowing the focus still further to consultative structures, Marchington 
(1994: 668) has similarly argued that: 
Some managers or functions may be keen on developing a particular vision 
of consultation, whereas others - by accident or design - may be pursuing 
goals which directly undermine this orientation. In short, a lack of 
omniscience, omnipotence and cohesiveness within management may lead 
to complex rationales and practices both between functions and different 
levels in the hierarchy. 
Is it, therefore, indeed possible to impute a consensus with regard to the managerial 
goals being pursued through these bodies, or is confusion and even contradiction 
the order of the day? Moreover, as highlighted by Glew et al. (1995: 404), 
employee participation must be regarded as a `process' rather than a `state'. Thus, 
while the goals of managerial actors may well be prioritised due to structural and/or 
hierarchical position, to what extent do they similarly evolve over time? This 
question is likewise considered. 
As suggested within the introductory chapter, NERs must also be located within a 
discussion of the erosion of voluntarism within the UK system of industrial 
relations. Over the last decade a range of provisions have served to 
juridify a 
system that was formerly marked by significant legal abstentionism. 
There is a 
burgeoning range of areas in which an employer is required to consult with 
employees, or their representative agents, regardless of trade union representation. 
What use, therefore, do management make of such institutions to discharge their 
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increasing burden under the relevant legislation? The study is similarly positioned 
to consider this issue. 
The chapter commences with a review of the literature germane to the topic. Here 
the major theoretical schools of thought pertinent to the managerial intentionality 
behind NERs are considered. Given the inadequate theoretical attention paid to 
non-union forms of representation by the academic community the discussion is 
informed by the wider literature on participation, in addition to the limited array of 
in-depth case studies specifically dealing with the NER phenomenon. The focus of 
these latter largely descriptive studies has generally been on worker outcomes and 
so they are again considered in the following chapter. Obliquely, however, these 
papers do provide some useful insights into managerial thinking which might be 
usefully abstracted for discussion. While the literature review serves to 
contextualise and locate the study, it similarly provides the intellectual 
underpinning for the presentation of the analytical framework that concludes the 
first section. 
The body of the chapter contains an evaluation of the managerial goals 
underpinning the presence of the representative structures in each of the three study 
organisations. As will become evident, this is not reducible to any single `grand' 
macro theory, but cuts across a range of motives - both defensive and more 
proactively formulated. In the final section the core themes of the discussion are 
reviewed and the rationale for both the variations and similarities in the managerial 
raison d 'etre are explored. 
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4.1 Insights from the Literature 
As noted, the extant literature dealing directly with non-union forms of 
representation remains relatively meagre. Nevertheless by initially expanding the 
analysis to the wider topic of employee participation it is possible to posit a range 
of theoretical orientations as potentially driving managerial interest in the `social 
technology' (Scholl, cited in Dachler and Wilpert, 1978: 2) that NERs represent. 
These theories, or `vocabularies of participation' (Brannen et al. 1976: 29), are 
derived from distinctly different value systems and may be bracketed under three 
headings: (i) a managerial approach which following Delmotte (cited in Bolle De 
Bal, 1992: 614) may be termed idyllic participation, (ii) a conflictual model, and 
(iii) a contingency approach'. 
4.1.1 Idyllic Participation 
This essentially managerialist perspective is awarded the above sobriquet because 
employee participation is treated as wholly benign and unproblematic from both a 
managerial and workforce stance. It is both a technique and an overarching 
managerial philosophy; positive-sum outcomes are envisaged as areas of common 
interest between employers and employee are highlighted. This position, to which 
much column space is devoted within both the academic and the more prescriptive 
management journals, draws its inspiration from the human relations school; the 
central postulate is that both management and worker interests are served through 
participation. As Dachler and Wilpert (1978: 8) observe, `increases in innovative 
behaviour and economic efficiency and productivity are seen as a correlate of 
individual and group development'. In a similar vein Argyris (1964) has argued 
that participation leads to greater self-actualisation and higher levels of 
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performance and hence the integration of individual and organisational needs. This 
intellectual tradition has spawned a mighty prescriptive literature replete with its 
own lexicon, subsequently resurrected under the participative management 
paradigm (cf. The Human Side of Enterprise, McGregor, 1960; New Patterns of 
Management, Likert, 1961; Integrating the Individual and Organization, Argyris, 
1964). From within this perspective participation is eulogised as a core component 
of a new theory of organisation and management; a panacea capable of correcting a 
variety of corporate dilemmas and difficulties that arise from the `debilitating 
effects of traditionally designed organisations' (Dachler and Wilpert, 1978: 7). 
Thus, for example, it has been argued that under the participation rubric: 
Decisions no longer emanate from a centralised authority that single 
handedly redresses balance among conflicting interests.... The repeated 
generation of decisions through structures of participation and interest 
representation reproduces the legitimacy of the system even for those 
stakeholders whose interests may have been circumstantially harmed by a 
given decision. (Chakravarthy, 1998: 443) 
Much space within the specialist management literature has been devoted to an 
evaluation of the various espoused outcomes of `theory Y' (McGregor, 1960) style 
management, including impacts upon employee performance, absenteeism, 
grievances and commitment (for useful meta-analyses: cf. Wagner and Gooding, 
1987; Spector, 1986). Latterly of course these broad ideas have undergone a further 
renaissance and refinement under the contemporary rubric of human resource 
management (HRM). Phrases such as `job enrichment' and `good communications' 
have become de rigueur amongst `forward-looking' organisations. 
In sum, all these subtle variations on a theme incorporate the common notion that 
the apparatus of participation, in its broadest sense, including job enrichment, 
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participative styles of management, work group re-organisation, improved 
communications and, more germanely, joint consultation, have the potential to 
deliver a range of both individual and organisationally benign benefits. 
Notwithstanding the presence of a vast body of work derived from within this 
paradigm there are crucial theoretical shortcomings inherent within the position. 
Firstly, participation is characteristically treated as a loosely specified concept 
within which a myriad of managerial interventions are collapsed. As Dachler and 
Wilpert (1978: 8) have argued, 
it has never been clear what characteristics participatory social 
arrangements have (or should have) according to theories of human growth 
and development. 
Such ambiguity clearly renders any empirical evaluation of espoused claims 
problematic. A more fundamental problem, however, lies in the uncritical 
acceptance of unitary theoretical presuppositions that underpin the idyllic 
orthodoxy -a position long since discarded as incongruent with organisational 
reality. Characteristically, with regard to the introduction of participative schemes, 
management is the primary actor with such initiatives implemented under the 
bidding of capital. Within the idyllic rubric, however, such phenomena are treated 
implicitly as non-aligned socially neutral interventions, the corollary being that 
participation is depicted as mutually advantageous, with attendant benefits 
accordingly accruing to both capital and labour. It is necessary merely to accept the 
truism that the employment relationship is at least partly distributive to expose 
fissures in such a position. By ignoring the potential for conflict within labour 
management relations, the idyllic position obscures the significant implications that 
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participation schemes may have, not simply for efficiency and productivity per se, 
but for the pattern of intra organisational social relations. This stance thus conceals 
the incorporative and manipulative functions that participation may potentially 
serve when imposed as a managerial tool. Grenier and Hogler (1991: 314) make the 
point well: 
The structure and power underlying participative processes is complex, 
ambiguous, and manipulable and far from bestowing meaningful authority 
on workers, such techniques may enable managers to maintain a 
relationship of dominance and control (emphasis added). 
This is not to suggest that participation cannot give rise to attendant benefits to 
both capital and labour in certain settings and instances. Indeed, a `hard' variant of 
the idyllic position is later introduced within the contingency approach, allowing 
for such an eventuality, but rather benign employee outcomes do not flow ipso 
facto from the very act of participation. 
4.1.2 The Conflictual Model 
Over the last 20 years or so a body of more critical work emanating from an 
industrial sociology perspective has emerged questioning the underlying unitary 
and positive-sum assumptions of the above paradigm. Within the context of direct 
participation this has typically been articulated under the rubric of labour process 
theory (cf. Rees, 1996: 19-22 for a concise meta-analysis). Indirect participation has 
attracted far less critical comment and this is largely associated with the work of 
Harvie Ramsay, whose `cycles' thesis (Ramsay, 1977) was heavily informed by 
observations relating to representative and consultative modes of participation. 
Ramsay's critique was founded upon Marxist premises about the nature of 
production relations in capitalist societies; thus in contradistinction to the unitary 
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assumptions underpinning the above managerially inspired literature, Ramsay takes 
as his point of departure the centrality of conflict and antagonism within the 
employment relationship. 
Ramsay's work represented a critique of the emergent `new era industrial relations 
thesis' that enjoyed a brief, but unfruitful vogue in the 1970s, whereby industrial 
democracy was viewed teleologically as a component of an evolutionary and 
deterministic process. Central to Ramsay's overtly historicist writings was the 
notion that management was most pre-disposed towards participatory mechanisms 
when its authority was under threat from below - the aim being `to nullify pressures 
to change the status quo' (ibid, 1977: 496). Managerial interest in participation was 
seen to be a function of historical conjunctures in the ongoing conflict between 
capital and labour giving rise to `clear waves or cycles of interest' 
(Ramsay, 1980: 50), in response to working class resistance; `interest' was seen to 
ebb once the managerial crisis had passed. For example, a discrete wave or cycle 
identified by Ramsay in his original 1977 paper was the mushrooming of joint 
consultative structures aimed at productivity improvements in the mid-to-late 
1960s. These structures were dismissed by Ramsay as an incorporative means of 
countering the growth in informal shopfloor power. The thrust of Ramsay's 
critique was that all modes of managerially inspired participation were manifestly 
tendentious creations, `presented as concessions by superordinates ... of some real 
degree of influence over decisions to those classed as subordinates' (Ramsay, 
1980: 46), the ultimate purpose being to incorporate the workforce through a 
system of `phantom participation', 
2 i. e. `a skilful con-trick' (ibid: 49) - or more 
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poetically - `honeyed flypaper dangled out to capture the unwitting worker' 
(Ramsay, 1993: 79). 
While highly influential, the cycles thesis is nevertheless readily vulnerable to 
assault at both an empirical and theoretical level. 3 The tone of the original paper is 
of data being used to illustrate theory rather than test propositions. Ultimately 
managerial motivation cannot be assumed or rejected on a priori philosophical 
grounds, but must be subjected to rigorous empirical analysis on a case-by-case 
basis. Ramsay's empirical reliance upon time series data to track the apparent 
`cycles', and secondary qualitative accounts, of varying rigour and merit, to impute 
a causal relationship is strongly suggestive of the former illustrative approach, 
undermining the validity of the conclusions reached. Indeed, in an overlooked 
passage Ramsay calls for further micro-level research to cast light upon a thesis 
that is ultimately conceded as being housed more within the realm of hypothesis 
4 than well grounded theory: 
It is important to recall that only secondary sources have been employed... 
Further research can greatly clarify the detailed processes at work, and so 
fill out the gaunt skeleton of analysis offered here. (Ramsay, 1977: 496 and 
498, emphasis added). 
Similarly in the manner that idyllic participation is based upon unitary premises 
about the nature of the employment relationship, and is subsequently blind to any 
manipulative possibilities, Ramsay's preoccupation with conflict results in an 
overly narrow focus on control issues. 
Ramsay's exposition has been subject to criticism; most notably by members of the 
UMIST industrial relations team (Ackers et al. 1992). Fundamentally Ramsay's 
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attempt to impose a panoramic theoretical order on the managerial interest in 
participation is seen to be undermined by the renaissance of participation from the 
1980s onwards, a period in which any `threat from below' is broadly viewed as 
having dissipated. 5 At a more refined level of analysis the `cycles' thesis is seen to 
oversimplify the employment relationship reducing it to one of an overriding desire 
by management to control workers more effectively. Drawing on work by Kelly 
(1985), Ackers et al. (1992: 270) argue for the need to shift the focus from labour 
control per se to the full circuit of capital which will `allow other business 
considerations such as product and labour market pressures a say of their own in 
the development of management strategy' -a theme developed in this chapter. As 
Nichols (cited in Hyman, 1987: 34) has argued, `the surplus value producing 
process cannot be reduced to the labour practices of management and the 
immediate issue of control of labour power'. Further developing this point, Ackers 
et al. (1992: 273) caution that Ramsay's position `neglects the fact that labour 
resistance may be a negligible or constant factor while other external pressures - 
from technology [and] the product and labour market.. . may persuade management 
to experiment with (or abandon) participation'. It is thus argued that `cycles' is 
4 
resolutely industrial relations centred' (ibid), and hence of partial explanatory 
value. 
Notwithstanding the vociferous nature of above critique, it would be wrong to 
suggest that the kernel of Ramsay's exposition is flawed in all cases. Indeed, as 
will be demonstrated, the introduction, or subsequent re-invigoration of 
participatory structures, may be tendentiously stimulated by a perceived external 
threat to managerial hegemony and prerogatives. As Ackers et al. (ibid: 274) argue, 
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ultimately Ramsay's account is simply `too narrow and partisan to serve as a 
useful general test for participation' (emphasis added). 
4.1.3 Contingency Approach 
The above literatures represent competing conceptions of participation. They are 
based upon highly partisan frames of reference invoking the notion that managerial 
intent is based upon either progressive or reactive and defensive goals; hence it is 
contested that such a polarisation lacks the sensitivity to dissect the complexities of 
contemporary managerial intent. Moving the discussion forward, a more subtle 
formulation has been afforded by the UMIST team, elements of which have been 
alluded to above (cf. Ackers et al. 1992; Marchington et al. 1992). In an in-depth 
study of 25 separate organisations, two possessing NERs, the indeterminate nature 
of the functionality of participative structures is stressed, with managerial motive 
posited as a matter for empirical enquiry, rather than a priori meta-theoretical 
assumption. From within their resultant `explanatory matrix' (Ackers et al. 
1992: 268), it is possible to abstract two dominant drivers behind participatory 
mechanisms. The first encapsulates elements of Ramsay's position, fulfilling his 
zero-sum expectations; participation is `industrial relations' (ibid: 277) centred, 
aimed at incorporating or bypassing unions, the underlying rationale being 
concerned with control issues. Alternatively the importance of `market 
participation' (ibid: 278) is stressed where `economic pressures other than 
labour 
control and union avoidance considerations motivate participation' 
(ibid). In these 
settings influences such as the need for customer care in the service sector, or 
labour market problems (e. g. recruitment and retention), are viewed as pre- 
eminent. Here labour and product market pressures `impact upon the 
human 
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resource problem without having to pass through the distorting lens of industrial 
relations problems' (ibid: 278) - the goals are hence more apolitical. 6 
The UMIST team go on to describe specific scenarios in which participation is 
assumed by management to yield tangible benefits, shedding light on the logic of 
the latter approach. The environments depicted coalesce around areas in which the 
quality and efficiency of production is dependent markedly upon the constructive 
initiative, commitment and support of employees. This is captured, for example, in 
the above references to `customer care' within the service sector. Ackers et al. 
(ibid) likewise provide the example of the invocation of a quality culture within a 
broader TQM manufacturing environment. Similarly, in such settings participation 
is viewed as an adjunct to loyalty and hence employee retention, facets that are 
again viewed as contributing to effective production or service delivery. 
A feature of this position is that production and efficiency benefits are correlated 
inter alia with greater employee involvement. In this sense market participation 
may be viewed as a `hard' variant of the idyllic position outlined above. Hard in 
the sense that while employee participation may deliver concomitant employee 
benefits, e. g. in the form employee satisfaction and retention, giving rise to 
positive-sum outcomes, such interventions are philosophically far from neutral. 
Any attendant employee benefits are ultimately epiphenomenal, as Ackers et al. 
(ibid: 278) note: 
The focus is openly on customer service or quality, and involvement and 
communications is a nakedly functional means to this end. 
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This contrasts with the inherent presuppositions of the `softer' variant where 
positive-sum outcomes are viewed as necessarily a correlate of wider 
organisational benefits. 
The above position, implicitly drawing its analytical inspiration from contingency 
theory, represents a useful counter to the `grand theory' catalogued earlier. It 
complements a growing body of literature suggesting that management is a 
strategic actor synchronising HR policies to wider business goals (cf. Kochan, 
1984: Arthur, 1992), although the extent to which such adjustments are genuinely 
strategic rather than tactical remains controversial (cf. Purcell, 1987; Purcell and 
Sisson, 1983). 
A further advance over the `cycles' model is that Ramsay served to conflate a range 
of techniques falling under the participation rubric (Ackers et al. 1992: 27 1); an 
NER is clearly a very different beast to an employee suggestion scheme. While 
Ramsay was engaged in a search for a broad macro-level `grand theory' of 
participation the UMIST team place the emphasis `on micro-level complexity' 
(ibid: 281). This facilitates some considerable untangling of both the participation 
construct and the managerial motivation behind specific techniques, such as NERs. 
It is noteworthy that within the settings presented the use of indirect participation in 
non-union organisations is restricted to situations where management is seeking to 
forestall the advent or return of union organisation; the bodies are, therefore, styled 
as surrogates for union based recognition (ibid: 278). Although the authors caution 
that `union weakening or avoidance should not be assumed a priori to be 
management's main motive' (ibid: 278), no direct evidence is offered of NERs 
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being utilised within a strategy of `market participation'. The application of such a 
strategy is nevertheless a core theme developed in this chapter which similarly 
adopts a contingency approach. 
4.1.4 Single Case Studies. 
Only a handful of scholars have embarked upon studies in which non-union 
representative structures have been the focal point of discussion. Within such 
research, self-evidently the questions that are asked about NERs and the answers 
sought, are shaped by the research agenda and the theoretical framework being 
utilised. Although these frameworks are not explicitly stated, the dominant position 
is broadly that which might be termed organisational democracy - the rights of 
employees to have some say in their working lives; the focus is, therefore, upon 
such structures as a means of advancing employee interests. Working out of this 
paradigm the thrust of the studies is inevitably on the comparative utility of NERs 
benchmarked against orthodox trade union representation. In view of the emphasis 
on worker outcomes the studies broach the issue of managerial motive from a 
somewhat tangential stance. Nevertheless, for the most part the studies are 
informative on the benefits sought and usefully build upon the insights of the more 
generic literature discussed above. 
Approaching NERs from the standard position, the concern of Lloyd (2001) was 
the extent to which the company council at `Aeroparts' -a manufacturer of civil 
aerospace systems - served to moderate the demand for union representation in a 
post de-recognition situation. Given the focus of the research, quite legitimately the 
discussion is framed within the theme of trade union mobilisation and the extent to 
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which the lack of effective non-union voice may act as a potential `trigger' to 
unionisation. Despite the conventional focus, the author traces the natural history of 
the representative institution in sufficient detail to afford a fairly concise evaluation 
of managerial intent. The body was created directly following the de-recognition of 
the incumbent unions - the then AEEU and MSF, the author therefore positions this 
firmly as part of a `union substitution approach' (ibid: 318), the overriding aim 
being to pre-empt the return of union organisation. This scenario is clearly 
`industrial relations' centred with control issues in and around job demarcation, job 
specification and overtime (ibid: 319) offered by management as rationales for the 
creation of the council. Interestingly the employee mix comprised a range of skilled 
workers including engineers, technicians and electricians within an apparently tight 
labour market; although managers cited a greater identification with the business 
(ibid: 319) flowing from the presence of the council, hinting at elements of `market 
participation' (e. g. plausibly as an adjunct to employee retention), this point is not 
developed. 
Recognising a lacuna in current research Gollan's (2001) study of Eurotunnnel 
`attempts to fill the gap... by raising a number of research questions', including: 
`why do non-union organisations choose NERs as [a] human resource management 
strategy', and relatedly: `what factors do organisations consider when choosing the 
type of NER strategy' (ibid: 377). The introduction is hence suggestive of a 
welcome re-balancing of academic interest. Notwithstanding the research aims, any 
rigorous attention to managerial motive evaporates beyond the preamble and the 
case study is largely devoid of any such analysis - all the more disappointing given 
the emphasis placed above on management strategy. Although some useful 
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theoretical ideas are explored (see below), the exposition is again essentially an 
account of the perceived effectiveness of the institution from an employee 
perspective with orthodox trade unionism positioned as the comparator, and 
preferred employee alternative. Nevertheless, the author does ultimately conclude 
that the company council represented a component of a union substitution strategy, 
however, there is an absence of data or analysis in the body of the report relating to 
the managerial position, and the reader is left to speculate as to the commercial 
advantage(s) sought. 
Geoffrey Broad's (1994) longitudinal study of an NER in a Japanese transplant 
('DenkiCo'), is likewise discussed with reference to the trade union problematic; in 
this instance the prognosis for union influence in an era where managerially 
imposed channels of communication and grievance handling are increasingly 
prevalent. There is an element of normative determinism as Broad traces the 
dynamics of consultation up to, and beyond, a union recognition watershed. The 
body is seen to metamorphose through a number of transient stages with trade 
union substitution, integration (combined trade union negotiation and consultation) 
and separation (consultation as a complement to collective bargaining) formats 
observed. 
Usefully the author highlights a difference in emphasis as between the core 
managerial factions. As indicated, Broad initially conceptualises the institution as a 
crude union substitute to precis the original managerial motivation. Hence, it is 
noted that British managers believed that the company council was the best option 
towards the forestalling of union recognition, especially in the face of overtures 
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that were increasingly being made by the `militant TGWU' (Broad, 1994: 30). 
More subtly, however, it is argued that `the overtly human relations component of 
employee consultation in DenkiCo screened the intention to use participative 
management techniques as a mechanism to achieve long terms gains in worker 
flexibility, high productivity and quality' (ibid: 27). Hence, `for Japanese 
strategists, the company council was principally an `educational vehicle', directed 
towards the structuring of employee attitudes' (ibid, emphasis added). 
This study may usefully be distinguished from the work of Lloyd and Gollan. In 
these latter studies the councils were positioned as direct union surrogates with the 
bodies ostensibly taking on functions such as wage negotiation. Within DenkiCo 
the initial role was not in any way to mimic trade union representation - the main 
constitutional aim was fundamentally integrational: `to exchange opinions of 
common interest' (Broad, 1994: 31, emphasis added), with the terms and conditions 
of employment likewise being unilaterally imposed. Ultimately, for Japanese 
managers the goals related to the engineering of a unitary ethos. As Broad (ibid: 
27) observes: 
Inspired mainly by Japanese senior staff a company council was set up in 
DenkiCo to provide a mechanism to rationalise the information and 
communication system directed towards the achievement of a `consensus 
culture'. 
It is of note that all the above commentators describe the strategies documented as 
`union substitution' (Broad, 1994: 36; Gollan, 2001: 339; Lloyd, 2001: 318) and, 
therefore, collectively conflate quite different phenomena, resulting in a degree of 
conceptual confusion. In the latter two instances the term is used accurately, given 
that the managerial aim is to simulate pluralist industrial relations and the 
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collective bargaining format - albeit decisively on management's own terms. The 
first instance, however, is manifestly inspired by unitary organisational goals. The 
purpose is not to de-activate any employee demand for independent external 
representation through the trappings of pluralist architecture; quite the contrary, the 
aim is to eschew the very notion of a legitimate divergent set of interests. Two core 
features of this model may be isolated. Firstly, the actual level of employee 
participation is of a very limited kind; heavy emphasis is placed on top-down 
communications as a means of avoiding misconceptions and explaining the 
cogency of managerial action. Secondly, given the desire to promote a culture of 
harmony and co-operation, the agenda of any discussions is deliberately steered 
away from serious matters of a distributive nature. The resultant outcome is an 
integrative format that seeks to neutralise the notion of organisational pluralism. 
Rather than substitution, this might more accurately be styled union evasion 
through employee `acculturation' (Bolle De Bal, 1992: 613), the managerial aim 
being the integration of the workforce into an enterprise culture; i. e. `the 
internalisation of the organisation's objectives at the individual level' (ibid). Such a 
broad distinction is similarly grasped by Gollan (2001: 382-383): 
One notion of a `substitute' is that it serves in place of a union. It assumes 
employers create an alternative form of representation which employees 
will prefer to `union' forms of representation. Alternatively, an entirely 
different notion is that alternative forms of employee representation make 
traditional union structures unnecessary, in the sense that they transform the 
employment relationship, with other high commitment practices, into a 
mutually productive relationship ... 
This notion is based on the premise that 
employees do not desire or need a protective agency through traditional 
bargaining per se (since this emphasises the adversarial distributive element 
of the employment relationship) because their basic interests are satisfied. 
In this approach the purpose of NERs is to encourage and foster an 
alignment of interests between employer and employees (emphasis added). 
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Watling and Snook's (2001) study of 'SAGCo', another Japanese transplant, 
manufacturing a range of automotive components, is of note in that managerial 
motive is placed centre stage: `the authors' primary data was intended to 
investigate if the management of SAGCo had intentionally or otherwise used the 
EC [employee works council] to promote the managerial agenda' (ibid: 2, emphasis 
added). Unfortunately the nature of this agenda is not specifically stated, but the 
eschewal of union influence is an implicit goal; the employee works council being 
created following the de-recognition of the incumbent union that itself followed an 
acrimonious pay dispute. 
The evidence presented is strongly suggestive of the body acting at the level of a 
sophisticated union substitute with many of the attendant trappings of pluralist 
collective bargaining in place. Thus, the council's competence extended to the 
negotiation of terms and conditions with the authors' noting of the constitution that 
it was `worthy of any recognition agreement of the time' (ibid: 6), with provision 
made for the ultimate referral of disputes to ACAS for conciliation and mediation. 
At the apex of the body's fortunes a3 -8% pay increase is secured and similarly the 
agenda is extended to include broader issues such as the company's trading 
position. The authors go on to argue that: `there appeared to be a genuine attempt 
by senior management to operate in a `partnership' with the EC' (ibid: 9). 
Ultimately, however, trading difficulties result in both a pay freeze and 
redundancies; events that betoken the demise of the institution, management 
ultimately proactively instigating a single union agreement `under the shadow of 
the law' (ibid: 10), in Autumn 2000. In sum, the SAGCo study appears to afford 
another example of a substitution model, albeit one additionally suffused with 
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elements of acculturation, manifest in a managerial desire to educate 
representatives regarding market imperatives. 
For the purpose of completeness it should be noted that in addition to the above 
papers there are a variety of more sketchy and predominantly factual accounts 
available dealing with NERs, including the IDS series of studies (1989; 1994; 
1999); Beaumont, (1987) and McLoughlin and Gourlay (1994). While their cursory 
treatment of motive does not warrant any detailed individual exposition, in a meta- 
analysis Terry (1999) points to a useful correlate, it being observed that the firms 
are characteristic in terms of size and activity of the unionised sector and that this 
inevitably `invites the argument that these company factory councils constitute 
explicitly or implicitly elements of union avoidance strategies' (ibid: ). 7 Relating 
this back to Ackers et al 's. (1992) modelling of `industrial relations' and `market 
participation', Terry's analysis hence supports the former position as the core 
managerial driver. 
4.1.5 Literature Review - Summary 
Before moving on, a brief recapitulation of the core analytical themes abstracted 
from the literature might be usefully employed as this will shape elements of the 
discussion that are to follow. Drawing on the wider generic literature on 
participation three broad managerial positions were identified. Of these idyllic 
participation in its `soft' form, as depicted in much of the management literature, 
was dismissed as incongruous with organisational reality, given its positioning of 
managerially imposed participatory structures as somewhat benign neutral 
interventions. From a very different intellectual paradigm the conflictual model 
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derived from Ramsay's work was depicted as an advance, given that it served to re- 
centre the inherent tensions within the employment relationship. Nevertheless, it 
was again seen to be a highly partisan frame of reference invoking the notion that 
managerial intent is based upon wholly reactive and defensive goals. The essential 
problem with this account is not so much that it is wrong tout court, but rather 
given that it is an attempt to impose a panoramic theoretical consensus on 
managerial thinking, it ultimately lacks the refinement to penetrate the complexities 
of contemporary managerial intent. 
The contingency perspective of Ackers et al. (1992) was offered as an advance on 
such cumbersome `grand theory'. Founded implicitly upon the pluralist assumption 
that the employment relationship is built around conflictual and interdependent 
interests, this position was seen to demand an acceptance of the essentially 
indeterminate nature of the functionality of participatory structures - including 
NERs. It was further argued that any comprehension of industrial relations 
practices requires an understanding of business strategy and the links between 
strategy and IR policy. 
Drawing on the data and analysis of the UMIST team it was possible to abstract 
two key drivers behind employee participation generically. The first of these was 
termed an `industrial relations' centred approach, with goals coalescing around 
control issues; specifically the amelioration or continued subjugation of shopfloor 
power as a means of more effectively regulating and channelling employee 
demands. Conversely, the importance of `market participation' was noted in 
situations where; (a) trade union issues are not a consideration and; (b) where 
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product and labour market pressures, such as the need for customer focus or 
retention of staff, are key considerations. It was noted that this mode of 
participation affords the potential for beneficial employee outcomes, although any 
attendant workforce benefits are subordinate to business goals. It was thus 
suggested that this could be further conceived as a hard variant of the idyllic format 
discussed earlier. This framework provided a rudimentary theoretical canvas for 
dealing with the more focussed descriptive case study data that in turn facilitated 
further refinements of our understanding. While generally this body of work has 
been primarily concerned with employee outcomes, the issue of managerial 
motivation could nevertheless be firmly tracked to industrial relations centred 
participation - i. e. union avoidance. Within these studies a subtle bifurcation in 
strategy was highlighted, however. Although commentators described the 
phenomena in blanket-like terms as `union substitution'; this was deemed to be an 
acceptable interpretation only in those situations where NERs mimicked orthodox 
pluralist trade union representation, i. e. those studies where the bodies purportedly 
engaged in negotiation or consultation over issues distributive in nature - in essence 
terms and conditions of employment. A quite distinct, crudely unitary phenomenon 
identified was one in which NERs are used as an attempt to structure employee 
attitudes and so foster an alignment of interests. Within this format an emphasis 
was placed on both employee `education' and integrational (positive-sum), rather 
than distributional (zero-sum) issues, this was styled `evasion through 
acculturation'. 
It is, therefore, possible from the detailed case study literature to sub-divide 
industrial relations participation into the above two broad categories of union 
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substitution, and evasion through employee acculturation. Similarly, drawing 
further on the work of the UMIST team one can - given a suitable context - 
hypothesise via extrapolation a third potential NER variant aimed at `market 
participation', i. e. goals other than those relating to labour control and union issues. 
Ultimately, therefore, from within the extant literature we can locate three broad 
managerial goals as potentially underpinning the presence of NERs: trade union 
substitution, trade union evasion through acculturation and conversely market 
participation. Two are industrial relations centred - the other is derived from 
beyond this frame. 
4.2 Analytical Framework 
It is evident from aspects of the literature review that the concept of contingency 
affords the potential for an empirically driven inquiry into the causation of NER 
structures. In order to subject this contention to a critical examination, however, it 
is necessary to apply some additional theoretical architecture. If the notion of 
contingency is to be usefully developed beyond a narrow appraisal of each 
organisational setting sui generis, an attempt must be made to explore the presence 
of these structures through a generically applicable set of core contingencies. 
It will be recalled from chapter 3 that the goal of the foregoing analysis is not to 
formally model the linkages between various structural determinants and the 
presence of non-union representation, but rather to explore the nexus to wider 
corporate strategy, i. e. the aim is to track the perceived complementaries between 
institutional preference and wider business priorities. With regard to industrial 
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relations participation one way of approaching the issue is to consider the outcomes 
that management might seek from non-union status through the lens of the alleged 
disadvantages of trade union representation, and then systematically track 
managerial concerns regarding such issues across the three case study 
organisations. Following Freeman and Medoff's (1984) modelling of the purported 
`monopoly face' of trade unionism two main causal processes are suggested. The 
first element is the notion that unions have a monopoly power which allows them 
to raise wage levels and, therefore, production costs at the expense of above normal 
profit or rent. Hence, within the US the union impact on wage levels is one of the 
most cited managerial dissatisfactions (Kochan et al. 1986). An alternative but 
compatible interpretation is that as monopoly institutions unions can enforce 
contract provisions that place restrictions on tasks performed mediating 
organisational change and flexibility, lowering the productivity of labour and 
capital (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Within a UK context the presence of such a 
managerial perception has been lent significant empirical support by Toner (cited 
in Flood and Toner, 1997). 
Goals in and around the desire for market participation have less well enunciated 
theory to call upon. It follows from the earlier summary, however, that the logic of 
this mode of participation would appear to derive from what Maclnnes (1985: 107) 
terms `the open endedness of the labour contract', and the concomitant need to 
engage employee and harness the `tacit skills' (Marchington, 1990: 12) of the 
workforce. As MacInnes (1985: 107) has observed: 
The transformation of the letter of the employment contract into the reality of 
efficient productivity depends on management securing the co-operation of 
the workforce and establishing the legitimacy of control in their eyes. 
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This is likely to be particularly important in instances where management cannot 
rely upon hierarchical control alone to deliver efficient production or service 
delivery. That is, situations where there is a need to generate employee `buy-in' or 
consent to managerial authority, particularly acute within the types of context 
described by Ackers and his colleagues where there is a focus on `quality' aspects 
of both production and service. Similarly within the locations depicted, the UMIST 
team refer to the ongoing need to retain employees, given that high levels of 
turnover impose a transaction cost impacting upon the efficiency of production/ 
service delivery. 
These arguments taken together would imply that the key referents here are the 
nature of the production/service regime and labour market considerations. The need 
for more than merely compliant behaviour in certain settings may impose a 
perceived need for a collective body, not least via the legitimacy afforded to 
decisions arrived at via consensus. Similarly the ability of indirect modes of voice 
to mediate employee `quits' or `exit' has been afforded coverage by Freeman 
(1990). This suggests that a theoretical strategy that directs our attention to both 
labour market and labour process 8 considerations might be usefully employed here. 
Although the above represent the core themes of the discussion a further influence 
that warrants exploration is the legislative dimension. Given the burgeoning range 
of areas in which both union and non-union organisations are required to consult 
with employees, most notably the redundancy provisions, it is plausible to suggest 
that this regulation affords an additional stimulant for the ongoing managerial 
support for such standing consultative bodies. Of course, in such instances the need 
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for consultation is imposed de jure. It could be argued, therefore, that the 
legislation represents an environmental `given', rather than a true contingency 
differentially shaping managerial behaviour. It is contested, however, that this is a 
pertinent area of inquiry as management may choose to utilise the standing 
consultative body, or convene an ad hoc vehicle, hence an element of managerial 
agency is operative under the provisions of the legislation. The case study 
companies have all experienced recent redundancy episodes and adopted the 
former stance. An interesting question, therefore, relates to whether the use of a 
permanent consultative body in such instances additionally connects with the broad 
goals reviewed above, for instance via the legitimacy afforded via the scrutiny of a 
standing body - this issue is additionally considered. 
Having reviewed the relevant literature and summarised the means by which the 
empirical data will be organised we finally turn to the task of evaluating the 
managerial intent in each of the three organisations. Initially the theme of union 
avoidance is afforded coverage. Firstly, the centrality of union evasion as a 
substantive managerial goal is evaluated. Drawing on elements of the above 
analytical framework we then return to the theme of contingency and explore the 
broader business goals that might inform managerial thinking focussing in 
particular upon issues appertaining to organisational change, 
flexibility, and wage 
control. To complete our analysis given that union avoidance through 
NERs was 
depicted as potentially being pursued via two principal routes, i. e. union 
substitution and employee acculturation, the orientation of the constituent councils 
within this dichotomy towards any strategy of union avoidance 
is explored. Within 
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the latter part of the chapter we again return to themes relating to market 
participation and the dynamic legislative context. 
4.3 Union Avoidance 
4.3.1 MediCo 
Chapter 3 outlined the organisational context of MediCo in some detail; more 
particularly the nature of the production regime was highlighted. It was observed 
that the representative body (the ECC) has jurisdiction over only plant grade 
workers - the majority of whom work on five (viaflex) production lines. Attention 
was given to the economic environment. As discussed, cost pressures and 
regulatory demands have impinged upon plant performance in recent years. Intra- 
organisational business rivalry was also seen to be intense, with European plants 
effectively competing with each other for corporate investment - and ever fearful of 
divestment. Corporate culture was likewise explored; this was seen to be suffused 
with a strong element of paternalism imbued from the US parent -a practice that 
typically seeks to increase the discretion of the employer (Morris and Smyth, 
(1994). Similarly in chapter 2, at a more generic level, reference was made to the 
well documented loathing of US MNCs to enter into trade union recognition 
agreements within their UK subsidiaries. 
Drawing on the earlier discussions the above conjuncture of factors is 
suggestive prima facie of an industrial relations functionality; the institutional 
presence of the NER being driven by issues of control - the subjugation of potential 
shopfloor power through a strategy of union avoidance. Indeed, a cursory 
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examination of the genesis of the body reveals a manifestly defensively orientated 
lineage. As observed in chapter 3, the origins of the ECC may be traced back to the 
early 1970s and the introduction of the `Social Contract' legislation of this era that 
sought to regularise the trade union recognition procedure. Under the revised 
legislation a union with substantial support in a workplace might obtain the right to 
recognition via a procedure operated through ACAS (Deakin and Morris, 2001: 32). 
This was of course simultaneously the historical zenith of trade union fortunes 
within the UK, and this period likewise witnessed the only major trade union 
recruitment drive on the plant, the details of which were ensconced in corporate 
folklore. The following account was a fairly standard offering: 
I wasn't actually here at the time but my Dad was. One pay deal many years 
back the shopfloor turned around and said: `no, sorry, we are not going to 
buy this', and they said somebody, I don't know who it was, called the 
union reps and they stood at the top of the road dishing out leaflets. That 
year they got the biggest rise they ever had. (Warehouse operative) 
In view of the above constellation of factors, the inception of the ECC may with 
some confidence be tracked to a solidly founded Ramsayesque logic, i. e. a desire to 
maintain managerial prerogatives in the face of a perceived threat to managerial 
hegemony, such pressures emanating from an increasingly hostile outside industrial 
relations climate juxtaposed against a legislative shock. 
Nearly thirty years on the domestic management remained strongly anti-union and 
nervous at the thought of union encroachment, notwithstanding the absence of any 
apparent immediate challenge. As firmly noted by the plant manager, an American 
expatriate: `one of the things MediCo want to do is maintain a union free 
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environment'. Such opposition was likewise detected by employees as 
demonstrated by the following characteristic comments: 
They don't want unions in this firm; they have always said they don't want 
that. (Production operative, viaflex department) 
I don't think that they would ever have a union in here, they would close the 
plant first. (Warehouse operative) 
They don't want a union, they don't have unions in America do they? I mean 
`John' [ex-plant manager] came over and couldn't believe that we talked 
about pay. He said in America they put it on the notice board; this is what you 
are getting, thank you very much. (Ex-ECC representative) 
The corollary to the above was that management insecurity in and around the trade 
union issue was firmly identified by most employees as the prime driver behind the 
maintenance of the ECC. Such managerial anxiety was graphically illustrated 
during the discussions that took place prior to research access being granted. As 
noted in chapter 2, as part of the research project an employee questionnaire was 
drafted and passed to the HR director for approval. It became a formal condition of 
access that prior to dissemination a question that sought to gauge the level of union 
support was dropped. The reasons behind this nervous antipathy are explored 
below. 
Non-Union Status: The Drive for Workplace Flexibility 
Within chapter 3 the wider parental organisational culture was delineated. A 
striking feature of this is the all-pervading level of paternalism, a practice that is 
classically viewed as being driven by anti-union sentiments (cf. Edwards, 1979; 
Freeman and Rogers, 1993). In keeping with the paternalistic ethos all Medico's 
US plants are non-union sites. Conversely, non-union status is not generally the 
94 
case within the plants across mainland Europe; the plant manager was candidly 
forthright in his account of the resultant benefits: 
I think we are probably, I guess, the least union influenced [plant in Europe] 
and that is something that we want to keep because it gives us flexibility. 
We feel like that allows us to be flexible and you know we are competing 
against [MediCo plants in] countries that have labour rates of one fifth of 
what we pay here. So we need flexibility, we need to be able to bring in 
temps when we want; we need to be able to change job descriptions when 
we need to. We need flexible workers, flexible concepts and flexible hours - 
you know we need that flexibility in our opinion to remain competitive, and 
we really don't feel like we need other people telling us how to do it. 
In a similar vein the HR director noted that: 
MediCo as a corporation have [long pause] not an anti-union policy, but a 
belief that if you work together with your people you can actually move 
forward a lot faster than you can with something that is bureaucratic. 
Even the most cursory textual analysis of the above passages would identify the 
drive for flexibility as the perceived principal benefit accruing from non-union 
status, one component of the purported monopoly face of trade unionism. The fear 
is that, via tight contractual provisions and the potential for industrial action, 
unions hinder the implementation of organisational change and flexibility, 
undermining productivity and performance. 
This drive for flexibility must additionally be firmly located within the corporate 
context of parental investment and divestment decision making. The organisation is 
a major world player in the arena of pharmaceuticals and IV solutions. Given the 
solid market position business rivalries were seen to be intra - rather than extra - 
organisationally derived, a function of the corporate policy of sourcing IV solutions 
from a range of European satellite facilities. As the personnel manager noted: `our 
[Medico UK's] biggest competitors are other [Medico] European locations, that is 
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our biggest worry in terms of rivals'. Within this context the plant's non-union 
status was unquestionably jealously guarded amongst the senior management team 
and seen as affording the UK facility with a competitive advantage over its 
European rivals. This was most eloquently relayed by the plant's European Works 
Council (EWC) representative, a junior manager (engineering supervisor) who had 
held the post since 1996. His exposure to the bureaucracy of pan-European 
discussions, where most other national delegates acted in accordance with union 
protocols, had served to confirm in his own mind the salience of the `general 
unions as barriers to change and flexibility' thesis, articulated by his more senior 
colleagues. For example, a recent EWC gathering was recalled in the following 
terms: 
The people [other EWC delegates] that came over would not make a 
decision on whether they would sign something on behalf of the workforce 
- they wanted to take that back to the workforce and have a vote on it. Now 
that seems to go against the reason that they are there, because they have 
already been voted on as representatives of these people, and they should be 
in a position to make a decision. Everything is done through a unionised 
structured sort of way - `that is the way the union wants it done - and that is 
the way we do it', and nobody is going to digress from that. That must be a 
real barrier for them [European management] not to be able to push things 
through, or to move things forward in time quickly and to respond to 
initiatives, business initiatives or market pressures as it were... It seems to 
me that any unionised industry is not running as efficiently as it should be 
and this is because management are not allowed to put efficiencies in place 
because it is going to cost jobs or whatever. They can't just chop a line out 
because that would be a big issue with the union, you know, they would go 
on strike. Whereas here, if they [senior managers] decide to do it - they just 
do it. 
Although concerns in and around flexibility and change informed managerial 
thinking, an interesting facet, particularly given the increasing focus on costs, was 
that no objections were articulated towards trade unionism on the basis of the 
alleged `mark up', i. e. the notion that unions are associated with higher wage costs. 
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Wage talks will be given fuller coverage below, suffice to say that as part of the 
pay strategy management sought in any case to benchmark pay levels against the 
local manufacturing norm, which included a set of companies that maintained a 
strong union presence. The company aim to pay within the `upper third of the local 
pay league' (2000 Pay Review Document), indeed documentation accompanying 
the annual pay talks demonstrated that the organisation was favourably positioned 
on a range of indices including: basic pay; overtime rates; shift premiums and 
bonus schemes. 
In sum, with regard to the key contingency underpinning the ECC as a union 
avoidance tool it is evident that fears of inroads into flexibility and the knock-on 
effects on inward investment principally informed managerial thinking, rather than 
wage issues. This is not to say that non-union status was without benefits in 
relation to wage matters. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, over short time 
horizons the absence of a credible check on prerogative has afforded management 
with the ability to make certain significant tactical adjustments to the plant's cost 
posture that have proved politically beneficial vis-a-vis European operations. Over 
the long-term, however, the ongoing systematic benchmarking of wage levels 
against the locally collectively bargained norm, would tend to suggest a view that 
management are loath to take advantage of the absence of unions to reduce wages 
and benefits, given that this could potentially trigger the very demand for union 
services it seeks to eschew. This is a point developed further in the discussion. 
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Union Avoidance: Modus Operandi 
The above account has presented evidence locating the forestalling of unionisation 
as a factor underpinning the ongoing managerial support for the ECC, with the 
potentially negative impact of third party representation upon plant flexibility 
representing a key contingency informing managerial thinking. As identified within 
the literature review, however, the functionality of NERs within a broad policy of 
trade union avoidance is far from homogenous: two broad perspectives were 
modelled: `union substitution' and `evasion through acculturation'. It became 
evident during the field work that the ECC was a vehicle very much positioned 
within the former approach. Nevertheless, particularly during pay talks (see below), 
there are similarly ideological forces at work redolent of aspects of acculturation. 
With regard to substitution, as discussed in chapter 3, the ECC has evolved into an 
institution whose key remit is the purported negotiation of the annual pay 
settlement and various related terms and conditions. The prime subject matter is, 
therefore, distributive in nature and management were seen to go to great lengths to 
immerse the pay review process in the paraphernalia associated with collective 
bargaining, with planning, preparation and active negotiating stages evident. The 
process, therefore, comprises various elements drawn directly from models of trade 
union negotiating behaviour (cf. Warr, 1973: Magenau and Pruitt, 1979). 
It is worth at this stage re-iterating Gollan's point that the underlying logic of the 
substitution approach is that management create a representative alternative that 
employees will prefer to trade union forms of representation - but by what 
processes might such a preference emerge, or indeed be contrived, over and above 
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the importation of the paraphernalia of pluralism? The existing literature has little 
to say on this point; it is, therefore, worth exploring the substitution process in 
some detail. A significant facet of the MediCo study was the use made of the ECC 
as a theatre through which purported managerial compromise was engineered and 
broadcast, suggestive of employee `wins', as a means of bolstering the body's 
credibility, legitimacy and hence employee support. As discussed below, this was 
particularly evident during the pay review discussions where the process was 
similarly subtly intertwined with facets of acculturation. 
The Dynamics of the Pay Review Process 
Pay reviews follow a fairly routine format comprising a series of meetings over a 
period of up to two weeks. The whole process is highly redolent of Scott's 
(1994: 8 1) `act of theatre', where within his biscuit works (albeit unionised) case 
study, negotiation was perceived as a highly visible `stage managed' event, with 
deliberations purposely prolonged by management `to make outcomes look as if 
they were the result of vigorous contest' (ibid). At MediCo the drama is enhanced 
by the pay talks being convened at a neutral venue: typically the town's premier 
hotel. The operation of the pay review comprises a number of sub-processes: an 
integral component being the `politics of investment' (Lucio and Weston, 
1994: 113), whereby representatives are systematically reminded of investment 
competition between plants and the crucial importance attached to labour costs 
9. 
As will be demonstrated, ECC representatives are subject to such real politik in 
order that they deliver the desired managerial outcomes: reasonable pay demands. 
A further practice is the ostensible invocation of managerial concessions, again 
echoed in Scott's study where managers routinely allowed shop stewards to 
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`negotiate them up' (Scott, 1994: 81). One necessary condition for this pluralistic 
charade, however, is a malleable and quiescent set of representatives; as will be 
demonstrated such a configuration cannot be taken for granted. 
(a) The 1999 pay review 
The context of the 1999 pay round was one of looming financial crisis. The facility 
had been forced to close the department responsible for the manufacture of blood 
collection packs due to new regulatory requirements. While this loss of production 
culminated in 64 redundancies, the more onerous ongoing problem was the 
servicing of the sunken costs, i. e. the residual fixed overhead: 
You take out all that volume [but] the building is still there, all of 
your insurances are still there. You are able to deal with the variable 
overhead - which, not wishing to make them sound like costs, are 
primarily people. But fixed overheads stay. We had a major task 
because that fixed overhead was going to go into everything else 
that was remaining, you did not need too much of a computer model 
to know that product cost was going to go way up. (HR director) 
Developing this theme the plant accountant recalled that the closing of the 
department resulted in a $2million `hole', further noting that with 60% of output 
goes into continental Europe the cost crisis was additionally compounded by 
unfavourable exchange rates. 
Two years previously a three year pay deal had been agreed with the ECC that 
provided for annual increases of 3.75%, a settlement increasingly viewed as 
untenable by plant level senior management in view of cost crisis. In spite of the 
then current budgetary pressures, the previous financial year had been strong, 
consequently a decision was made by the plant manager to pay the remaining 
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portion of the 3.75% increase as a one off lump sum payment (LSP), and charge it 
against the 1998/1999 fiscal year. Crucially, as far as European operations were 
concerned (in purely accounting terms), this would have the favourable impact of 
effectively freezing labour costs -a significant component at 35% of total product 
cost, partly assuaging the burden of the residual fixed overhead. Consequently, it is 
evident that notwithstanding the convening of extraordinary pay talks, the decision 
to impose a one off LSP had already been taken. The plant accountant candidly 
recalled details of the initial briefing to the senior management team: 
He [the plant manager] actually said it wasn't an option, it was 
something that he was going to impose. But having said that, he 
imposed it by giving everybody the background of why he was 
going to do it. He didn't say I am going to do this [clicks fingers], he 
got everybody on the board in the room... Now to the extent of 
saying you've got no choice that was true, but I would think that if 
everybody was listening to the message he was imparting it made 
kind of sense. 
As Marchington (1980: 155) advises when seeking to examine the extent of 
employee participation in management decision making it is crucial that the 
researcher be able to locate the point at which decisions are actually made, rather 
than formally taken. The above account, from a member of the inner cabinet, is 
therefore significant in confirming that the impending consultation had been 
reduced to an act of `non-participation' (ibid). 
An important contextual point relating to the build up to the talks was that 
something of a coup d 'etat had occurred within the ECC; the incumbent chair was 
perceived as too moderate amongst certain group members and was pressed to 
stand down. Consequently, notwithstanding intense managerial efforts to sell the 
pay deal the replacement chair, and some of the more vocal representatives, refused 
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to accept what was on offer given that the issue had attracted significant employee 
rancour because: (a) although in practice employees would be paid the same annual 
amount via the lump sum, cumulatively they would lose out in years to come as 
there would be no increase on basic pay; and (b), there would be a long-term 
impact on pension provision. At this stage management increased the size of the 
LSP, but influential members of the ECC failed to respond to the concession, the 
new chair in particular strongly questioning management's interpretation of the 
situation. 
In view of the failure to get ratification management chose to by-pass the 
representative machinery, putting their case directly to employees in a series of 
departmental meetings. In the final event something of a straw poll was conducted 
by the representatives at the behest of management, demonstrating that the 
managerial message had got home with most employees being prepared to accept 
the LSP. The finale to the pay talks, however, was the resignation of the chair and 
several representatives - their number plunging at one stage to just three delegates. 
(b) The 2000 pay review 
In contrast to 1999, the 2000 pay round was held in more auspicious circumstances. 
During the interim period a business development manager had been recruited with 
both diversification and increased sales of the core product range resulting in an 
improved financial performance. Consequently heavy inroads had been made into 
alleviating the burden of the residual fixed overhead. The 64 redundancies had 
started to fade from memory, and in the summer of 2000 the enhanced financial 
position had resulted in a record production bonus (£600) being paid to plant grade 
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employees. This was lauded by management as being a direct result of the LSP that 
had created a `favourable financial variation', and was advanced as a post hoc 
justification for the effective wage freeze. The ECC team had likewise undergone 
something of a metamorphosis; although resignations had seen the numbers 
initially plummet from 12 to just three, a quorum of six was present by the time of 
the pay talks. The effect of the resignations had served not only to reduce the total 
numbers, but also to leave a more receptive residual group of representatives, the 
present incumbents being variously acclaimed by management as `in-control and 
mature' (plant manager), and `pretty keen, pretty balanced - effective people' 
(personnel manager). Overall such a benign set of circumstances clearly presaged a 
more economically favourable backdrop to the 2000 pay talks than that which had 
accompanied the previous pay review. 
Interviews with representatives and management, along with an analysis of minutes 
and other documentary data, suggests that the theatrical dimension to negotiation 
followed the accustomed format with meetings taking place at a local hotel. The 
data demonstrates the extent to which the initial process of attitudinal structuring 
via the invocation of the `politics of investment' had become an increasingly 
sophisticated exercise, the previous pay debacle being uppermost 
in the mind of the 
management team; as the personnel manager admitted: `we were a 
lot better 
prepared this year than we have ever been that I can remember'. 
One slide warrants 
reproducing in full: 
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Figure 2.2000 MediCo Pay Review: Managerial Presentation 
THE PRICE IN THE MARKET PLACE AT THIS TIME IS EXTREME AND 
WE HAVE LOST BUSINESS AS A RESULT OF OUR PRICE BEING TOO 
HIGH. THE CUSTOMER OWES MEDICO NOTHING IN THE WAY OF 
LOYALTY IF OUR PRICE IS TOO HIGH. 
WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN TWO EXAMPLES OF WHAT CAN HAPPEN IF 
ORGANISATIONS FAIL TO IMPROVE THEIR COST EFFECTIVENESS; 
OUTSIDE OF MEDICO, BUT JUST ACROSS THE ROAD, WE HAVE SEEN 
`FLASKCO' MOVE ITS MANUFACTURING OPERATION TO CHINA. 
INSIDE MEDICO WE HAVE ALL HEARD OF THE ANNOUNCED 
CLOSURE OF THE MEDICO MANUFACTURING OPERATION IN 
VALENCIA. WE ARE FORTUNATE THAT WE WILL PICK UP SOME OF 
THE PRODUCTION VOLUME BUT IT COULD SO EASILY HAVE BEEN 
THE OTHER WAY ROUND 
LABOUR RATE COMPARISON 
MALTA $8.57/HOUR 
IRELAND $11.81 /HOUR 
SPAIN $12.25/HOUR 
UK $14.36/HOUR 
JUST ON THESE NUMBERS, WHERE WOULD YOU MANUFACTURE? 
In addition to a comprehensive focus on the real politik of investment imperatives, 
representatives were also subject to a barrage of data including: plant financial 
`variation to budget'; a local pay review (positioning the company within the upper 
third of the pay league); a reminder of the total reward package (the paternalistic 
nature of which was explored in chapter 3), and a length of service profile used as 
evidence to support the relative munificence of current benefits. 
Following this initial phase the actual posturing started on the morning of the 
second day of talks with management offering a 2.5% increase. As there had been 
no hourly wage increase for two years there was a feeling amongst the ECC group 
that a restoration of the status quo ante would require an increase of the order of 
9%, nevertheless in practice a suitably moderate counter claim of 5.25% was 
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lodged. There was a degree of `to and froing' with management responding with a 
revised offer of a 3% increase, this in turn spawned a counter ECC bid of 3.5% 
accepted by management after an over night adjournment. Despite the outward 
appearance of a negotiation process, interviews with both sets of actors revealed 
that any concessions were more apparent than real - the following examples 
demonstrate the point: 
It [payroll] is a big area of expense to control. So it would be silly of 
me to say that we obviously don't control that in terms of our 
budgetary constraints, and therefore the presentations that we give 
are very much orientated towards what we are committed to in our 
budgetary process, and they [the ECC] understand that. So to that 
extent we - `David'- [the HR Director] does a splendid job. I have 
to say that he negotiates with a very small `n' around those 
parameters... But I think negotiation, as I would have understood it 
from my first incarnation at Philips - then no. (Plant accountant) 
Going into the pay talks it wasn't basically what we were 
going to get, it was getting up to what they were prepared to 
give us... Talking to them afterwards they gave the 
impression that, you know, we got more than they were 
actually going to give us, but that's management talking and 
they possibly want to make us feel good. (ECC chair) 
To sum up, the above depiction provides a graphic account of an NER being 
utilised as a sophisticated trade union substitute, a central facet being the 
orchestration of wage bargaining engineered to suggest the presence of a 
competent and independent employee forum. A striking feature is the parallel to 
Ramsay's notion of phantom or pseudo participation with management going to 
great lengths to construct the facade of tangible influence, when in reality any 
notion of employee empowerment is largely illusory - particularly evident in the 
1999 pay talks when ultimately a non-compliant body was side-stepped by 
management. In Ramsay's (1983: 215) terms, the managerial aim is clearly to 
`sustain and reinforce management's position, not to transform relations to a new 
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basis'. Acculturation is similarly a sub-component of this process, imbued via the 
heavy and systematic provision of business metrics, suggestive of the need for a 
community of purpose in the perennial drive for plant viability. 
While the body is brought closely into the pay review process, it is nevertheless 
evident that they key contingency underpinning the desire for non-union status is 
concern in and around workplace flexibility. Wage levels are ultimately 
benchmarked against local firms, some of which maintain a strong union presence, 
there is consequently minimal opportunity to pursue the potential for a non-union 
incentive via this particular route. At best the absence of a union facilitates tactical 
short-term adjustments, as indicated by the lump sum payment incident, rather than 
the ability to impose a pay strategy without reference to wider exogenous 
influence. In the final analysis, however, the paraphernalia of the substitution 
process requires not insignificant resourcing, and as demonstrated, the 
acquiescence of representative agents cannot be taken for granted. An intriguing 
question, therefore, relates to what this tour de force contributes to union avoidance 
over and above the strategy of paternalism in which it is embedded - this is a theme 
to which we will return later in the thesis. 
4.3.2 FinanceCo 
The banking sector is of note in that, in contrast to the economy in general, trade 
union density has remained at impressive levels, hovering around the 50% mark 
throughout the mid-1990s (Gall, 2001: 359). Likewise finance workers have of late 
shed their image of being `strike free' and `docile' (ibid); indeed the period of the 
early 1990s (to 1997) was one in which `strike action began to become an 
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acceptable currency amongst union members', and a more `normal' part of the 
industrial relations landscape within banking (ibid). Such increased tension is 
related to the heightened competition within the sector depicted in chapter 3, and a 
more `hard nosed' managerial approach to industrial relations (Storey et al., 
1998: 150). Inevitably the genesis of the FinanceCo partners' council in 1992 must 
remain a matter of conjecture. Nevertheless, the evidence hints strongly at a 
managerial team looking nervously over their shoulder to the wider sector where a 
traditionally compliant workforce had become more belligerent under the tutelage 
of the increasingly militant banking unions. Indeed, accounts of longer serving 
employees indicated a very tight coupling of cause and effect, and the following 
comments are instructive: 
It [partners' council] started off I would say as a rear guard action, there 
was a very strident BIFU interest in FinanceCo and the then chief executive 
was keen that we didn't have a massive union presence. There were some 
people that started to get quite turned on by the idea of having union 
representation. There were others who felt it would become restrictive and 
tie us up in red tape, and so I think that the organisation took the decision to 
create a partners' council which was put in place with some level of 
scepticism. I remember receiving BIFU type leaflets and literature, and 
BIFU had a pretty active South-West office, and then suddenly PC was 
born. (Head of Eastern retail) 
It [the rationale] was probably trade union avoidance to start with, we have 
not had trade union recognition here and a number of years back there was 
a growing feeling that there ought to be some union in place. (Systems 
programmer) 
This clearly hints at representative participation being `industrial relations' 
focussed, akin to Ramsay's position with control issues to the fore. A core facet of 
Ramsay's exposition was the dynamic or cyclical nature of participatory 
mechanisms - managerial interest was seen to wane and subsequently re-emerge 
in response to threats to managerial authority (Ramsay, 1977: 496) the aim being to 
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`nullify pressures to change the status quo' (, bid). Threats to managerial hegemony 
can clearly emanate from a myriad of directions - the state included; in this sense 
the timing of the research was opportune in coinciding with the introduction of the 
Employment Relations Act 1999, that inter alia introduced a formula for trade 
union recognition. Under the cycles thesis, such a macro-level change is precisely 
the kind that would be expected to presage a renewed interest at the micro-level in 
managerially sponsored incorporative solutions; indeed, as will be discussed below, 
a striking facet of the study was the impact that the legislative shock had upon the 
company's interest in, and policy towards, the council. 
The Dynamics of Union Evasion 
Throughout the 1990s the then banking union BIFU had waged a concerted 
recruitment campaign; based on purportedly leaked information, the bank viewed 
themselves as prime targets for the TUC's Organising Academy (Team Brief ). 
Latterly UNIFI activity had been particularly concerted during the 1999 branch 
closure programme. The head of group HR recollected these events thus: 
Over the last 10 years BIFU, or UNIFI as they are now, have been trying 
to get collective representation within FinanceCo and we have always said 
no because we wanted to involve all the staff directly, rather than have a 
body to negotiate that only represents a small minority of staff. About 2 
years ago they picketed our buildings and got hold of our fax machine 
numbers going for recognition, basically they were trying to whip up anti- 
FinanceCo feeling for about 5 months. 
Managerial concerns were amplified by the recognition legislation juxtaposed 
against the move to a multi-divisional corporate format. The re-structuring of the 
organisation was widely viewed as rendering the company exposed to a recognition 
claim within a particular division. In early 2000, as a direct response, the company 
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decided to conduct a poll on its own terms, without trade union access, to gauge the 
level of union support - the ballot was independently facilitated by the IPA. 
Employees were asked to vote for their preferred representative model from a 
choice of three options: continuing representation via the partners' council; trade 
union recognition, or representation via a modified council with a broadened remit 
(detail of the ballot document is presented at Appendix 4). The hazardous nature of 
such a pre-emptive strike was not lost on the senior management team given that 
such a ballot, if supportive of trade union representation, could under the 
legislation be held out as prima facie evidence of `reasonable [trade union]support' 
and so potentially trigger the need for a further poll under the auspices of the 
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC): 
Certainly myself and our MD were very unsure about it and spent quite a 
few weeks deciding whether to sign it [the ballot] off or not... So yes, there 
was a lot of soul [searching], there was about a week of how the hell is this 
going to go. (Head of group HR) 
In the final event the most popular option (46%), was that of an extended remit for 
the existing PC. The management team inevitably utilised the ballot internally to 
legitimise the in-house representative approach with the results widely publicised. 
Nevertheless, there was now an incumbent need to broaden the remit of the 
institution, particularly given that a significant minority (32%), had voted for trade 
union recognition. In response a document entitled A New Approach to Staff 
Representation and Involvement was tabled in October 2000 which did translate 
into a degree of internal change to both personnel and procedure. Firstly, an earlier 
model of regional councils was re-designed to reflect the multi-divisional format of 
the company, and to better co-ordinate these a new role of full-time PC 
representative was created. In addition to acting in an administrative capacity, the 
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incumbent was granted a permanent seat on the new group organisational 
development policy forum (GODPF) -a body charged with the task of approving 
group wide HR policy change. Furthermore, commitments were made regarding 
the competence of the various constituent elements of the representative model. 
Consequently, a pledge was entered into that in future consultation would take 
place at an early stage on `sensitive issues', and likewise that discussions would 
become more focussed, with the distribution of money within the pay round a core 
agenda item. 
In sum, the above account demonstrates a clear linearity between a legislative 
shock and a micro-level adjustment; essentially an attempt to forestall change via 
the introduction of a best practice consultative model. 
Non-Union Status: Issues of Pay Flexibility and the Insulation of Corporate 
Culture 
The above data lends credence to the use of the PC within an overall drive for a 
union free environment, 10 but how are we to conceive of this in relation to wider 
business priorities? Again we return to the contingencies modelled earlier in 
relation to the monopoly face of unionism; issues in and around organisational 
change, flexibility and the union mark-up. A number of points need noting here. 
Firstly, echoing the position at MediCo, senior managers expressed concern that 
any union presence would act as an impediment to change. The following was a 
characteristic comment: 
Unions have a bad name, having seen to be doing a good job they moved to 
standing in the way of progress, and I think there is a bit of that, just 
having 
the title union tends to leave a bad taste in the mouth. I have negative views 
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about them. It is something external, we would have less control and we don't 
want to be associated with things like strikes. (Head of HR shared services) 
In contrast to Medico, however, the notion of pay was a further directly espoused 
referent, as the head of group HR noted: 
Our parent company have a union and negotiate with a union. Our view is 
that if a union came in they would only be representing a very small 
proportion of people - why should a union drive our pay for what is a very 
small percentage of the organisation? We are not in a position, I don't think, 
where the input of a union would improve our financial position. 
In one respect such a reference to pay was surprising. Given that pay levels are 
closely benchmarked against competitors within an industry where unions maintain 
a significant presence (Gall, 1997: 226), de facto the quantum of pay is indirectly 
`driven' by, or at least pegged to wider collective agreements. In this context the 
position again echoes MediCo, except that in the latter instance it is the local rather 
than the sectoral picture that is the comparator. FinanceCo is distinct, however, in 
that in common with the sector in general, pay was being used in a much more 
sophisticated and creative manner to complement an increasingly performance 
orientated market driven culture. Thus, recent years had witnessed the introduction 
of broad banding, contingent pay through performance appraisal and changes to 
profit related pay. Given that this more business orientated approach to pay policy 
has resulted in industrial action in the wider sector (cf. Gall, 1997: 224; Gall, 
2001: 358), a plausible interpretation is that the essence of any concern relates to 
the maintenance of control over the reward strategy rather than issues appertaining 
to pay levels. Thus, in terms of our dichotomy of contingencies it is suggested 
again that the drive for non-union status was less centrally concerned with 
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perceptions of a union mark-up, than with the notion of unions as barriers to 
change, in this instance towards a flexible strategy of market driven compensation. 
Although issues appertaining to flexibility and organisational change were clearly 
influencing managerial thinking, there is a necessity in this instance to move 
beyond a narrow economically defined logic to fully understand the presence of the 
partners' council. Over and above such concerns there were hints that the presence 
of trade union representation would be unwelcome due to the perceived 
confrontational nature of the major banking unions, something deemed as 
anathema to corporate culture. Disquiet at such potential ideological contamination 
had its genesis in the branch closure programme of the mid-to-latel990s when 
BIFU had embarked on a robust recruitment drive. As indicated, this had involved 
both picketing of the headquarters, and direct approaches to the workforce via 
facsimile that sought to `whip up anti FinanceCo feeling'. The union had again 
been active more recently. This may be tracked to a decision by the parent 
company, EireCo, to engage in discussions with a view to merging FinanceCo with 
another finance house. In the final event the move did not get beyond exploratory 
talks. However, BIFU had again used such speculation as a springboard for a 
further recruitment drive; the outcome was widespread distaste at what were 
perceived as crude attempts to make political capital out of the incident. As one 
senior manager noted: 
The management perspective is that we want to engage with our own people. 
We want to hear it from employees directly, not from somebody who 
interprets what they say. The way I would illustrate this is that when the 
merger thing came out, EireCo made a statement that they were in 
discussions. That was quite a nervy moment for the people in this business. 
But if you take the BIFU rep, she stood on the pavement making a nice little 
statement [to the press] about the adverse impact this would have for 
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FinanceCo employees, but the trade union weren't even in the building and 
they had no basis on which to comment, but they are so quick to judge. (Head 
of Eastern retail) 
In sum, taken together the above data sets usefully build upon the MediCo study. 
Again an evident contingency driving the policy of union evasion relates to issues 
in and around organisational change and flexibility. Nevertheless, over and above 
these standard concerns, in this instance issues of ideology similarly serve to colour 
managerial thinking. 
Union Avoidance: The Hybridised Nature of the PC 
Earlier in the chapter the role of NERs within two broad strategies of union 
avoidance was modelled. MediCo was seen to be skewed predominantly towards 
union substitution, although acculturation was evident as a sub-process within 
wage discussion. Drawing on the terms of reference and profiles of the councils 
catalogued in chapter 3, the position at FinanceCo may clearly be distinguished in a 
number of key respects. Unlike the position at MediCo there is no cut-off point at 
supervisory level; constitutionally the FinanceCo PC represents all employees up 
to, but not including, board level. A striking aspect is hence the inclusive nature of 
the representative model. A resultant feature of the gatherings is, therefore, the 
absence of the oppositional `in' and `out' groupings evident at MediCo. In 
addition to its inclusivity the circumscribed formal level of competence is similarly 
noteworthy as it does not extend beyond `meaningful consultation', i. e. the seeking 
of and taking account of PC views in the decision making process (Partners' 
Council Charter). More importantly such consultation broadly steers clear of 
potentially divisive areas. While within the context of MediCo zero-sum 
distributive bargaining over wages and related terms and conditions is the essence 
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of the key subject matter, under the terms of reference of the FinanceCo PC 
integrational issues (i. e. `areas of common concern', Walton and McKersie, 
1965: 5) are at the forefront. To be sure, it is not possible to expunge totally all 
potentially pernicious topics from the agenda, but where these do surface 
management has customarily sought to place the emphasis upon implementation 
and procedure. For example, within the annual pay review the PC has traditionally 
not been concerned with the quantum of money available, but issues such as the 
performance management system. Likewise, within the recent corporate re- 
structuring the remit of the body was not related to the substantive decision to re- 
structure, but various implementation issues. It is clear that wherever possible 
management have sought to deem the more antagonistic or discordant areas as 
ultra vices to the body's term of reference redolent of an approach to union 
avoidance akin to `acculturation', i. e. the neutralisation of the notion of a plurality 
of organisational interests. 
The two routes to union avoidance were originally depicted as mutually exclusive. 
However, building upon the MediCo data, this study further serves to emphasise 
that reality is far more complex. An interesting facet was the dynamic and evolving 
nature of the body with modifications being made to the representative format, 
ultimately in response to the recognition legislation. As noted, a range of changes 
to the remit of the PC were introduced following the resultant poll in 2000, given 
that the employee preference, sold strongly on a managerial manifesto, was the 
enhancement of the PC's terms of reference. Such an envisaged expansion 
specifically referred to the broadening of the remit of the partners' council to 
include an enhanced role in consultation on issues such as pay and pay systems. In 
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sum, it is evident that recent statutory intervention is serving to move the 
representative model incrementally towards a hybridised approach where elements 
of both acculturation and substitution are in evidence. 
4.3.3 Frid eCo 
In chapter 3 the organisational setting of FridgeCo was plotted. Unique amongst 
our case study organisations the creation of the representative body followed the 
de-recognition of an incumbent trade union, the then AEU. Again this is 
suggestive prima facie of an `industrial relations' centred rationality forming some 
component of managerial thinking; in this instance a participative structure 
fashioned to pre-empt the return of union organisation as similarly depicted in the 
studies by Lloyd (2001) and Watling and Snook (2001). This much having been 
said, the accounts of employees suggested that trade union support and 
membership were partial; by an ex-shop steward's own admission membership 
previously had hovered somewhere between 20 and 30%. Questions relating to de- 
recognition addressed to the shopfloor were consequently largely met with 
indifference and indeed, at times hostility was expressed towards the union. It was 
a common place to suggest that the body had pursued a narrow sectional agenda 
benefiting the higher grades from whence the active membership had largely been 
drawn. Long serving employees talked of the union's unhealthy relationship with 
the company founders feeding into moderate demands and sought after jobs being 
awarded on patronage. The following account was fairly standard: 
It [lack of trade union support] goes back a lot of years, a lot of years. I have 
been here since 68' and I personally, and quite a few of the guys I have 
known most of my life, always felt that the founders were hand in glove with 
the union - management and union, there was too much of a cosy 
115 
relationship. I don't know it just stunk. I think they [the trade union] were 
bought off, but that's another matter. (Skilled worker, commercial goods) 
Although the passage of time prevents the substantiation of such claims it is clear 
that the union was widely viewed as an ineffectual vehicle for employee demands. 
Certainly the remaining shop stewards bemoaned the loss of union recognition; 
however, the wider mood was largely one of indifference. In any event the whole 
de-recognition process appears to have represented a relatively bloodless coup for 
the new management team 
Despite depictions of a somewhat `cosy' relationship, the mood amongst 
employees was that the company council had, nevertheless, largely been created 
out of a desire by the incumbent management team to appease any demands for 
external employee representation. As one of the former ex-shop stewards recalled: 
My honest opinion is that they [management] don't want outside bodies 
having an interest in FridgeCo, whereas before we always had outside bodies 
and the union would come in and talk. But the [new] personnel manager was 
against you as soon as you walked in the door. He came into a meeting with 
the union district secretary and said that he wasn't interested and straight 
away they were at loggerheads. Then they came up with the company 
council. 
As will be discussed, interviews with the principal managerial actors exposed clear 
differences of emphasis with regard to the purpose of the company council. 
However, if managerial accounts lacked consistency, it was evident that, as at both 
MediCo and FinanceCo, union evasion did indeed form some component of the 
milieu of motive; the contingencies driving union avoidance are indicated below. 
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Non-Union Status: The Imperative for Organisational Change and Cost Control 
Outwardly the de-recognition of a weak trade union followed by the creation of a 
managerially sponsored body appears crudely opportunistic, especially given the 
wholesale changes to the manufacturing regime that were to follow. As discussed 
in chapter 3, these included the move from a flow-line format to cellular 
production, redundancies and the introduction of shift working. Similarly, the 
timing of the research coincided with the fifth year of an effective wage freeze. In 
terms of the contingency model outlined earlier, therefore, there are some 
interesting facets that warrant consideration. Firstly, in line with both MediCo and 
FridgeCo, the notion of unions as barriers to change informed managerial thinking, 
notwithstanding overtones of incorporation. Although the union was widely 
perceived as relatively impotent, the radical production transformation was 
unquestionably eased by the removal of any potential challenge from an 
independent representative body. Indeed, the personnel manager was candidly 
forthright in observing that `trade union involvement would not be welcome at the 
present time', conceding that the utility of the council was founded in its perceived 
ability to diffuse residual employee demands for external collective representation. 
The absence of trade union representation, however, had emergent benefits beyond 
that of furthering the ability of management to initiate changes to the production 
regime unimpeded. It is important to note that the change in production strategy 
was beset with an array of problems including increased `down-time', due to 
commissioning problems, and a poorly received product launch. Consequently by 
the time of the research the company was losing money on a month-by-month 
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basis. In response to such pressures a rigorous cost cutting exercise was in place. 
As the personnel manger noted: 
We have done everything that we can to make savings and stream line the 
organisation. We have recouped some of the losses and it is down to careful 
management: tightening the belt, controlling spend, controlling overtime, 
controlling temporaries, making redundancies which reduced our payroll - trimming wherever possible. 
In view of the ongoing cost pressures it is conjectured that, unique amongst our 
three case study organisations, FridgeCo was implicitly following a low-wage 
policy as part of such `belt tightening'. Although the desire for non-union status 
was initially driven by concerns regarding flexibility, a further unavoidable 
interpretation is that wage issues were figuring increasingly prominently with 
management pursuant of a non-union incentive via this particular route. 
Union Avoidance: Twin Track Substitution and Acculturation 
It is evident from the foregoing account that the company council was perceived as 
performing a role within the company's desire for the maintenance of non-union 
status. Although in one sense the council conformed fairly tightly to the 
substitution model, there were strong overtones similarly of acculturation. Within 
the former context the standard trappings of dilute pluralism were in place. Hence, 
while the remit of the council did not extend beyond consultation, the scope of 
issues nevertheless borrowed from the former collective bargaining agenda, 
covering terms and conditions of employment; training and development; working 
conditions and employment policy rules and procedures. An interesting finding, 
however, was the extent to which the company council was similarly imbued with 
a heavy educative tenor. The first 25 minutes or so of the monthly meetings would 
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be taken up with the positioning of extensive information on company 
performance. The range of metrics was impressively encompassing with data 
provided on a range of financial, production and HR indices including: profit and 
loss; turnover; market share; downtime; employee turnover, and absence. The 
following is a characteristic extract from the minutes: 
Company Performance: It was reported that sales in January were 
£3,241,000 making a total of £27,624,000 for the financial year so far. Our 
losses for the financial year are £392,000. Although this figure is below plan 
it is an improvement on the previous year. 
Sales and Marketing: `Ian Jones' gave a presentation to the council on the 
current state of the refrigeration market. Many areas of the market are lower 
in volume this year. FridgeCo's overall share of the market has dropped to 
10.8%. While technical products are maintaining their volume, the new 
product range has only achieved 20% of plan. Reasons for poor performance 
were given. We have recently dropped the prices on a large number of 
products in order to move our stock, and it is unlikely that we will get these 
prices back up. UK Sales is short of four members of its staff, and recruiting 
is taking place. 
This hints at a desire to manufacture a closer identification with the company, both 
by imbuing employees with managerial definitions of success - budget to plan, 
turnover and market share etc - and similarly through a heightened awareness of 
the economic pressures facing the organisation. There are certain notable affinities, 
therefore, to Broad's (1994) study of DenkiCo where the council `was principally 
an educational vehicle directed towards structuring employee attitudes' (ibid: 27). 
The extent to which this was originally conceived in such terms, however, is 
uncertain. As will be demonstrated within the following section, such 
encompassing information provision arose originally out of a desire by the 
production director to utilise the body as a high involvement tool, with extensive 
information provision perceived as dovetailing into a TQM culture. Nevertheless, 
by the time of the research the more receptive representatives were being cultivated 
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to enlist shopfloor co-operation regarding the economic problems the organisation 
faced. As one delegate noted: 
What we are trying to do is smooth things over. Trying to placate the people 
on the shopfloor and getting them to face reality. That is if they want a job 
this is unfortunately the way we have to go at the moment. 
This is again reminiscent of DenkiCo where such communication was directed 
towards the engineering of a `consensus culture' with representatives positioned by 
management as intermediaries, the goal being to underwrite the cogency of 
managerial action. The contribution of this twin-track approach to the 
organisation's continued non union status is a theme to which we will return. 
To briefly review the above study it is evident that the data usefully builds upon 
that presented within the other two settings. In common with the previous studies 
the notion of union avoidance was evident. A point of departure, however, was that 
the presence of the company council as a component of a union avoidance strategy 
was tracked to both the classically purported managerial advantages of a union free 
environment. As within the other studies the perception of unions as impediments 
to change surfaced; it was far from coincidental that the removal of the union and 
subsequent creation of the council format was followed by wholesale 
transformation of the production regime. It was evident that latterly, however, in 
response to financial pressures, a cost containment strategy was in place, manifest 
in an effective five year wage freeze. In contrast to the other study organisations, 
therefore, it is suggested that management was taking advantage of trade union 
absence to pursue a non-union incentive via a low wage strategy. 
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4.4 Market Participation 
To date the chapter has examined the presence of the constituent NERs through the 
lens of industrial relations participation. Taken together the studies reinforce the 
tenor of the extant literature in demonstrating the centrality of a defensively 
orientated motivation, tracked in the above instances predominantly to concerns 
regarding the impact of an external representative body on workplace flexibility 
and change. It was argued earlier in this chapter, however, that a narrow focus on 
workplace issues of managerial control is less than satisfactory, not least because it 
obscures the potential impact of other business considerations on employer 
strategy. In particular existing accounts have neglected the more creative ends 
which collective representation might serve in non-union settings. In mitigation this 
is predominantly the outcome of research design, such studies largely concerning 
themselves with employee outcomes rather than managerial motive. It is 
nevertheless to this wider topic of `market' participation that we now turn. 
It was suggested earlier in this chapter that the managerial logic underpinning 
market participation is founded upon the need to harness the tacit skills and co- 
operation of the workforce and/or considerations relating to employee retention. 
The corollary to such an assertion was the suggestion that labour process and 
labour market issues are likely to represent the principal contingencies stimulating 
any managerial interest in this area; this premise sets the framework 
for analysis 
within this section. 
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4.4.1 Medico 
Chapter 3 provided a rudimentary sketch of the production regime at MediCo. The 
daily work regime was seen to be most singularly marked by monotony, with task 
cycle times typically extending to no more than three seconds duration. Even 
though the slack within the local labour market was being eroded due to a benign 
economic climate, the filling of any vacant posts remained unproblematic; indeed 
the tendency in recent years has been to reduce the head count as automation had 
resulted in labour savings. Such an organisational setting would tend to suggest the 
absence of an overriding necessity to pursue the more creative apolitically 
orientated goals of market participation, i. e. goals focusing on recruitment and 
retention and the extraction of extra contractual performance through employee 
involvement. Nevertheless, senior managers were keen to hint at the latter more 
benign foundation. The HR director, and architect of the body, in particular was apt 
to slip into the lexicon of HRM to explain the original genesis and raison d 'etre 
underpinning the body: 
We really didn't know at the time what we were doing. I know that sounds 
a bit bad, it was, we couldn't - if you said what are you really trying to do 
we could not articulate in those days as clearly as we can today what we 
were trying to achieve. But I can see it clearer now, because it is what we 
call employee engagement. 
Notwithstanding the above concise post hoc rationalisation, there was scant 
evidence linking the body to a systematic `hearts and mind strategy' being crafted 
by senior managers. Some caution is required, however, as this could conceivably 
be a reflection of a body noted by the personnel manager as being `in need of re- 
invigoration', rather than simply hollow rhetoric. Nevertheless, pace the above 
espoused desire to engage employees, the lack of knowledge of the formal 
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representative system was deep seated and palpable. The following complaints 
were commonplace: 
I know they meet, I don't know how often they do, but they used to have 
like monthly departmental meetings and things like that, but I don't see 
much of that going on now. Whether it does [meet] or not, if it does it is 
poorly publicised. In my department I have never seen an ECC rep, the only 
time I will see one is if I am lucky enough to be on the night shift. 
(Production operative, tank room) 
I think it is lacking in communication with what happens with them in their 
meetings - other than their notice stuck on the board - once a quarter is it? 
(Production operative, viaflex department) 
The above comments usefully serve to highlight the extent to which, pay talks 
aside, ECC meetings had become largely ritualistic in tenor. Minutes demonstrated 
that there was rarely a full quorum, and indeed at the four gatherings attended only 
three delegates were present. Although production imperatives and line 
management antipathy were often blamed by representatives for such absence, no 
steps were taken by management to correct the situation towards giving meetings a 
more stable footing. Likewise, on occasion no formal agenda was presented for 
deliberation. 
The overall impression was that only a minimal attempt was being made by the 
senior managers to engage employees via this particular intervention. Quite the 
contrary, as the above comments suggest the body was broadly perceived as 
withering on the vine. Indeed, within the survey only 23% of employees agreed 
with the statement that `management are committed to the consultation process' . 
To be sure, come the pay talks managerial interest was annually rekindled. Indeed, 
three of the six representatives had been appointed (i. e. `elected' unopposed) 
following a recruitment drive initiated by the personnel department - significantly 
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just prior to the 2000 pay review. However, as demonstrated in the previous 
section, the importance of this key set piece event to management centres on its 
perceived contribution to non-union status, rather than any notion of employee 
empowerment. Indeed, the only evidence of a more creative intent was provided by 
a small group of production managers, one of whom argued: `the important part of 
the ECC to me is the work that they do at the lower level getting involved in 
relations between the second layer of management and the shopfloor'. It was 
suggested, somewhat ironically, that when changes were indeed unilaterally 
imposed by their senior colleagues, such managers would use representatives as a 
sounding board. This would involve briefing them as a means of predicting the 
likely consequences to future morale and the knock-on effect for departmental 
absenteeism -a means of taking the temperature of the workforce. Save this 
discrete grouping, however, utilising the body in an intelligence gathering function, 
the overriding organisational focus comprised a far less proactive, predominantly 
defensively orientated agenda. 
4.4.2 FinanceCo 
In common with the other case study organisations, the data presented earlier 
pointed to the PC as a defensive strategy of union avoidance. As will be seen, 
however, a key point of difference between this and the MediCo study, was that in 
this instance senior managerial intent was far more complex. Accounts were 
provided consistently of a parallel motivation. Broadly, the perception was of a 
defensive intent simultaneously suffused with more progressive and constructive 
goals in mind, related to both labour process and labour market issues. Indeed, the 
formalised managerial conception was that of a high involvement managerial tool: 
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The purpose of the partners' council is to assist in the achievement of 
corporate strategy by extending and developing the structured involvement 
of employees in HR policy and decisions which affect them. (Partners' 
Council Policy Document, March 2001) 
At one level the above is a fairly standard managerial exposition and could again 
be dismissed critically as vacuous rhetoric, utilising the powerful lexicon of HRM 
to screen the harder reactionary intent catalogued earlier. This study differs 
fundamentally from MediCo, however, in that the notion that the body was 
additionally suffused and overlain with a desire to achieve employee engagement, 
via meaningful dialogue, was not one largely confined to the senior managerial 
team. However, there was a sense that the core motivational driver was somewhat 
ephemeral and apt to vary over time. The following comments demonstrate these 
points: 
My guess would be that it probably started out as being actually how can 
we avoid getting a union involved, and it has probably matured into how 
can we use this effectively to have good dialogue with our people and 
manage the business effectively through talking. I see an organisation that 
very much wants to involve the people and has been looking at ways to 
make sure that happens. (Key retail accounts manager, grade C) 
When partners' councils came along there may have been an element of not 
wanting unions in, but that was not the driving motivator; it was more 
around getting staff involvement - getting staff buy-in. It actually comes 
back to managerial style, I actually believe that FinanceCo does try to be 
genuinely consultative and communicate with its employees and partners' 
council is one mechanism for doing that. (Reprographic supervisor, grade 
D) 
Although interviewees were apt to rationalise the council in terms of the need for 
employee involvement and `good dialogue', such phraseology says 
little about the 
functional ends that such processes might serve. When further pressed a range of 
organisational benefits that broadly come under the rubric of market participation - 
i. e. goals in and around improvements in service delivery through the agency of a 
125 
committed and stable workforce - were articulated. As will be discussed below, 
senior managers and PC representatives stressed the utility of the body primarily in 
terms of employee `buy-in' or cooperation, improved commitment and employee 
retention. 
The Context of Market Participation 
Over the last decade the banking sector has become fiercely competitive. 
Notwithstanding leading edge initiatives such as dot-com banking, close proximity 
to the customer remains a core feature within the financial services arena. This is 
an industry in which a myriad of organisational players offer a fairly uniform 
portfolio of products, therefore excellence in customer care is perceived as an 
important source of competitive advantage. Within the branches employee 
commitment was viewed as potentially problematic, not only because of recent 
branch closures, but similarly due to the number of internal re-structures that have 
been initiated in recent years. Some form of retail adjustment has taken place 
almost annually as the company has experimented with various arrangements to 
better align the retail network within the newly competitive terrain; roles have been 
created, extended, modified and replaced. Accordingly, employee consultation, 
with the PC as a core facet, was viewed as an essential vehicle for the securing of 
employee co-operation, legitimising the perennial re-structuring process, as 
demonstrated by the following comments: 
We have become an awful lot more focussed about what we are doing, 
where we are going and how we are going to get there. We are an awful lot 
better at communicating that to the employees and getting the employees 
involved much earlier on, instead of. `we have done this - here you go'. Now 
it is: `we are considering this, come in and talk to us - give us your input'. 
What we were finding was that every year there was a re-structure, and 
certainly within the branches there were waves of discontent because they 
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never sort of got the staff to buy-into the process. They [senior managers] 
finally caught onto the idea that if you get the staff to buy-into the process it 
is a much smoother and more enjoyable process, and not one where people 
have this perception of change forced on them. (Chair, head office council) 
Part of my role is to resolve issues and to make sure that people are satisfied, 
looked after and feel valued - all that kind of behavioural stuff. And the only 
way you are going to do that is through feedback - with PC we go straight 
on in there and pick up issues. (Head of Eastern retail) 
While, particularly within a retail context, employee motivation and commitment 
was proffered as informing the managerial intent behind the body, employee 
retention was also acknowledged as a significant driver - particularly at head office. 
Turnover amongst certain staff with scarce skills, especially IT, was highlighted as 
particularly problematic. High employee turnover was acknowledged as both 
increasing training costs and mediating the quality of head office service delivery. 
This lends credence to various claims, especially amongst HR professionals, that 
concern in and around retention influenced managerial thinking, with the provision 
of voice via the PC positioned as a means of mediating employee 'exit': 
It just makes common sense to know what your employees think. I have 
been responsible for doing turnover figures for this place and it can be a 
problem. This is right across the industry anyway, high turnover, and you 
need to know why, and people are not always honest on their exit forms. It 
is a cost thing; at the end of the day it costs so much money when you lose 
people in recruitment costs - so why not know what they are feeling, why 
not try and avoid upsetting them - it just makes total common sense. 
(Manager, HR shared services) 
Similarly, within this context a view proffered was that of management utilising the 
councils at an early stage as a means of extracting information sets on the attitudes 
of employees towards proposed policy change and organisational initiatives. Again 
this was a means of taking the temperature of the workforce, as observed at 
MediCo, albeit carried out in a much more systematic fashion. As discussed in 
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chapter 3, the PC model is multi-tiered with any changes to policy requiring 
ratification at the GODPF; here partners' council chairs converse directly with 
senior management. Such `environmental scanning' (Quinn, 1996: 3 84) was viewed 
as augmenting the ability of senior managers to extract input from employees in an 
undiluted manner, and thus their capacity to gauge the potential effects of decisions 
downstream. As one ex-PC chair recalled of GODPF gatherings: 
Officially we were not part of the [policy formulation] process at all. 
Having said that people would always listen to your views. So if something 
was put on the table one of the questions would be actually what do you 
think PC would think about this? What would the PC view be if we took 
this line? As a PC chair I would say, `I think you are going to have some 
problems if you go down this line because of this, this and this; I think you 
need to revisit this, or alternatively, I don't think the members will have any 
issue with this at all'. I have to say that my experience is that most of the 
time - not all of the time - the people in that meeting were very focussed 
about how will the staff feel. It is a question of not shooting messengers, the 
company want to listen to strong messages that are coming through - they 
are acutely aware that messages get filtered out as they go through. 
From the foregoing account it is evident that management has sought to locate the 
PC as a tool for the attainment of a range of integrational outcomes: partners' 
councils as active agents in the process of employee retention; as a vehicle for 
consensual decision making and as a motivational bridge. Such managerial claims 
are lent credence given the wide armoury of other similarly `progressive' HR 
practices that are in place; practices that might be considered complementary to 
such a `hearts and minds' strategy viz. the kind of high commitment or high 
performance managerial tools commonly associated with the HRM rubric. Cully et 
al. (1999: 80) list a set of 15 such initiatives including: profit related pay; single 
status; team briefings, and share ownership. The high take up at FinanceCo is 
manifestly impressive. Of the practices listed, 12 are in place within the head office 
environment; while this falls to 10 at retail level, such a haul is nevertheless 
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significant placing the organisation within the top 14% of companies utilising 8 or 
more practices (ibid: 110). Such a tight bundling of progressive initiatives suggests 
an internal consistency to the accounts articulated above. 
In sum, this study clearly differs from MediCo in that the above account lends 
support to the widespread notion of management using the body not only to avoid 
unionisation, but more proactively as a delivery mechanism for the inculcation of a 
range of commercially useful individual skills, competencies and psychological 
states. In line with the earlier framework for analysis there were clear linkages to 
labour process and labour market contingencies. Taken together this and the 
previous analysis probing the issue of union evasion suggests that managerial 
behaviour in relation to the PC is permeated by a collection of considerations both 
defensive and more creatively orientated - this is clearly at variance with the case 
study literature reviewed earlier. The study likewise undermines the notion of 
managerial consensus with regard to the pursuit of corporate goals via this 
particular intervention. Merging the two substantive themes presented, subtly 
different emphases were evident, although no consistent pattern emerged. For 
example, the most senior person responsible for the PC (head of group HR), made 
explicit that union avoidance and issues appertaining to pay and flexibility was the 
key driver. Nevertheless, other HR managers stressed the potential benefits in 
terms of employee retention, particularly at head office level. Within the retail 
network employee motivation and `buy-in' was again thematically popular for 
managers. Likewise, it was evident that the precedence afforded to the various 
goals was apt to vary temporally in response to both internal exigencies and 
external shocks, as demonstrated by the renewed emphasis upon trade union 
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avoidance, re-prioritised following the introduction of a statutory recognition 
formula. In turn, however, these broad conclusions raise some supplementary 
questions relating to outcomes: firstly, what in practice is the substantive 
contribution of the body to the company's preferred non-union status? Secondly, 
are the benign more individually framed outcomes ultimately realised? These are 
themes to which we will return later in the thesis. 
4.4.3 FridgeCo 
Building upon the FinanceCo study, at FridgeCo a variation in senior managerial 
motive was likewise detected. Earlier in the chapter the topic of union evasion at 
FridgeCo was explored with the managerial position enunciated by the personnel 
manager. This actor aside, one other managerial player had been actively involved 
in the consultation process, its architect, the production director, albeit from a less 
defensive vantage point. In conversations spanning an 18 month period it was 
emphasised that from his perspective the original decision to remove the trade 
union in 1994 was not taken out of any ideological opposition to trade unionism 
per se; indeed during the interim period prior to de-recognition the trade union was 
viewed as an amenable partner, perhaps reflecting the wider power dynamics of the 
period: 
We would talk about this and that, and they [the union] would just accept it. 
The regional officer would come in and he would say that business needs 
must be met because it is important for the employees and the economy, and 
it was kind of like they would give us a free hand. (Production director) 
Ultimately the interpretation here was that de-recognition had been invoked 
because the representative process was partial. Thus in an early interview it was 
argued that: 
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Before I joined the company there was a notion that the union wasn't 
serving its purpose, but it was no more than a notion. When I came here it 
was the opportunity to do something about that. I do believe that if people 
in an organisation are going to be effective then they need to be well 
managed, well led, well briefed and communicated to - but also well 
represented. I don't believe that the union was representing the people well 
at all. The view was that there was only a small percentage of employees 
who were actually in the union. So if we were discussing changes to terms 
and conditions the union reps would go back into the factory and they 
would casually brief their members - but if you weren't a member you did 
not get to know. Other people in the organisation might have had different 
things on their mind, but basically it [a company council] fitted my belief in 
what an organisation can be for its employees. It fits a view that people will 
be, and want to be, fully involved in an organization, and a company 
council, as opposed to union representation, would fit that ideal much more 
closely. (Production director) 
The council was hence viewed as a means by which the workforce, irrespective of 
union membership, could be enfranchised, creating a company wide system of 
communications and involvement. In lengthy discussions, however, it became 
evident that such goals were not founded upon some form of democratic idealism, 
rather this actor had in his mind a clear vision of utilising the company council 
again towards a market participatory approach, with issues in and around the labour 
process representing the key contingency informing such a position. Nevertheless, 
the financial crises in which the company was to subsequently find itself had 
served to undermine the pursuit of this ambitious agenda -a topic developed 
below. 
Market Participation: The TQM Nexus 
The production director had been recruited on the basis of his experience of, and 
belief in, the efficacy of Japanese manufacturing practice. Previous employment at 
the Rover Group as a project manager had involved periods of secondment to Japan 
131 
during the Rover-Honda tie up of the early 1990s. This Japanese experience 
represented something of a philosophical awakening: 
I spent three weeks in a factory in Japan and saw how they were introducing 
new products, saw how they related to it, how the whole thing worked, saw 
how the factory was laid out in the interests of flow which minimised 
material movement and eliminated waste and all that stuff - and everyone feeling briefed and part of it. What I found was that in all the time I had been 
at Longbridge I had been uncomfortable with the way things had been done. I 
thought I have been here [Japan] three weeks and I am very comfortable with 
all of this. It just fits, it suits - Japanese techniques of world class 
manufacturing, cellular manufacture, workflow and reducing changeover 
times and basically, you know, how to treat people. 
On appointment at FridgeCo in 1994 he had been given a high degree of freedom 
to introduce a state of the art production system within the allocated budget. Given 
the above desire to emulate what was perceived to be successful Japanese 
manufacturing practices, the centre piece was a cellular mode of production, a 
format that had acquired considerable kudos within the UK. Indeed, FridgeCo 
corporate publicity material was unapologetic in noting the company's debt to 
Japanese influence: 
The company is investing heavily in training its people and in developing 
new working practices similar to those adopted by successful Japanese 
companies to create a world class organisation capable of competing and 
winning against far larger multi-national businesses. 
The original project was rigorously specified within a clear strategic vision 
encompassing a wider cultural change, with an attendant transformation of 
employee relations. The move to the new factory was perceived as representing a 
tabula rasa that would facilitate the introduction of a complementary portfolio of 
personnel and working practices. The normative thrust of discussions was of an 
original desire to build in both `hard' and `soft' components of a total quality 
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management regime, i. e. the synchronisation of personnel and labour relations with 
manufacturing production strategy. With regard to the former hard `production 
orientated techniques' (Rees, 1996: 12), U-shaped cellular production was the 
centre-piece. Further components introduced included a just-in-time production 
format and statistical process control. More pertinently for current purposes an 
array of complementary `soft' TQM practices were similarly introduced; practices 
that seek `to generate commitment to quality' (ibid), suggesting an internal 
coherence to the original blueprint. A newsletter, team briefings and kaizen were 
introduced in swift succession. The latter was given particular early prominence 
with production workers participating in two day workshops with production 
subsequently stopped for one hour per-week to facilitate regular kaizen sessions. 
A cultural shift was additionally pursued via other pillars of the Japanese model 
including the increasing use of peripheral workers to even out fluctuations in 
demand, and more subtly the use of `egalitarian symbolism' (Graham, 1995: 106), in 
the form of a `shirt sleeves' managerial style and `workwear' uniform for all 
production workers, regardless of grade. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis placed on the above initiatives the original 
introduction of the company council represented the kernel of the TQM software. 
Given that the overall goal was to create a high involvement culture attuned to the 
greater demands of cellular production, partial trade union representation was 
viewed as inimical to the wider vision, which encompassed a desire to elicit the 
support and co-operation of employees to the greater demands imposed by the 
transformation to a quality driven culture. 
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Given the intellectual coherence of the above blueprint the most notable facet of 
the study, however, was the degree to which, despite his best intentions, the 
production director's strategic vision had been all but frustrated by the close of the 
research period (March 2002): 
In the last organisation I was at I had the opportunity to bring all of this 
together, all I wanted to do really when I came here was to do the same thing 
- but it hasn't really panned out like that. (Production director) 
Managerial outcomes will be afforded scrutiny later in the thesis, suffice to say 
that the financial crisis in which the company became embroiled had served to 
check the vision of a cultural transformation. By the beginning of 2002 the 
financial position was `threatening the very viability of the company' (Annual 
Management Plan). Consequently over the duration of the research period (October 
2000 - March 2002) it was evident that the softer paraphernalia of TQM was being 
wound down. The provision of team briefings had become intermittent resulting in 
rumours of closure and takeover. Likewise, kaizen had been abandoned not least 
because the plant could no longer afford the luxury of shutting down production 
cells for the required one hour per week. In any event, as one plant engineer 
somewhat sardonically argued, the wage freeze and resulting employee attrition 
dictated that there was an increasing reliance upon temporary agency workers `who 
had little to contribute to the philosophy of continuous improvement'. With regard 
to the company council, the major problem was that the vicissitudes of day-to-day 
crisis management were perceived as rendering the process of prior information 
provision and workforce consultation increasingly difficult in view of the necessity 
for short lead times in decision making. One upshot was increasing concern 
amongst representatives that consultation was not being invoked before 
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management took decisions (Council Minutes), with a related failure to keep 
delegates abreast of rapidly changing events. As the production director lamented 
in the final interview: 
We are in a business that is under severe financial pressure and this now 
pervades everything that we do. That pervades into a managerial style of 
reacting. You are like a fire fighter; there is a continual pressure and that is 
basically driving everything. 
Thus, in one notorious incident representatives only became aware that a freeze on 
production recruitment had ended via company advertisements placed in the 
situations vacant section of the local newspaper. In another characteristic episode, 
as a result of labour shortages, the managerial team had been forced to approach 
the non-production areas for volunteers to undertake manufacturing tasks to help 
clear a backlog of orders. This brought widespread criticism that instead of being 
formally briefed on the matter the council had been reduced to hearing `confusing 
snippets of information from various sources' (Council Minutes), a 
scenario anathema to the original formulation for a well briefed and `fully 
involved' workforce. 
The positioning of the council as a high involvement tool was further comprised, 
however, for reasons beyond issues of financial crisis and ensuing environmental 
indeterminacy. Within chapter 3 coverage was given to the absence of an 
overarching managerial style within FridgeCo. A resultant corollary was a failure 
on behalf of the other members of the incumbent senior managerial team to `buy- 
in' to the cultural transformation, and, consequently lend significant support to the 
consultation process. The two other functional directors (finance and technical 
matters) rarely attended council gatherings, and the tenor of interviews with the 
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production director was similarly that they had failed to effectively champion the 
process of consultation within their own functional areas, prompting the following 
reflections in the final interview: 
What I have found is, and it is fairly fundamental, one has to be the MD to 
see through initiatives such as this. It is very difficult as a functional director. 
Likewise you cannot cocoon one function of the business and say we will do 
it here, because that does not work either. 
Effectively the only other source of managerial support for the council was the 
personnel manager. However, as mentioned earlier, goals here were more 
defensively conceived. Indeed, it warrants highlighting that this divergence spilled 
out into differences of opinion with regard to council procedure. The personnel 
manager's belief was that monthly meetings served no useful purpose, arguing that 
bi-annual gatherings would be sufficient for consultation on wages and terms and 
conditions. Conversely, whilst the production director invoked open-ended 
meetings, seeing them as serving an educational purpose, a means of nurturing 
human resources via improved communication and information sharing, the 
personnel manager expressed cynicism at how representatives would manipulate 
this and `spin meetings out' to the end of the shift. In another famous instance the 
production director had upbraided the personnel manager in open forum for not 
following up an action point from the previous minutes, as the former observed: 
Afterwards he [the personnel manager] collared me to say that I had 
embarrassed and undermined him in the company council meeting and that 
I kind of showed that there was not a consistent management front. That 
story kind of highlights our different views - it is not us against them. 
In sum, drawing upon both this and the earlier FridgeCo data, we can again deduce, 
as with FinanceCo, that the managerial intent underpinning the representative 
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structure was, originally at least, infused by an amalgam of motives, itself informed 
by a medley of environing contingencies - both internally and externally derived. It 
was similarly apparent that there was an oscillation in the prioritisation afforded to 
particular aims; specifically the necessity for speed of reaction premised upon 
unfettered managerial prerogative eventually serving to occlude the originally 
privileged market participatory goals. Subsequent discussions in the thesis will 
attempt to amplify and elucidate more fully upon this and other tensions unleashed 
by this mode of managerial intervention 
4.5 The Legislative Dimension 
The above account has sought to locate the logic underpinning the presence of the 
three NER structures by embedding them within the context of wider business 
policy and strategy and in so doing an array of contingent factors were explored. 
Managerial thinking, however, needs to be further located within the increasingly 
pervasive legislative climate imposing the statutory need for consultation in certain 
instances, most significant of which are the redundancy provisions. Such 
regulations provide for the convening of ad hoc consultative machinery. 
Nevertheless, in the recent past all the three case study organisations have sought to 
utilise the standing body to discharge the legislative burden. At one level of 
analysis this is a fairly unremarkable observation; the analytical interest here, 
however, derives from the skilful micro-management of the process suggestive of 
goals beyond legal compliance per se. 
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Turning firstly to MediCo, due to both increased automation and the intense 
investment competition between European sister plants, redundancy was an 
ongoing and palpable threat, with the necessary consultation procedure invoked in 
1999 when 64 jobs were lost. Although the legislation requires that `employers 
must consult the workers' representatives with the purpose of finding ways of 
avoiding the dismissals' (Sargeant, 2001: 488), it is evident that management have 
invoked a more minimalist interpretation of the provisions to delimit their 
application. Ex-representatives in particular, were critical that the actual 
redundancy decision, and number of employees affected, was presented as a fait 
accompli with employees given little opportunity to assess the reality content of the 
need for the planned cull. Thus, although the HR director was anxious to stress that 
`they [ECC representatives] are certainly involved in the initial discussions of what 
can be done to save jobs', delegates evinced that their role was far more passive. 
As one ex-representative bemoaned: 
They tell us what is happening - but as to input? I don't believe we had any 
input in it. They would tell us first, then after that they [representatives] 
would ask questions, but as to input or effect, no none whatsoever. 
Whilst the substantive decision was not up for discussion, it is noteworthy that 
management have involved, and continue to involve representatives closely in 
various procedural aspects, e. g. the drawing up of redundancy criteria. A points 
system remains in operation based around standard norms such as last-in first-out, 
and representatives, at the behest of management, have periodically `tinkered' with 
the system, for instance, the building in of perfect attendance into the overall 
equation. This allows management to further discharge one of its duties under the 
legislation, to provide information with regard to the proposed method of selection 
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(Sargeant, 2001: 489). At a more analytical level, involving representatives 
proactively could be seen as an attempt to legitimise the decision via the 
representative body's imprimatur. At the very least the ECC performs a crucial 
function in allowing the MediCo management to absolve itself of the legal burden 
while, as with wage discussions, the process is engineered to preserve managerial 
prerogative intact. 
With regard to FinanceCo the institutional objectives of the PC were re-drafted in 
October 2000; a core purpose delineated being the need to `provide a legally 
acceptable framework for formal consultation'. Thus, of the three organisations, 
this represents the only instance where the constitution of the representative organ 
expressly refers to the need for legal compliance. In a similar manner to MediCo, 
FinanceCo has witnessed recent redundancy episodes imposing the need for formal 
consultation. As discussed in chapter 3, a major branch closure programme was 
undertaken in the late 1990s that ultimately resulted in the closure of 29 sites. More 
recently, a smaller number of jobs were lost at head office during the re-structuring 
of the organisation into autonomous business units. 
In line with the earlier account depicting the managerial desire to use the body to 
obtain the structured involvement of employees, managerial actors were again keen 
to suggest a desire to take advantage of the legislative requirements to engage 
employees in this element of corporate decision making. The reality of the 
situation, however, was less benign; consultation was depicted by representatives 
as having minimal impact on such strategically important decisions. The most 
significant findings emerged within the context of the branch closure programme. 
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Here, it was evident that consultation carried minimal purchase with regard to the 
substantive decision, notwithstanding the legal requirement that consultation take 
place with a view to avoiding dismissals. Several representatives responded to 
senior managerial exhortations for the submission of business plans demonstrative 
of branch viability. However, the widespread view was that this represented a 
perfunctory exercise - mere `window dressing'. The following was a standard 
complaint: 
They [management] said if you feel the branch is viable put forward a 
business plan - so we did. It was a very good business plan, I have been a 
management consultant and this was a good business plan - you could have 
gone to a bank and borrowed money on it. But FinanceCo said no, well they 
didn't even take it out. I don't believe that they ever actually read it - they 
had made that decision and nothing was going to change that decision. 
(Representative, retail council) 
Echoing the position at MediCo, the evidence again suggests that the representative 
body allows management to discharge their legislative duty within a minimalist 
interpretation of the regulations, effectively leaving managerial prerogatives intact. 
This of course raises issues regarding both the efficacy of the voice process and the 
compatibility of both defensive and more proactively formulated goals - themes we 
will pick up on later in the thesis. 
With regard to FridgeCo, as within both other organisations, the increasingly 
dirigiste legislative climate had of late served to further bolster the perceived 
importance of the body as a managerial tool. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
research period coincided with the fortunes of the company being at their 
historical 
nadir. Unsurprisingly, therefore, FridgeCo had in recent years experienced 
redundancies and had been obliged to implement consultation under the relevant 
140 
regulations. Indeed, the redundancy procedure had been invoked just 12 months 
prior to the research commencing with the loss of 84 production jobs. 
As within the other companies the evidence suggests that management used the 
standing body to formally discharge the various legislative duties incumbent upon 
them, with a similarly narrow interpretation of the legislation invoked to avoid the 
more potentially erroneous procedural implications. Again significantly the 
provision that employers must consult workers' representatives with the purpose of 
finding ways of avoiding the dismissals was adeptly sidestepped. It is evident that 
in the 1999 redundancy episode management had made a decision regarding the 
precise number of employees that would be affected prior to the consultation 
period being invoked, reducing the process to one of merely explaining the 
decision. The implementation of the statutory procedure accompanying the 
redundancies was minuted thus: 
`John Smith' [finance director] stated that due to various factors the 
company's share of the refrigeration market had dropped. The new range 
has not been as well received as expected. Production volumes have had to 
be trimmed down in line with the lower sales volume and therefore 
FridgeCo's cost base will have to be reduced. This will be achieved with 
redundancies. Just under 100 people will be made redundant. 
Again an interesting facet was the skilful handling of the process. In the run up to 
the redundancy notification the minutes highlighted the systematic positioning of 
business data appertaining to various economic issues. It is evident that in such 
situations the heavy use of the standing body as a communications forum serves a 
useful complementary function for management, providing an early opportunity 
for 
the preparation of the ground for redundancy notification. In McArdle et al 
's. 
(1995: 167) terms, `the use of the logics of the market to legitimise managerial 
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action'. Within such a context the legislative demands that require companies to 
seek ways of avoiding dismissals, and search for accommodation (Deakin and 
Morris, 2001: 806), is discharged relatively easily, in that attitudinal structuring 
conceivably mediates the potential for employee challenge to the logic of 
managerial action. Indeed, so consummate was management's command of events 
that not only was its version of reality unchallenged, but the body was similarly 
fused into the management function - as the production director observed: 
They [representatives] did a lot of work talking to people about the need for 
redundancies and so on and so forth and therefore that eased the burden. 
They would take on some of the communications, some of the 
responsibility. They effectively became another 14 people who would 
actually recognise that the redundancies were inevitable and were actually 
helping us to see it through in the fairest way possible. 
Taken together the three case studies would suggest that the ongoing support for a 
standing consultative body is very much additionally informed by the need for 
legal compliance, the legislative context must, therefore, be viewed as a further 
important push factor illuminating the managerial interest in NERs. A more 
discriminating analysis, however, suggests links with elements of the earlier 
discussion appertaining to union avoidance. The MediCo and FridgeCo studies are 
notable in this respect. As observed, in the former instance the ECC is proactively 
involved in the setting of criteria for redundancy selection. At FridgeCo the council 
is likewise procedurally brought very closely into the consultation process. Such 
involvement is suggestive of an element of extra-managerial policing of corporate 
behaviour by a putative standing opposition, connecting into the union substitution 
goals reviewed. More subtly, Sargeant (2001: 489) has argued that `management 
may see the process of mandatory consultation as a way of legitimising its 
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decisions'. Indeed such functionality was explicitly embraced by the FridgeCo 
production director: 
You present to them the need why we feel we have to do it, and if they see 
it from the same perspective, or accept that it is inevitable, then it kind of 
reinforces that, it makes sense of what we are doing. 
In such instances the ostensible ratification by a standing representative body is 
potentially politically expedient. At a symbolic level it is suggestive to both 
internal and external audiences of the trappings of organisational pluralism, whilst 
the ability to systematically build representative support affords a legitimacy and 
cogency to managerial action, mediating the potential for destabilising workforce 
dissent. As such these themes connect with the goals relating to union evasion, 
suggesting a degree of synergy between managerial priorities and the use of a 
standing consultative body to discharge the de jure requirements. 
4.6 Discussion 
This chapter has examined the managerial motivation underpinning the presence of 
NERs in each of the three study organisations. The architecture for the discussion 
was set early in the chapter when the extant literature was explored: this ultimately 
involved the merging of elements of the generic academic discourse on 
participation with the more detailed case study data. Drawing on the work of the 
UMIST team the potential managerial objectives underlying participatory 
structures, and by extrapolation the presence of NERs, were presented as 
representing differing emphases relating to `industrial relations' and 
`market' 
participation. The former position was summarised, in the context of this study, as 
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being preoccupied with the maintenance of managerial prerogative through the 
amelioration of shopfloor power via a strategy of union avoidance. Following the 
integration of the detailed case study data a further distinction was made between 
`substitution' and `acculturation' approaches to such eschewal of union influence. 
Conversely a market participatory approach was deemed to be an entirely different 
managerial position concerned with more apolitical goals targeted at achieving 
outcomes in and around employee engagement, commitment and retention. The 
corollary to the above typology was the premise that managerial interest in NERs 
might be best understood as a response to an array of contingencies. The chapter 
thus moved on to explore the perceived complementaries between institutional 
preference and wider business priorities. What this chapter has demonstrated 
unequivocally is the applicability of the contingency derived approach to this area 
of study, the managerial rationale underpinning the presence of these bodies being 
permeated by a variety of motives. The analysis has graphically highlighted the 
need to consider the particular organisational context when seeking to unravel the 
managerial goals underpinning the presence of NERs, and highlights again the 
inadequacies of resorting to `grand theory', pace Ramsay, as an explanation for 
complex micro-level social phenomena. We have seen the difficulties in imputing 
one overriding strand of emphasis relating to the control of labour, when business 
priorities are themselves much more complex. Similarly, by isolating one 
participatory intervention the chapter has further informed the debate on the links 
between employee involvement and various contextual factors. 
Only at MediCo were the goals of the senior managerial team seen to be derived 
solely from within an industrial relations perspective. This in essence represented 
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an exemplar of the Ramsayesque thesis, with managerial aims being concerned 
principally with the maintenance of control and the subjugation of any potential 
shopfloor power. It was clear that both the genesis of the ECC and the continued 
managerial resourcing were based upon the desire to pre-empt union organisation. 
The council was very much a trade union substitute, with the annual pay review 
central to the remit of the institution. Management were seen to go to considerable 
lengths to construct a facade where outwardly the process had the appearance of 
plant level collective bargaining, with what Ramsay terms pseudo participation 
very much in evidence, replete with ostensible managerial concessions. 
In contrast to MediCo the position at both FinanceCo and FridgeCo was seen to be 
far more complex as the milieu of motive was additionally permeated strongly by 
labour process and labour market considerations. To be sure, as discussed below, a 
commonality across all three organisations was the desire to maintain a union free 
environment - albeit with variable levels of emphasis - as a push factor towards the 
creation of the relevant NER structure. However, within the latter two companies 
there was a marked intra-organisational divergence of intent amongst managers. At 
FinanceCo it was evident that a variety of commercial pressures were serving to 
buttress the partners' council as a component of a market participatory approach. 
Consequently, in addition to the implicit goal of union avoidance, the espoused 
benefits were articulated in terms of employee engagement, cooperation or `buy- 
in', and retention. At FridgeCo, where the company council was created following 
the de-recognition of the incumbent trade union, a clear managerial driver behind 
the body was again deemed to be a desire to appease residual employee demands 
for collective representation, through the creation of a managerial surrogate. 
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Nevertheless, the wish to utilise the body as the cornerstone of a market 
participatory approach surfaced, with the company council's introduction, at least, 
representing a component of an envisaged shift to a total quality management 
culture. 
As noted, one of the key findings of the analysis was the use of representative 
structures as implicit components of a wider corporate non-union policy. Within all 
organisations this was seen to include elements of both the substitution and 
acculturation formats modelled early in the chapter. Although the theme of 
avoidance is present in much of the case study literature previous researchers, save 
Lloyd (2001), have not sought to engage directly with a discussion of the perceived 
business benefits or commercial advantage to be accrued through such a strategy. 
Rather non-union status is treated as a `free floating' end state, with minimal 
strides made to integrate this into an exploration of wider corporate strategy. 
Earlier in the chapter the notion of unions as monopoly agents was introduced. The 
potential material benefits of non-union status were theorised as falling under two 
headings: reduced labour costs and the overcoming of resistance to organisational 
change and flexibility (Freeman and Medoff, 1984: 13). It was noted that within the 
wider literature such perceptions of a purported non-union incentive carry 
significant purchase amongst managers. As will be seen in the subsequent chapter, 
managements in all organisations have sought to clearly delineate the degree of 
employee empowerment manifest through the agency of the relevant representative 
body to insulate managerial prerogatives - but to which primary goal is this 
targeted? This chapter has clearly demonstrated that concerns in and around 
flexibility and organisational change were the principal contingencies informing 
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managerial thinking. At MediCo disquiet regarding the union issue was discussed 
by senior managers in terms of the concepts of `flexibility' and `bureaucracy', 
rather than labour costs, indeed wage levels fall within the upper third of the local 
pay league and are benchmarked against neighbouring firms, some of whom are 
unionised. The preference for non-union status was additionally positioned within 
the context of corporate divestment and investment decision making. The perceived 
flexibility was regarded locally as commercially advantageous given that the 
competing European satellite plants were mostly unionised; a status that was 
perceived as hindering the ability of the relevant management to initiate change or 
`push things through'. 
Similarly at FinanceCo goals were seen to relate to flexibility and organisational 
change reflecting concerns in and around the desire to remain fleet of foot within a 
very fast moving sector, and the apprehension that unionisation `would slow things 
down' and `tie us up in red tape'. As with MediCo the lower wage costs allegedly 
associated with non-unionism were not in evidence, salary levels being 
benchmarked against the industry norm. Nevertheless, the theme of pay flexibility 
was an apparent referent. 
A further concern of senior management at FinanceCo was that of the perceived 
`confrontational' nature of the banking unions. Flood and Toner (1997: 266) have 
used the concept of the `psychological contract' to articulate managerial concerns 
within non-union firms, in essence the notion that trade union representation 
inevitably imports and promotes an adversarial climate undermining the building of 
a consensus culture and atmosphere of high motivation. Within the FinanceCo 
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study there were again hints that trade unionism would import an ideological 
contagion that could potentially destabilise the employment relationship, impairing 
business efficiency. 
FridgeCo represents the only example within our case studies where a low wage 
strategy was being pursued for commercial advantage. This will be given full 
coverage in chapter 5 when the efficacy of the voice process is reviewed. Suffice to 
say at this stage that a wage freeze had effectively been in operation during the five 
years prior to the close of research with management apparently pursuing a non- 
union incentive via this particular route. It is tempting, therefore, to view the 
original de-recognition of the incumbent trade union and its replacement with a 
purely consultative vehicle teleologically, as a purposeful and strategic attempt by 
management to reduce labour costs within a highly competitive sector. Such a 
conclusion, however, would represent an over-rationalisation of managerial action; 
as Nolan and Edwards (cited in Hyman, 1987: 31) caution, there are dangers in 
`investing employers with impossible amounts of knowledge, cunning and 
foresight'. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the organisational move to a new 
cellular production format was beset with a range of difficulties, not least increased 
down-time and a drop in sales due to a poorly received new product launch. These 
additional cost pressures ultimately triggering the subsequent wage freeze - such 
financial shocks, however, were not in any way foreseeable. To be sure, the pay 
bill did become an overriding concern and it would in all likelihood have been 
more difficult to control labour costs so tenaciously in a unionised setting - not 
least the number of redundancies and terms of severance; but there is no evidence 
that this was uppermost in management eyes at the outset of the non-union policy. 
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Indeed, the de-recognition of the trade union coincided with an organisational 
attempt to move the product range away from a low price strategy to a more 
specialised market niche where a price premium could be supported. The evidence 
presented is strongly suggestive that any benefits accruing from union avoidance 
per se were originally, at least, again perceived by management in terms of 
flexibility and innovation, more particularly the assuaging of potential resistance to 
the introduction of cellular working and, perhaps more pertinently, ancillary 
modifications to working practices, i. e. the introduction of shift working. 
A stated aim in the introduction to this chapter was the addressing of the hypothesis 
that NERs, within a suitable environment, might be created for reasons solely of 
market participation. In none of the study organisations was motive tracked 
exclusively towards this goal with union considerations deemed unimportant. 
However, at FinanceCo and FridgeCo the senior managerial motivation 
underpinning the bodies was seen to straddle goals aimed simultaneously at both 
industrial relations and market participation. This use of the relevant councils as 
components of a market participatory approach was informed by contingencies 
relating to both labour market pressures and the evolving and increasingly 
demanding nature of the labour process. Within the context of FinanceCo, at retail 
level the last decade has been one of almost continual change as the company has 
sought to better hone the services on offer in response to an increasingly 
competitive terrain. Employee motivation was acknowledged as a problem, 
particularly where employees failed to `buy-in' to the ongoing organisational 
change, undermining the quality of service delivery within an 
increasingly 
customer orientated environment. Given that the nature of cashiering 
is 
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progressively being transformed into the more demanding and proactive function 
of cross selling, this was of concern to senior branch officials. There was hence a 
desire to engage in early two-way communication through the PC to encourage 
`buy-in' and to `unblock problems'. At head office labour market problems were 
the core driver where there was an extremely tight labour market for certain 
categories of worker. This resulted in a desire therefore to stabilise the workforce, 
particularly in relation to those with scarce aptitudes and experience, while the 
mediation of turnover was seen as having other epiphenomenal effects including 
reduced recruitment and training costs. Indeed, taking the evidence as a whole at 
FinanceCo what emerged was an extremely variegated picture. While a multiplicity 
of motives were being pursued through the body, different emphases were clearly 
evident in relation to specific business units, markedly, as noted, the retention of 
employees in sensitive market positions at head office and employee motivation at 
branch level, with the desire for union avoidance representing the common 
denominator. 
At FridgeCo the anticipated reviving and modernising of the plant en route to a 
total quality format was likewise a distinct driver giving rise initially to clear 
market participatory goals, i. e. goals directed beyond simple plant control issues. 
The switch from a flow-line to a more individually demanding cellular production 
format was perceived by the production director as requiring a complementary shift 
to a high involvement culture. Accordingly the company council originally formed 
the centre piece of an array of soft TQM practices including kaizen, team briefings 
and workwear positioned to deliver the greater workforce engagement required 
under the terms of the new production regime. As similarly observed, however, in 
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this instance the ensuing financial crisis very much served to subvert the 
development of this more creative agenda. 
The research has likewise highlighted the dynamic nature of the participatory 
process. The benefits sought may evolve or be re-prioritised due to a myriad of 
external pressures and shocks. Similarly, the internal profile or overall `centrality' 
(Marchington, et al. 1993: 559) afforded to such participative structures may vary. 
In regard to the former theme, at FridgeCo, despite the original genesis of the 
company council being depicted in terms of goals relating to both organisational 
change and employee involvement, by the time of the research a cost crisis had 
triggered the more narrow pursuit of a non-union incentive in relation to pay 
strategy. With regard to the theme of `centrality', at FinanceCo heightened overall 
attention was being paid to the consultative process following the introduction of a 
statutory formula for trade union recognition, manifest in the re-modelling of the 
representative format. This was evinced in an alteration to the terms of reference of 
the body with an increasing focus on distributional, in essence wages issues, as 
well as those staples of an integrational nature. The legislative intervention had 
clearly acted as a stimulus for an overhaul to the representative format. 
Marchington et al. (ibid) have usefully captured such change in the managerial 
prioritisation of participatory initiatives via a `waves' metaphor. The central 
argument is that the nature of participation varies over time, and is the result of a 
variety of influences giving rise to `waves' of managerial interest. On a similar 
theme of dynamism, specifically with regard to indirect representation, Poole 
(1978: 79) has argued that `at the micro-level it is clear that the nature of joint 
consultation machinery is a particularly sensitive barometer of the organisational 
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strength of workers'. This `ebb and flow' in managerial interest as a response to 
micro-level tensions is a core theme to which we will return in the concluding 
chapter. 
Finally, within this section the increasing requirement for legally derived 
consultation needs to be reviewed. FinanceCo was the only organisation amongst 
the case study group where formal reference was made to the need for legal 
compliance. However, consultation periods, as required by redundancy legislation, 
had been invoked in all organisations within the two year period directly prior to 
the research. In each instance management elected to extend the status of the 
standing body as opposed to the convening of additional ad hoc consultative 
vehicles. It was apparent that all councils served to ensure formal legal compliance, 
while usefully rendering management prerogatives intact, despite the legislative 
onus on the need for consultation towards the purpose of avoiding dismissals. It 
was similarly evident that within two of the organisations the perceived utility to 
management went beyond the mere discharging of the legislative burden. Both 
MediCo and FridgeCo had sought procedurally to bring the relevant representatives 
very closely into the process. This was demonstrated at MediCo where the 
representatives were involved with management in the ongoing process of drafting 
the redundancy criteria. One interpretation of this would be that management was 
simply discharging, or indeed going beyond, its duty under the legislation, to 
provide information as to the proposed method of redundancy selection. However, 
given the manipulation of the body catalogued within the pay talks it would be 
naive to assume that management do not consider the incorporative potential, and 
the possible use of such procedural consultation as a means of diffusing embryonic 
152 
conflict. Indeed, by so enmeshing the standing body in the establishment of 
redundancy criteria this both discharges one of the legislative responsibilities and 
plausibly transfers some of the managerial burden to the employee group. Further 
evidence was provided of this at FridgeCo where representatives were brought very 
closely into the redundancy process. The evidence is thus suggestive that beyond 
their de jure role in such instances, a standing representative body may be 
perceived as useful ideologically as a means of legitimising managerial action. 
This chapter has argued that in creating and sustaining NERs management are 
pursuant of a medley of aims. As yet, however, we have not addressed the crucial 
issue of whether the anticipated goals are realised. This is a theme to which we will 
return. Prior to moving on to such an evaluation of outcomes, however, it is 
necessary firstly to scrutinise the efficacy of the representative bodies as theatres 
for the provision of voice, as differences in this respect impact directly upon the 
realisation of both the defensive and more proactively formulated goals. It is to this 
task that we now turn. 
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Notes 
1. It is also possible to identify a fourth variant: the industrial democracy model. 
This perspective is inspired by democratic goals per se. As Bolle De Bal 
(1992: 604) notes `participation is seen not only as a means to an end in itself [but] 
a way to create a strongly democratic society, characterised by active, participative 
citizens'. Democratic and political theorists (cf. Pateman, 1970; Mason, 1982) have 
long advocated the democratisation of the workplace as `an incisive challenge to 
the liberal separation of democracy from the institutions of everyday life' 
(Pateman, cited in Mason, 1982: xvi). The benign societal outcomes envisaged by 
those rejecting the hegemony of liberal democratic theory include the development 
of an active democratic citizenry (ibid: xvi), and the stability and efficiency of 
social institutions (Sartori, cited in Dachler, 1978: 4). Fundamentally, however, 
from this position participation in the workplace is advanced for the pursuit of 
societal rather than organisational ends. Given that management in capitalist 
enterprise is judged largely upon efficiency and productivity measures, rather than 
civic criteria, a priori it is possible to reject the proposition that managerial interest 
in participatory tools, including council structures, is largely founded upon 
democratic idealism. 
2. While Ramsay uses the term `phantom participation' other commentators, in 
particular democratic and political theorists such as Verba (1961) and Pateman 
(1970), have used the phrase `pseudo-participation' to describe the same 
phenomenon. The two terms will henceforth be treated as synonyms. 
3. Indeed the virtual granting of seminal status to the work is the more problematic 
given that the fundamental tenet - the cyclical nature of the participatory 
phenomenon - was plotted by Michael Poole some two years earlier 
(1975) when 
Workers' Participation in Industry was first published: 
Developments in workers' participation and control, their ebb and flow in 
particular historical periods, their variations in significance in specific 
industries and factories and even their main international variations, can 
largely be attributed to differences in the latent or underlying strength of the 
main industrial classes, parties and groups.... When that is, the underlying 
power of workers as a whole, or their specific organisations, or at the still 
more local level of particular work groups, has for some cause or other 
been enhanced this has usually been expressed at the manifest level of 
power in given developments in participation and control (Poole, 
1978: 38, 
emphasis in original). 
A clear distinction was nevertheless Poole's optimism that the 1970s 
betokened a 
secular shift to workplace democracy, Ramsay's prognosis was of course 
less 
sanguine. 
4. This passage is overlooked by certain commentators who ascribe to 
`cycles' the 
explicit status of theory (cf. for example, Hollinshead et al. 1999: 
394). 
5. As the UMIST team acknowledge (Ackers et al. 1992: 270) this is a point 
conceded by Ramsay in his later work. 
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6. The authors also identify two further positions: `philosophical' and `faddish' 
participation (Ackers et al. 1992: 279-280). The former is problematic in that within 
the four instances depicted as falling under this heading the UMIST team fail to 
make a convincing case that participation is invoked `as an end in itself (ibid: 279), 
a very tight gateway. Indeed, it is conceded that `[managerial] material self interest' 
has played a part in the creation of two of the four schemes. Based on the sketches 
provided it is not possible at one remove to unravel the interwoven complexities of 
managerial intent. However, given that all four of these organisations were heavily 
unionised, trade union marginalisation is a plausible interpretation. Thus, within the 
context of one firm: `ChemCo', it is noted that team briefings were introduced `as a 
vehicle for communication to explain the massive change which the site was 
undergoing' (Marchington et al. 1992: 62). Similarly at another organisation: 
`NTC', unions were fearful of being bypassed following the introduction of a TQM 
scheme. Ultimately it is conjectured that the dominant motivation behind the 
various initiatives in the UMIST study is satisfactorily captured within the 
industrial relations - market participation dichotomy, although broader corporate 
philosophy may represent a contributing pull factor (cf. also note 1. above). 
The problem with the notion of `faddish' participation is not so much that it 
is a flawed depiction of organisational reality, but rather the mere fact of 
participation being `transient, poorly resourced and weakly sponsored' (Ackers et 
al. 1992: 280) does not of itself preclude the presence of motive, no matter how `ill 
defined or grandiosely unrealistic' (ibid). Hence, at one company, `LeisureCo', 
depicted as falling under this heading, while there was little substance to employee 
involvement, participation was nevertheless `[o]stensibly... supposed to hone the 
human resources to the requisite customer care standards' (ibid), i. e. a market 
participatory approach. Given that within the context of my own research the three 
bodies had been in existence for between 8 and 30 years, the very notion of faddish 
participation is in any event rendered a somewhat unsatisfactory depiction. 
7. Terry's study did not include the1999 IDS report, nevertheless the relationships 
identified still hold good. 
8. Again to re-emphasise, this term is used descriptively to avoid inflicting the 
somewhat clumsy construction utilised above ('the nature of the production/service 
regime') repeatedly upon the reader. 
9. Approaching the same phenomenon from a radical perspective Burawoy (1985) 
styles this `hegemonic despotism'; `the tyranny of capital mobility over the 
collective worker' (ibid: 150) allowing management `to command consent to 
sacrifice' (ibid: 127). 
10. The use of `in-house' modes of representation in the guise of ostensibly 
independent Staff Associations has long been a feature of the banking and finance 
sector. Such bodies have similarly been dismissed as attempts by employers to 
keep trade unions at bay (cf. Kelly, 1996: 56). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EFFICACY OF NON-UNION VOICE 
The previous chapter investigated the managerial motives underpinning the presence 
of the representative structures in each of the three study organisations. Taken 
together goals were seen to relate to both `industrial relations' and `market' 
participation, that is the pre-empting of trade union influence and the release of a 
range of organisationally benign individual skills and competencies. Typically, 
however, the aims pursued via traditional modes of voice are couched in terms of the 
furtherance of collective employee interests, rather than those of the enterprise as a 
whole. This chapter, therefore, shifts the empirical field of analysis to the employee 
side and seeks to interrogate the utility of such structures from a workforce 
perspective. 
Within the introductory chapter reference was made to the presence of a perceived 
representation gap within the UK. Drawing on 1998 WERS data it was observed 
that while the majority of employees are indeed nowadays without trade union 
representation, a significant number of such workers nevertheless have access to 
non-union consultative structures. To what extent, therefore, do such bodies serve to 
effectively articulate the interests of employees, and do employees under such 
structures feel empowered in having the ability to formulate and shape the decisions 
that affect their working lives? These are the central themes considered in this 
chapter. 
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A formal conceptualisation of the NER phenomenon was undertaken in the 
introductory chapter. It will be recalled that these bodies represent wholly 
managerial creations and lack formal linkages to the external trade union movement, 
they are perforce totally dependent upon their managerial patrons for funding and 
indeed all forms of resourcing. A key theoretical issue with regard to this mode of 
representation, therefore, centres on its autonomy, i. e. the degree to which such 
bodies are free from managerial interference. Relatedly, and more specifically, the 
data in the previous chapter demonstrated that such representative bodies are apt to 
be exposed to managerial attempts at `acculturation' - the managerial desire to foster 
an alignment of interests. So, what added problems does such overt ideological 
pressure place upon the voice process, particularly given that a formalised counter 
ideological bulwark may well be lacking? This question is additionally considered. 
As will be discussed below, the extant literature expresses broad dissatisfaction with 
NERs as mechanisms of voice provision. While at an empirical level these studies 
provide invaluable data, there are nevertheless severe limitations within the 
contributions. This arises from the essentially descriptive nature of the accounts that 
are unsystematic in their treatment of NER voice provision. Although various 
deficiencies are catalogued, the studies fail to connect these into a coherent analysis. 
More particularly, with regard to the multi-faceted concept of `voice', the term is 
prevalent in the literature, yet it remains largely undefined lacking an explicitly 
stated theoretical framework. There has to date been no attempt to distinguish 
analytically the various components, and explore the multi-dimensional nature of the 
construct, notwithstanding the presence of an array of conceptual tools that might 
potentially facilitate a more penetrating and nuanced understanding. The present 
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treatment seeks to go beyond extant contributions by providing a framework for both 
an empirical and theoretical analysis of the utility of these institutions as theatres for 
the provision of collective voice. 
This chapter is divided into three sections: initially the literature germane to the topic 
of NER voice provision is summarised. Drawing on these empirical observations it is 
evident that a range of defects within this mode of voice have been recorded; 
deficiencies that merge markedly around a uniform set of themes. It is, therefore, 
argued that by default the central components of the voice construct may be plotted 
with some degree of confidence. This gives rise to an analytical framework 
comprising four concepts - power, autonomy, competence and legitimacy - that is 
subsequently used to examine voice provision in a systematic and structured manner. 
Pulling on the wider disciplines of sociology, political science and democratic 
theory, the discussion moves on to operationalise and elaborate on the contours of 
the complex concepts delineated. Armed with some conceptual clarity, the study 
then proceeds to explore the efficacy of the voice process in each of the study 
organisations. The substantive analysis is split into four data sections, with each 
representative structure considered in turn along the principal dimensions articulated 
above. The final sections draw out the key analytical themes and afford a 
comparative assessment of voice in the three study organisations. 
5.1 Insights from Existing Data Sets 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the extant literature dealing with the NER 
phenomenon has largely approached the topic from an organisational 
democracy 
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perspective, typically suffused with an implicit normative preference for orthodox 
trade unionism as a counter to the apparent democratic deficit. Although as noted 
these studies are essentially descriptive in nature, they nevertheless provide a useful 
source of data within which to explore the contours of effective voice. Two 
approaches may be distinguished; firstly, there are those studies that track non-union 
representation in a post de-recognition context (cf. Lloyd, 2001; Watling and Snook, 
2001). Characteristically employers seek to reassert a power balance more 
favourable to management and the voice process is thus observed against the 
backdrop of a reorientation and decline in employee influence. For the researcher 
this usefully serves to throw into sharp relief various shortcomings in voice 
provision. Conversely, another group of studies may be distinguished where NERs 
are emplaced in organisations with no history of unionisation - often new start ups 
(cf. Broad, 1994; Gollan, 2001). Clearly such studies lack the comparative dimension 
that is often present in the former where voice is judged against a trade union 
benchmark, but nevertheless, analytically both sets of studies coalesce markedly 
around a common set of themes. Although the studies are framed within a myriad of 
organisational contexts, and the representative structures are themselves diverse with 
respect to constituencies, resources and terms of reference, the overall picture is one 
of remarkable homogeneity. Given the consistency of findings in this respect there is 
little to be gained theoretically from a tedious trawl through, and rehearsal of, the 
individual data sets. Such uniformity may, however, be usefully summarised and 
abstracted to serve as a basis for analysis. Firstly, the structures are universally 
deemed as possessing limited power and influence vis-a-vis management, and this 
renders attempts to modify or frustrate the managerial agenda, or indeed vigorously 
and proactively pursue an independent set of goals, problematic. Secondly, concerns 
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are expressed with regard to the capability and expertise of delegates in undertaking 
their representative function. The tone is broadly one of employees being co-opted 
into the role of representative with minimal training. Thirdly, given that these 
structures exist under the patronage of management widespread disquiet is perhaps 
inevitably expressed with regard to the degree of institutional distance evident 
between delegates and their managerial sponsors. This feeds into concerns with 
regard to the extent to which these institutions are free to formulate both policy and 
strategy independently. Fourthly, the representative-constituent interface warrants 
comment, the frequency and quality of contact being a clear point of anxiety. This 
processual aspect of representation is demonstrably multi-faceted but Terry 
(1999: 20) has suggested that constituents might reasonably expect through the 
agency of their representative to be given access to a range of services. These 
include: the receipt of information, the ability to raise grievances and indirectly 
influence the terms and conditions of employment, and more generally, simply have 
their views sought. Onerous constituency sizes, vacant seats and the absence of 
formal feedback mechanisms are all seen to hinder the interaction between 
representatives and constituents, obviating the provision of such core representative 
services. In view of the above collection of shortcomings the bodies are uniformly 
viewed as lacking in credibility, particularly amongst important constituencies 
adversely affected by given decisions. Ultimately the consistency 
in findings is again 
replicated in the tendency for the representative structures to prove somewhat 
unstable, indeed in three of the four studies (Broad, 1994; Gollan, 
2001; Watling and 
Snook, 2001) the institutions are eventually ousted and superseded by trade union 
recognition agreements. 
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The above summary facilitates some considerable unpacking of the rather vague 
notion of `voice'. Drawing on these studies effective voice appears to presuppose a 
basic set of inputs or resources that may be organised parsimoniously around four 
central themes or concepts: power, autonomy, competence and legitimacy. All four 
of the concepts abstracted will be afforded detailed coverage; however, legitimacy 
must be differentiated in that it has distinct properties. Suffice to say at this stage that 
it represents both an input, or resource, and a derivative of the voice process. Within 
the latter context legitimacy must be viewed as a subjectively conferred state 
concerned with the `feeling of oughtness' (French and Raven, 1968: 262); in the 
words of Suchman (1995: 574) `legitimacy is socially constructed in that it reflects a 
congruence between the behaviour of the legitimised entity and the shared (or 
assumed) beliefs of some social group' (emphasis in original). Such legitimacy if 
realised, however, similarly captures conceptually an important element of an 
institution's access to resources (Chaison and Bigelow, 2002: 9). Accordingly, 
various commentators (cf. Chaison and Bigelow, 2002; Greenfield and Pleasure, 
1993, Hege and Dufour, 1995; Hyman, 1997) have invoked the primacy of 
legitimacy as a dimension under which systems of employee voice should be 
evaluated. Indeed, it will be argued that legitimacy represents the fulcrum on which 
the realisation of collective power resources turns; therefore there is good reason to 
regard it as the sine qua non of effective voice. 
The four dimensional framework outlined orders the discussion that follows. Initially 
drawing on the wider disciplines of political science, democratic theory and 
sociology the main theoretical and analytical issues surrounding the concepts are 
explored. We then operationalise the four spheres of voice through the provision of 
161 
empirical definitions in each instance. The three NER structures are then evaluated 
along the four principal dimensions articulated. Inevitably the conceptualisations to 
be developed do not provide totally discrete entities; as will become clear, the 
distinction between certain aspects of power and the constructions of the other 
concepts is particularly opaque and requires sensitive treatment. 
5.2 Power 
In line with the above analysis Greenfield and Pleasure (1993: 172) have argued that 
a necessary yardstick for assessing whether any entity provides true voice for 
workers is power: 
Is the nature of the voice expressed such that it carries with it the power to 
effectively voice workers' concerns (i. e., does this voice have the capacity to 
effectively influence decisions with which the workers are concerned? ). 
Given the close attention traditionally paid to power within the context of trade 
union analyses such a proposition may be regarded as soundly based. Unfortunately 
the above scholars fail to seriously interrogate the concept of power beyond the 
standard sociological offering that `power is often described as the ability to bring 
about outcomes you desire' (ibid: 178). This is a common enough failing, as 
notwithstanding the centrality of power to various facets of the employment 
relationship, the term remains poorly articulated. Such cursory treatment has invoked 
the criticism from Kelly (1998: 10) that `the concept tends to be used in a purely 
commonsensical way without definition or explication' by industrial relations 
commentators; sentiments echoed by Kirkbride (1986a: 13): `the concept represents a 
major lacuna in the theoretical development of the discipline'. Whilst an applied 
162 
study of this kind cannot remedy such an omission, a full examination of the 
contours of the concept remains essential to any thorough assessment of voice since, 
as will be demonstrated, power may be manifest in a number of subtle guises. 
Michael Poole is one of the few industrial relations specialists to attempt a formal 
conceptualisation of power. In Workers 'Participation in Industry (1978) Poole 
provides a three dimensional model, linking power resources to the extent of 
participation in the workplace. Poole's multi-faceted view of power thus provides a 
useful canvas on which to focus the following discussion. 
Within Poole's analytical framework, the most obvious interpretation of power is 
deemed to be `manifest power' (ibid: 13). This `involves equating the concept with 
certain of its more obvious manifestations', e. g. income and wealth, formal position 
within particular societies and organisations, and the scope and range of issues 
controlled or influenced by particular parties. From the perspective of employee 
voice, the latter manifestation is the most directly relevant. Operationally a simple 
continuum outlining the scope and range of issues influenced (or controlled) by the 
representative agency may be utilised to capture this rudimentary aspect of power. 
The typologies below draw heavily upon the work of Shuchman (cited in Poole, 
1978: 26-27) and Bernstein (1976). 
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Table 2: The Scope of Employee Participation 
5 Negotiation/collective bargaining: representatives meet with management to veto or 
approve decisions; if veto management submits modifications 
4 High-level consultation: workers initiate criticism and suggestions. Management still has 
sole power to decide, but usually adopt worker proposals 
3 Mid-level consultation: same as below, but the outcome may stimulate managerial re- 
consideration 
2 Low-level consultation: managers give prior notice of certain changes, representatives 
have chance to voice their views 
1 Right to information 
With regard to scope (Table 2, above) it should be noted that the taxonomy is an 
abridged version of the originals. Given that their focus was an evaluation of 
workplace democracy, very much the leitmotif of the discipline in the 1970s, various 
higher order categories e. g. joint power or partnership have been omitted. As can be 
seen, there are a range of variables. Consultation itself is a term that raises immense 
definitional problems; in part this is avoided by presenting the term as a continuum. 
The range of issues (Table 3, below) provides the second dimension of manifest 
power, again drawing upon the work of Shuchman and Bernstein the following 
taxonomy is derived: 
Table 3: The Range of Emnlovee Participation 
10 Investment in new machines and buildings 
9 Job security - lay offs 
8 Pace: how the job is done 
7 Setting wages 
6 Promotion 
5 Fringe benefits: collective welfare/income (e. g. medical - pensions) 
4 Hiring 
3 Discipline 
2 Training 
1 Physical working conditions 
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As with scope, the categorisation represents a precis reflecting the task in hand. 
Likewise, as originally noted by Bernstein (1976: 53), the ranking must be regarded 
as an approximate averaging of the importance placed on these issues by employees 
and managers. Some care must be taken additionally in not assuming that influence 
over one issue level automatically confers it on those below it. 
Accepting that the above model sketches but one dimension of power, Poole 
(1978: 17) additionally draws attention to the work of so called latent power theorists 
(e. g. Marx and Bierstedt), who have sought to move beyond the more `concrete 
manifestations' of power. Here the focus is on power bases or sources; central to this 
is the notion of `resource possession' (Kirkbride, 1992: 72). As Poole (1978: 17) 
advises, `it is the general view of latent theorists that no group or class has the 
capacity to exercise power unless it first develops certain power bases'. Employee 
power within this framework is classically considered within a trade union context 
where through collective organisation employees can apply sanctions or impose 
costs in an attempt to coerce the employer into accepting various demands. 
Characteristically, the extant literature on NERs suggests that a similar ability to 
inflict costs upon the employer via strikes or go slows etc is absent, but this apparent 
lack of ability to unite and bring combined pressure to bear has not been theoretically 
explored in any way - this study seeks to correct this empirical oversight. Within a 
unionised setting several studies have pointed to the pivotal role that leadership plays 
in inculcating and stimulating the collective awareness and activism necessary for 
the creation of a latent power base (cf. Fosh, 1993; Greene et al. 2000; Metochi, 
2002). Similarly mobilisation theory (cf Kelly, 1998; 34-36) stresses the importance 
and multi-faceted role that leadership plays in the acquisition of collective power 
resources. The theoretical problem of mobilisation and linkages to latent power 
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resources, however, must be considered not only within the context of workforce 
mobilisation, but more subtly with regard to the mobilisation of argument vis-a-vis 
management. While effective leadership would appear to presuppose recourse to 
both elements, it has been suggested, nevertheless, that reliance predominantly upon 
the latter may still yield tangible advances. Thus, as Kirkbride has argued (1992: 77): 
4 even in situations of resource imbalance the weaker party possesses a certain 
amount of power and one of the forms that this can take is the skilled use of rhetoric 
and argument'. Kirkbride's account usefully draws attention to the use of `linguistic 
resources' (ibid: 76), as well as those of a physical and material nature. Central 
components of the former are deemed to be `legitimising principles' (ibid: 77). As 
Kelly (1998: 12) has argued `legitimising principles are important because employers 
not only want production, they also want to rule the workplace with the consent of 
the workforce'. On the same theme Armstrong et al. (cited in Kirkbride, 1992: 79) 
observe that: 
In any cultural setting there are certain acceptable motives for action [what we 
call `legitimising principles'] which are in turn, embedded in the characteristic 
world view (ideology) of that culture. 
As Kirkbride advises (1992: 79) in his own study of a functioning non-union 
company council, in order to influence outcomes representatives must `identify and 
articulate' such acceptable motives. Legitimising arguments proffered by 
management include their legal right to manage, competitive pressures and the need 
for efficiency (Armstrong, cited in Kirkbride, ibid). Conversely, employee 
representatives may utilise management's arguments or `consensual principles of 
justification' (ibid). These may include consistency of treatment, precedent and 
ethical standards of behaviour (ibid). 
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The third and final component of Poole's model focuses on values and ideology, 
which are deemed to be `mental resources' (Poole, 1978: 19) at the disposal of 
management. Poole (ibid) goes on to argue that these `form a critical link between 
the other latent or potential aspects [of power] and their actual realisation'. Any 
evaluation of employee power, therefore, needs to closely consider managerial 
values and ideology, given that ideological domination may serve to preclude any 
power realisation. The potential for such an occlusion may be especially acute within 
non-union organisations due to the absence of a formalised counter ideology, 
juxtaposed against an often stridently communicated unitarist managerial rhetoric, 
expressing the norms of managerial prerogative, managerial competence and 
management's right to manage. The use of mental resources is a theme developed by 
Lukes (1974: 28; cf, also Hyman, 1975: 26): 
Is not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things, either because they see it as natural and 
unchangeable or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? 
Although this topic is an apposite area of inquiry, it is evident from the above 
discussion that the use of `mental resources' is thematically more directly pertinent 
to an evaluation of managerial power, rather than that of an employee group. The 
mobilisation of such ideological resources by management may have important 
ramifications for the ability of NER structures to shape and implement an 
independent agenda. This is a theme that is central to the notion of institutional 
autonomy, as managerial attempts to influence employee preferences a priori 
through the internalisation of managerial norms, e. g. via systematic briefing, have 
the potential to prevent opposition from ever surfacing; accordingly full coverage is 
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provided under that heading. The immediate task, however, is that of appraising the 
manifest and latent power resources of the three NER structures under review, the 
principal areas of inquiry being their terms of reference, both formal and informal, 
and issues appertaining to the mobilisation of both people and argument. It is to that 
task that we now turn. 
5.2.1 MediCo 
Although the analytical framework utilised here is built around four concepts, power 
represents the only one of these abstractions referred to directly by interviewees in 
any of the three organisations. This convergence in vocabulary between the 
academic and the vernacular is demonstrative of the pivotal role of power as a 
component of voice - certainly in the eyes of MediCo employees it was very much 
regarded as the pre-eminent variable. Indeed, within the survey 77% of employees 
agreed with the statement that: `the balance of power between management and 
employees is too heavily in favour of management', sentiments reflected in the 
following characteristic comments: 
My perception of the ECC at the moment is very similar to what it was 
before, I think the majority of people are on there for the right reasons - but I 
think they have no power. (Tank-room operative) 
I don't think that you have any input at all, don't get me wrong I enjoyed 
being on it, but for something important I don't think that you have any 
power whatsoever. (Ex-representative) 
Reference was made above to the commonsensical use of the term power within the 
discipline of industrial relations. That the above non-academic community might use 
the concept in a rather imprecise manner is understandable; however, if we move 
away from the matter-of-fact and seek to engage in a more thorough theoretical 
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analysis is the body genuinely powerless, or is it perhaps wise to heed Batstone and 
Gourlay's (cited in Kelly, 1998: 11) caution that, `as long as the employer wants 
production the workers have some degree of power'. 
Manifest Power 
Drawing on the typologies outlined in Tables 2 and 3, the most salient finding relates 
to the limited scope of discussions, which does not extend beyond the terrain of 
consultation. While the senior management team were anxious to portray the annual 
pay review as a negotiating process the reality of the situation, as demonstrated in 
chapter 4, is that pay settlements represent in practice a fait accompli, with 
representatives possessing no right of veto. The annual pay review may be viewed at 
best as a process of `mid-level' consultation (see Table 2), in the sense that the 
discussion may invoke some managerial re-consideration, albeit of a fairly marginal 
nature. Unsurprisingly, the higher ranking categories of investment, pace, and job 
security were very much the domain of unfettered managerial prerogative; in the 
context of the former two categories representative `participation' was limited to top 
down information provision. 
Job security or redundancy is subject to legislative regulation; by law management 
are required to consult with employees or their representatives. In terms of Table 2 
the consultation process, however, may again most accurately be styled as `low- 
level' consultation. As similarly discussed in the previous chapter the plant has 
recently experienced redundancies; although representatives were involved in 
devising a selection mechanism, any discussion of the number of employees affected 
or the business case for the course of action was strictly off limits. 
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Promotions, training and hiring while ranked fairly low in the above schema are not 
included at all within the terms of reference of the body. Similarly, there is limited 
influence over fringe benefits. Finally, at the bottom end of range, the issue of 
physical working conditions was very much live at the time of the research. 
Repetitive strain injury in particular was common amongst line operatives due to the 
very short cycle time in operation. Nevertheless, while such issues were raised at 
council meetings the topic was effectively subsumed under the banner of `how the 
job is done', an area of unfettered managerial prerogative. 
In sum, the above account mirrors much of the extant research into these bodies with 
the influence of the institution extending no further than mid-level consultation on a 
fairly limited range of issues. There is, therefore, to use Poole's technical 
terminology a relative absence of manifest power. 
Latent Power 
Although Poole presents latent power as a discrete second dimension there is a 
complex interaction between power of a manifest and latent nature; indeed the 
limited remit of the institution is largely explicable in terms of the body's 
impoverished latent power base. Typically where interest representation is 
concerned, this component of power is discussed within a trade union context. The 
proxy variable of union coverage allied to a subjective component - Offe and 
Wiesenthal's concept of `willingness to act' (cited in Kelly, 1998: 12) - is seen to 
afford trade unions variable quantities of latent power. There is, however, no a priori 
reason as to why a non-union workforce should not similarly engage in collective 
action. Certainly, there is evidence of employee belligerence to managerial proposals 
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surfacing in non union settings (cf. Lloyd, 2001), and of such rancour achieving 
tangible concessions (cf. Scott, 1994: 121). Earlier in the chapter, the lynch-pin role 
of leadership in employee mobilisation was briefly discussed. A key facet of 
MediCo, and indeed all three studies, however, was the largely inert stance taken by 
the representatives vis-a-vis their constituents. Certainly the incumbent delegates at 
MediCo viewed their day-to-day role very much as passive ciphers of information, 
with seemingly no attempt made to instill into employees any sense of collective 
awareness and activism, as two representatives remarked concerning the pay talks: 
If we said to them [employees] we totally disagree, we should withhold our 
services for a day it wouldn't work, you wouldn't have the backing. I don't 
think there is anyone here who would actually say I am not coming to work 
one day because the pay deal is not enough. 
Management have to really negotiate with unions because the unions have 
power - we have nothing. We can't go back to the workforce and say we 
don't want you to accept this, we will do a go slow or a work to rule. We 
can't can we? 
The above passages are informative in demonstrating the inertia of representatives 
and the absence of proactive behaviour on their part. That collective action might 
require actively engineering via a process of persuasion and through the imbuing of 
employees with a sense of injustice (Kelly, 1998: 35) is overlooked, or not 
considered. Attribution for workforce passivity is placed firmly on the shoulders of 
the employees themselves, rather than directed more introspectively towards the 
representative group. Interestingly, this inactive stance may be contrasted with that 
of one of the previously more belligerent crop of representatives, later to resign, 
who had sought to orchestrate collective action during the imposition of the lump 
sum payment: 
They [employees] are toothless. There are about 30 setters, they set up the 
lines here, without them the place does not run - they have to do overtime. I 
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said right let's get all the setters together and do an overtime ban - they will 
struggle to run the place. Most of them [setters] said no, you can't do that, 
they will lose too much money. What about the money they are going to lose 
over the next 10 years? They weren't interested and they were the ones most 
affected by it - they chose not to do anything, that's why I call them 
toothless. 
Notwithstanding the above comments, it is evident that within this setting 
characteristically leadership traits failed to surface, while on the rare occasion that 
they did, calls for some form of mobilisation still met with a negative response. The 
reasons underpinning both representative and employee passivity are only explicable 
respectively with reference to the wider concepts of autonomy and legitimacy, 
themes to which we will return. 
Ethnographic research, including observation of various ECC gatherings, similarly 
suggests that this group of representatives were ineffectual in terms of the 
mobilisation of argument. Typical of this was one incident when there was an 
alteration to the shift working pattern on one of the `viaflex' production lines. 
Employees who had formerly worked a continental rotating three shift pattern were 
switched to constant days with a concomitant loss of pay. As the exchange below 
demonstrates, the ECC chair invoked the `legitimising principles' of precedent, 
equity and fairness to argue that a period of notice should have been given: 
ECC chair: It has come from viaflex that people are not getting notice to 
change shifts. When LVC1 switched from three shift to two shift they were 
given 13 weeks shift premiums if they changed, but in viaflex changing from 
three shift down to days they have received nothing - it is a big change [in 
money]. 
HR director: As a principle we should give as much notice as possible, but if 
you get into blanket rules it never deals with the person with difficult 
circumstances. 
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ECC chair: What is the law regarding change to work? Why was LVC given 
13 weeks notice money and viaflex not given that option? 
HR director: If we as a management group make those decisions we should 
be hoisted by our own petard, this draws you into a situation where you have 
black and white rules. 
ECC chair: LVC got 13 weeks money - you offered it, they just want the 
same as them. 
HR director: Fine - but if you treat all the people the same it will be difficult, 
it is like a convoy it will be pushed back to the slowest ship - you know I 
steer clear of hard and fast rules. 
It is apparent from the above exchange that the more coherent and considered 
argument came from the employee side. While the HR director was seeking vainly to 
counter the representative's reasoning by invoking the legitimising principle of the 
need for flexibility, his thesis was inarticulate and rambling; yet the ECC chair failed 
to press home the advantage and ultimately the shift workers were not compensated. 
Kirkbride (1992: 78) invokes a similar exchange from his Bettaclave Placid case 
study where again the more cogent argument was offered by the employee side, yet 
likewise the management team achieved ascendancy in the tussle. Kirkbride 
dismisses resource inequality as a totally acceptable explanation, and certainly within 
the above episode at MediCo there were other shortcomings that compromised the 
ability of the body to secure compensation for this group. Firstly, the representatives 
failed to achieve a potential quorum of six - only three were present eliminating any 
impression of a united front behind the issue. Secondly, as within Kirkbride's study, 
there was a failure on the employee side to muster all the potential power available to 
them, namely managerial insecurity in and around the issue of unionisation. No 
attempt was made to link such inconsistencies to the potential `triggers' (Kochan et 
al. 1980: McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1994) to unionisation and/or to talk up the 
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possible consequences of a failure to reach agreement. As Kirkbride (1992: 74) 
advises: 
It may be argued... that the key variable in a power relationship is not the 
possession of resources by one party but the perception of those resources by the 
other. Thus, an essential part of the negotiation process involves attempting to 
inflate artificially in the minds of one's opponents the resources under one's 
control and the cost of disagreement. 
Indeed, as will later be demonstrated in the FridgeCo study, it is possible in such 
instances for intelligent and astute leadership to yield tangible concessions, 
notwithstanding the absence of obvious power resources. 
5.2.2 FinanceCo 
As noted, it is a commonplace within studies of NERs for such bodies to be 
primarily criticised by employees as lacking in power - the FinanceCo PC was un- 
exceptional in this respect. Indeed this was a core theme within the IPA report where 
an array of disparaging metaphors were evinced. The following examples are 
demonstrative: 
PC is a sham which lacks teeth and the views of the employees are ignored 
frequently. 
I do not approve of trade unions but I feel that partners' council is a toothless 
waste of time. On important matters management push through what they want 
anyway. Performance related pay and IT call out rates are two examples of this. 
Staff don't have any real say on anything really important. 
A more nuanced analysis of power again, however, suggests that the above 
represents a rather blunt critique. 
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Manifest Power 
Power in its manifest form was operationalised above via a model that distinguished 
between the `scope' and `range' of participation. It is noteworthy that while, as 
within the MediCo study, scope did not extend beyond the terrain of consultation (as 
distinct to negotiation), there was nevertheless more of a tendency for consultation to 
stimulate managerial re-consideration. Within the terms of the model mid - as 
opposed to low-level - consultation was invoked more often. Furthermore, with 
regard to `range', such re-consideration was not limited to the lower ranking 
categories, e. g. training and physical working conditions, but at times extended to 
strategically important decisions concerning corporate structure and job security - the 
very areas in which it might be expected that management would defend its 
prerogatives most vehemently. This was graphically demonstrated when the 
company restructured to a multi-divisional format. This move involved the 
devolution of staff to the relevant business units in various functional roles e. g. IT, 
marketing, HR and finance, whereas others remained in a group-wide capacity; in 
total 160 positions were re-defined. In this instance, the head office council exhibited 
a degree of influence, particularly in the arena of manpower deployment, 
notwithstanding the fact that this was a strategic decision. Under the terms of the 
constitution in such instances the consultation process technically is triggered to deal 
with issues of procedure, rather than matters relating to the substantive decision or 
change. Despite the formal remit of the institution being procedural, that of acting as 
a communications channel particularly for employees with concerns regarding re- 
deployment and career progression, PC input was nevertheless taken on board. The 
most significant modification was the maintenance of the internal communications 
department as a group-wide entity which did not form part of the original managerial 
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blueprint. The PC was able to identify a range of business benefits highlighting the 
importance of such a function: 
A whole department was going to go at one point and then it didn't. The 
whole role was kind of considered not necessary, and then it was considered 
necessary again. The department went themselves directly to the director and 
said: `look you don't think there is a role for us, but what about this, what 
about the other'. The role of the council came in because we were able to 
support our colleagues in that respect because we were able to say: `here is 
the feedback from everybody else and they have all said why is this 
department going? ' There was a role for the council because you would 
expect that if people are being made redundant then one reaction would be: 
`oh how could you possibly make us redundant, we feel worthless, we are not 
worthless' - it is a natural response. But when you have got other people from 
other departments or other areas within your division backing you up, and 
saying: `not just because I like you, but who the hell is going to do what you 
have been doing all this time'- it gets a lot more [attention]. (Ex- 
representative) 
Echoed by a current representative and grade B manager: 
I was able to talk through some of the management issues as opposed to 
simply saying the staff would like to [unclear]... What is the benefit to the 
business? As a manager you could start talking through the benefits of the 
business and sell it as a business benefit because everybody wants something, 
but the business has got to see some benefit to it. 
Likewise at retail level, there are instances where the consumer PC has served to 
both further and protect the interests of various groups of employees. The overall 
trend at retail level has been towards the re-fashioning of the branch network into 
finance shops and the removal of non-selling activities such as mortgage processing 
to regional centres. Two branch re-structurings had taken place within the two years 
directly prior to the research. Given that these re-organisations are again essentially 
strategic business decisions, making certain roles rather than people redundant, 
under the terms of both the constitution and legislative requirements such 
decisions 
fall outside the remit of the need for prior consultation; while consultation 
is invoked 
management make no apologies for this not taking place while the proposals are at a 
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formative stage. Ostensibly the process is again procedural rather than substantive - 
one of explaining the rationale for the decision. 
Notwithstanding the limited de jure remit of the retail council in such instances, 
accounts were offered of the council being utilised to modify proposals as a means of 
improving the technical quality of the final decision - typified during the March 2000 
re-structure. The proposals as originally formulated envisaged inter alia the abolition 
of the roles of 14 customer support managers (CSMs). These performed a training 
and coaching function for both customer service managers and advisors - under the 
proposals this function was to be undertaken by the area management. PC input 
served to highlight the detrimental impact that such a cut would have, given the 
specialist knowledge brought to bear by a dedicated group of in-house trainers. As a 
result of feedback the re-modelled role of area sales and business coach was created. 
As the head of Eastern retail noted: 
We have inserted the involvement of the PC into the [re-structuring] process. 
Now, whilst we are not expecting any googlies to be thrown in, I would 
counter that by saying actually one of the structural changes that we went 
through 2 or 3 years ago we went to the PC and we put the structural change 
to them and they came back [to us]. With regard to one particular role they 
made a recommendation for change, and those recommendations were 
accepted and implemented. 
Significant as such incursions were into the terrain of managerial prerogative, it is 
noteworthy that the situations described involved a largely `integrative' subject 
matter, with consultation centring around objectives congruent in nature, a reflection 
of the formal terms of reference of the body that broadly eschew potentially divisive 
subject matter. In the words of Walton and McKersie (1965: 5) `such [integrative] 
objectives are said to define an area of common concern, a problem'. Significantly 
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when discussions involved a more distributional set of issues, managerial 
receptiveness to PC input was far more qualified. As discussed, the quantum of the 
annual pay award is beyond the formal terms of reference of the institution. 
Nevertheless, consultation has been invoked recently with regard to other similarly 
potentially divisive areas, but with minimal impact on outcomes. For example, at 
head office both employees and representatives were critical of the fact that 
modifications to the profit related pay scheme had introduced differentiation between 
grades, and that similarly the removal of health care benefits for retirees had been 
driven through unilaterally by management with merely `lip service' being paid to 
the consultation process. In terms of the `scope' of discussions, at best this amounted 
to low-level consultation, i. e. representatives being given prior notice of change. 
Likewise, as discussed in chapter 4, at retail level a host of branch closures took 
place in the late 1990s. While several branches took the opportunity to submit very 
detailed business plans, outlining branch viability, the cull took place as per the 
original blue-print. So why was any manifest influence restricted to situations 
offering the potential for positive-sum outcomes at the expense of more 
distributional matters? To probe this question there is inevitably a need to move on 
to a discussion of the latent power resources of the two divisional bodies under 
review, both of which differ subtly in view of their distinct compositions. 
Latent Power 
A feature of the FinanceCo representative model is the extent to which its very 
structure militates against the formation of power resources. In contrast to the 
traditional vehicle for employee expression viz. trade unionism, an attribute of this 
format is its very oecumenical nature - each of the six divisional councils is an 
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amalgam of fragmented employee groupings. Divisiveness and sectionality is 
therefore, apparent, particularly within the head office council. Here the constituency 
includes bar staff and filing clerks through to systems analysts and lawyers 
specialising in compliance. If as Goodman (cited in Kelly, 1998: 11) has argued, the 
exercise of power requires group cohesion as a pre-condition this council structure is 
clearly a format inimical to the generation of latent power. A useful way of 
conceiving of the impact of this upon latent power is to consider mobilisation in 
terms of a number of stages or hurdles. If the pre-requisite of cohesion is lacking, in 
this instance due to an absence of a distinct occupational identity, any ability to 
engineer a collective employee response to discrete employee demands is likely to be 
found wanting. 
Of the two councils under review at FinanceCo, the retail body is the less inclusive 
and, therefore, offers the more solid foundation on which to build a latent power 
base; indeed senior managers viewed the branch network as the more likely trade 
union target. The membership is largely compressed within the two lowest gradings 
(D and E). Furthermore, there was a widespread belief amongst retail employees that 
terms and conditions of employment were inferior to those enjoyed by head office 
staff, feeding into a marked degree of antipathy towards non-retail functions. The 
following was a standard complaint: 
There is definitely a feeling of them and us. They [head office] get a lot 
higher rate of pay than we do and that is coming up time and time again. You 
can go up and be a CSA in the main office and your pay is as good as a 
manager in one of the branches - all the time that comes through. (Retail area 
sales and business coach) 
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Such antagonism towards head office affords the nuclei of a latent power base, given 
that such a feeling of relative deprivation is a broad theme around which the 
mobilisation of collective interests might coalesce. However, the council structure 
appeared to act centrifugally, characteristically emphasising the parochial agenda of 
the sub-groupings rather than mutual concerns. Although the constituencies are all 
retail based, and fall within the lowest two grade bands, there is nevertheless a 
marked heterogeneity of function militating against group cohesion. In particular the 
two prime sub-groupings representing the CS (cashiering) and A and G (sales) teams 
pursue independent agendas within the meetings. The topics that interest the former 
are predominantly house keeping type issues, such as uniform and heating, partially 
reflecting lower career aspirations, while the latter are more preoccupied with 
remuneration matters, given their largely commission based pay structure. 
Parochialism and sectionalism likewise feed into an inability amongst council chairs 
to colonise the wider representative apparatus to press employee demands. The 
divisional councils are essentially inward looking; this inherent insularity ensures 
that within the meetings of the group body no combined influence is brought to bear. 
There is in any event virtually no bi-lateral contact between the councils. Ultimately 
the lack of a community of interests at intra-council level is mirrored within the 
group wide body - again a myriad of fragmented interests frustrates any sort of 
coherent response. The newly appointed full-time representative charged with co- 
ordinating the divisional councils acknowledged the inherent contradictions and 
tensions within the model: 
We need to have separate councils because business units are very different, 
but there needs to be some kind of united PC. It is no good saying that 
mortgages think this but we totally disagree - where are we coming from on 
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this then? We have to know at the end of the day what stance PC are taking on 
an issue - but sometimes there won't be a common position because you have 
to understand the diversity of the business units. 
Over and above the inherent sectionalism it was evident that again an absence of 
leadership frustrated the creation of any significant latent power base. Given the 
inclusive nature of the councils under review, there are few issues that potentially 
provide a nucleus for the mobilisation of all the internal constituencies - however 
at retail level the branch closure programme provided one such rare opportunity, 
since it was a measure that would inevitably have uniform cross functional 
implications. Nevertheless, in terms of leadership, it was evident from retrospective 
discussions with representatives that no attempt had been made to frame the issue 
in collective terms with a view to constructing a broad alliance against the 
proposals. Certainly some representatives were active, notably in submitting 
business plans, but only towards protecting their individual branch locations. As at 
MediCo the leadership required to trigger collective mobilisation - in this instance 
through the re-formulation of discrete branch interests into a collective issue - was 
again absent. 
Finally in this section turning to the theme of mobilisation of argument it is worth 
reiterating that the inclusive nature of the PC format is not totally detrimental to the 
voice process, notwithstanding the sectionalism catalogued earlier. Especially within 
the context of the head office council the breadth of the body fuses a range of 
managerial specialisms e. g. law, accounting and HR. In consequence, unlike the 
positions at both MediCo and FridgeCo (discussed below), the theoretical 
frameworks and lexicon utilised by the executive body to justify major decisions 
(e. g. restructurings) are part of the everyday vocabulary of many representatives. It is 
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of note that where the PC has been influential in shaping major decisions, e. g. the 
decision to maintain a central internal communications department, the `legitimising 
principles' utilised were management's own - that is, efficiency considerations. 
Likewise, within the context of the retail council, the maintenance of a permanent 
coaching function was based around the quality of service delivery, i. e. - retail 
efficiency. It is ultimately the ability of the councils to muster a coherent business 
case, the competence to argue on the very terrain of senior management, that 
represents the potential strength of the PC model. As noted, however, managerial 
receptiveness is very much restricted to those situations lending themselves to 
positive-sum outcomes, rather than those of a more distributive nature, that 
ultimately appear to presuppose a more robust set of resources, i. e. the mobilisation 
of both argument and a collective workforce consciousness. 
5.2.3 FridgeCo 
Manifest Power 
Any discussion of power within the context of the FridgeCo company council needs 
to be placed within the wider framework of the parent-subsidiary relationship, itself 
conditioned by the financial plight of the company. A crucial mediating factor with 
regards to the presence of manifest power was the limited degree of financial 
autonomy ceded from the Malaysian conglomerate to its UK subsidiary; both overall 
salary levels, and indeed all forms of capital expenditure, were subject to strong 
central control. It was a commonplace throughout the study for both managerial and 
non-managerial actors to bemoan the number of seemingly relatively minor 
decisions that required head office approval. In one instance the proposed 
appointment of an occupational nurse was an ongoing `action point' on the minutes 
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from October 1998 until the appointee's eventual recruitment in early 2001, while 
head office approval was awaited. Likewise, a request from clerical staff for an extra 
photocopier was a live issue for 9 months before head office eventually declined to 
sanction the expenditure. The following comments are indicative of the frustration of 
representatives: 
There are so many things on there [minutes] where we are still waiting for 
answers back from Malaysia that have been carrying on from as, well almost 
as long as I have been on the company council. 
If we were dealing with a management that could actually make on the spot 
decisions it would be far better and the company council would probably 
work a lot better. But because we are dealing with people 16,000 miles away 
it is third party all the time. It is difficult, and a lot of the people on the 
shopfloor do not appreciate that, they think that decisions should be made 
overnight, and they aren't. 
It was, therefore, evident with regard to the more important areas of the employment 
relationship that the representative body was not involved at the actual focal point of 
the decision making process; while the level of participation was enterprise based, all 
important decisions were taken at one remove by the parent. Expressed theoretically, 
`participation potential' (Walker, 1975: 447) is clearly diminished in such situations 
of limited subsidiary autonomy. What influence there was, was transmitted 
somewhat tortuously via the agency of the production director to head office. Thus, 
in terms of both `scope' and `range', constitutionally the body had consultation rights 
in all the areas that were previously subject to collective bargaining. However, in the 
crucially important area of wage determination, by the time of the research this 
amounted at best to a process of `low-level' consultation. Representatives could 
voice their opinion, but in view of the financial plight of the company juxtaposed 
against the lack of direct contact with the parental decision makers, the ability to 
stimulate any sort of managerial re-consideration was largely absent. Indeed, this 
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similarly applied to matters at both ends of the `range' spectrum. As noted in chapter 
4, the recent redundancy decision was presented as a fait accompli. Likewise, as will 
be discussed later in the chapter, the issue of physical working conditions was a 
matter of employee concern, but remained subject to strong local managerial 
prerogative. There was, nevertheless, one important example of significant influence 
being exercised: prior to the move to the new factory the council was effective in 
achieving concessions for production workers over the introduction of shift working. 
In order to understand how this incursion into a higher domain of manifest power 
had been achieved it is necessary to unpick the events through the lens of latent 
power. 
Latent Power 
Prior to the transfer of production to the new facility the plant had operated a one 
shift pattern: Sam - 4pm. In order to obtain the necessary output from the new 
cellular production format it was anticipated that ultimately the plant would move to 
a continental rotating three shift regime. As an interim measure it had been decided 
that on opening, the new factory would run two shifts: 6am - 2pm and 2pm - 10pm. 
The domestic management were aware that the transition would require some 
financial concession, and in a special council meeting representatives were informed 
by the financial director that head office had authorised a premium of 7.5% for 
employees working the late shift, but that no premium would be paid for `earlies'. 
The initial offer was widely viewed as derisory by the workforce and roundly 
rejected by the representatives, a typical comment being: 
They offered 7.5% per cent at the beginning, we said straight away that is no 
good, they are laughing at us. 
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In the final event the council was instrumental in getting the premium for the late 
shift increased to 15% and a 5% bonus introduced for employees working the early 
shift. The whole process was redolent of a negotiating rather than consultation 
process; so what latent power resources were brought to bear to achieve this 
apparent concession? 
In the introduction to this chapter the pivotal role of leadership was stressed as an 
influence upon collective power resources. It is noteworthy that this episode 
contained one of the very few examples of behaviour redolent of leadership from 
amongst the three data sets. In particular representatives were adept in transmitting 
employee rancour to management via the mobilisation of argument. This can be 
divided into a number of elements. Firstly, the more vocal members of the council 
took the unusual step of calling for, and holding, a pre-meeting prior to the official 
gathering to discuss what would be an acceptable managerial concession. 
Consequently during the formal talks with management they were able to act as a 
caucus and present a unified front in unreservedly rejecting the original offer. 
Secondly, a counter argument was successfully mobilised to reject managerial 
exhortations of the overriding need for profitability. The `legitimising principles' 
(Kelly, 1998: 12) utilised concerned appeals to equity considerations; the rejection 
of the original offer was justified on the basis of it being an unacceptable quid pro 
quo for the wholesale disruption entailed to employees lives via the working of 
unsocial hours. Crucially there were two ex-shop stewards on the council who 
skilfully utilised their remaining linkages with the by now AEEU, which framed 
the issue externally in strong and emotive terms. Under the banner headline of 
Shifts of Shame, the local newspaper carried front page claims by the AEEU 
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regional officer that the town's largest employer was seeking to `coerce' employees 
over work hours. This served to broadcast the perceived improper treatment of 
employees to a wider audience, acting to embarrass both the local - and more 
importantly - the Malaysian management. A further strand in the mobilisation of 
argument was the adept use of `linguistic resources'. Again the representatives 
stressed the potentiality for a counter sanction - albeit one of an individual rather 
than a collective nature, i. e. exit. The following comment is indicative of the tactic: 
I took it to my constituency; they said: `no chance' So I went back with the 
other reps and we turned around and said: `no this is unacceptable people 
won't work for this - they would rather hand in their notice. 
Within a very tight local labour market this skilfully served to amplify the potential 
cost to management. Finally, the ex-shop stewards were again proactive in making 
primary and tentative moves towards a more collectively based response, i. e. 
workforce mobilisation, by seeking to imbue employees with an enhanced sense of 
injustice, building upon the already widespread ire of much of the workforce. 
Basically they [employees] weren't being told anything by management, they 
were only hearing rumours - so I took it on myself. Now I am allowed 8 
hours per month to talk to people and I probably took 6 hours in one day. I 
went around each department and stopped it. I called them for a meeting and 
told them exactly what was going on. I thought it only fair because it was 
getting to the time when the shift system was coming in, they needed to 
know- and I told them! I stopped them and called a meeting like you would a 
shop steward, they stopped the machines, stopped the line or cell, then they 
got back to work after about a quarter of an hour, twenty minutes. Yes we did 
have a bit of an influence. 
While falling short of any decision on collective action, at the very least such 
histrionics sent an unequivocal message to management demonstrating collective 
employee concern, emphasising the strength of feeling on the plant. 
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An interesting facet of the consultation process in and around the introduction of the 
shift premium was the rapidity of the managerial counter offer. Although it was 
originally minuted that the finance director would `discuss the issue with head 
office', the revised bid came in within a matter of days, in contrast to the lengthy 
procrastination that typically surrounded all financial matters. Indeed, when pressed 
on the issue the production director conceded that head office had authorised the 
potential payment of an enhanced rate prior to the consultation process - but only if 
such a concession proved absolutely necessary. This episode demonstrates that while 
such structures are characteristically viewed as lacking a latent power base, 
incapable of blocking managerial proposals, intelligent and proactive leadership can 
nevertheless, in certain situation, potentially achieve tangible employee gains. 
It is a truism of industrial relations that the balance of power between labour and 
capital is in a constant state of flux, captured in Carter Goodrich's (1975) `frontier of 
control' metaphor. This remains applicable within a non-union context, although the 
parameters of variation are normally weighted more or less strongly in the 
employer's favour. It is of note that the above events occurred 12 months prior to the 
research commencing, and were recalled retrospectively by representatives in a 
somewhat melancholic manner. One year later the power dynamics had changed to 
the detriment of the council: the introduction of shift working did indeed result in a 
steady exodus of longer serving employees unable or unwilling to adjust to the more 
onerous shift patterns. The following comments are demonstrative: 
We did have a lot of problems about shift working, they just did not want to 
do it. There was a lot of problems with the older workers where they had 
been here 20 odd years and did not want their lives turned upside down. 
(Company council representative) 
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It is one thing to put something on paper, to put it into practice is something 
else. A lot of people found that whereas they said yes they would do 
permanent lates, or rotate, when it actually came to do it they found they 
could not manage - so a lot of people have left through it. We had to have a 
recruitment drive and a lot of the people we have got are agency workers to 
fill the gaps. (Company council representative) 
As the latter comment hints at, it was at this time that the number of foreign agency 
employees began to burgeon, a group not formally covered under the representative 
body's remit. Initially brought in as a short term measure to alleviate problems 
caused by tight local labour market conditions, it was clear that by the time of the 
research their heavy use had become more strategic. Given the financial pressure on 
the company the utilisation of agency staff had become increasingly attractive due to 
the inferior wage costs - £4.40 per hour as opposed to £5.28 for a directly employed 
semi-skilled worker. More particularly, the company had become increasingly reliant 
on such staff for overtime working at short notice. A contentious issue was the 
number of foreign employees working so called `double shifts', i. e. a 16 hour day 
from 6am to 10pm, where worker fatigue was perceived as causing health and safety 
problems. A clear core-periphery pattern was evident; however, paradoxically the 
outcome was a partial inversion of orthodox models manifest in a poorly paid set of 
employees on full-time contracts, juxtaposed against a foreign component well 
rewarded by their own domestic standards. 
Throughout the preceding 12 months the issue of a further pay review had been very 
much dominant. It was nevertheless evident that the perpetual supply of agency 
workers was serving to keep wage levels artificially depressed. Within one council 
meeting the production director's statement that the pay review was ongoing was 
met with derision born out of a frustration that reflected an effective 5 year wage 
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freeze. After the meeting it was `in confidence' noted that the reality of the position 
was that there was no reason to give a wage increase since the domestic management 
had somewhat serendipitously stumbled upon a ready supply of cheap foreign 
labour. Accordingly, the argument fed back from Malaysia was `why should we pay 
an increase just because they [staff on permanent contracts] are English? '. Ultimately 
the systematic replacement of local workers with foreign agency staff had expunged 
managerial concerns over employee attrition, mediating the body's prime source of 
latent power, rendering further managerial concessions on pay over and above the 
shift premium remote. 2 
5.2.4 Power: Summary 
Power comprises theoretically the most complex of the concepts enunciated within 
the voice construct and a considerable amount of ground has been covered in the 
preceding discussion. It might be apposite therefore at this juncture to pause and take 
stock. As noted, extant analyses of NERs posit limited power resources as serving to 
undermine the efficacy of these structures as mechanisms for employee voice. Such 
research, however, has failed to interrogate theoretically the complex nature of the 
term, hindering the development of a more discriminating understanding of the 
apparent deficiencies (and indeed any strengths) of such structures. The more 
sensitive treatment afforded above, while again acknowledging the relatively 
impoverished level of influence of these bodies vis-a-vis management, has 
nevertheless demonstrated that the relevant NER institutions are not genuinely 
powerless, as is commonly portrayed. In terms of manifest power the councils were 
seen broadly to wield minimal influence within the arena of the set of items 
traditionally subject to unionised collective bargaining, and this was tracked to the 
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absence of a credible set of collective sanctions. Nevertheless, it was demonstrated 
that there remains space for such bodies to secure tangible concessions, or defend 
existing favourable arrangements, through the exercise of more subtle power 
resources, i. e. the mobilisation of skilled rhetoric and argument. Two scenarios were 
delineated. The first was the FinanceCo example where in various significant 
situations a coherent business case was proffered for modifications to the corporate 
agenda. It was additionally demonstrated, however, that such influence did not 
extend beyond items of an integrational (positive-sum) nature. More significant, 
therefore, was the FridgeCo situation where the company council in one famous 
instance was seen to wield leverage within a more distributive set of circumstances. 
Here a wily core of representative actors was able tactically to exploit managerial 
insecurity and concerns by delineating the potential costs of a particular course of 
action. Likewise, tentative strides were made to imbue workers with a collective 
sense of injustice. The distinguishing feature here was the emergence of a far more 
pro-active set of behavioural traits akin to elements of leadership behaviour. Such 
favourable outcomes, however, were relatively rare. To fully understand such power 
dynamics it is necessary to further consider a more subtle form of resource 
imbalance - the ideological. As will be demonstrated below, under the heading of 
autonomy, superior `mental resources' at management's disposal are habitually 
decisive in obviating an independent employee response. 
5.3 Autonomy 
Autonomy is a concept that has received comprehensive philosophical examination. 
The term has its etymological roots in the Greek words autos (self) and nomos (rule 
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or law) - literally self rule. The phrase was first applied to the Greek city state; as 
Dworkin (1995: 13) observes `a city had autonomia when its citizens made their own 
laws' (emphasis in original). The philosophical development of the concept is widely 
acknowledged (cf. Blackburn, 1996; Lindley, 1986) as owing an enormous debt to 
Immanual Kant: `the autonomous man, in so far as he is autonomous is not subject to 
the will of another' (ibid: 64). Hence, at it simplest autonomy relates to the 
sovereignty of the individual, or in a collective context, `the capacity for self 
government - agents are truly autonomous if their activities are truly their own' 
(Blackburn, 1996: 31). Conversely, elected representatives may be seen as lacking in 
autonomy if their will is under the control or manipulation of another - ultimately the 
touchstone of autonomy is freedom from external constraints. 
From a range of philosophical positions autonomy is regarded normatively as a 
desirable quality. However, when the concept is abstracted to apply to committees 
and other representative organs the merit of the condition becomes increasingly 
ambiguous. Indeed, in one very real sense autonomy and legitimacy (to be discussed 
later) are antithetical concepts, as strong objections can be made to a representative 
organ being too autonomous. There arises a clear tension between `the interests of 
individuals as they perceive them and their interests as perceived by 
others'(Dworkin, 1995: 86). Specifically within an industrial relations context Hyman 
(1997: 310) while stressing the importance of autonomy acknowledges the presence 
of this tension: 
The complex interaction between autonomy and legitimacy makes in the 
words of Regalia for an `ambivalent and evanescent relationship' [between 
representative and constituent]. 
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It is evident from the above discussion that autonomy may be evaluated along two 
principal dimensions: firstly, the independence of the representative mechanism from 
the employer and secondly, the relationship of the representatives to their 
constituents. Given that the latter facet will be given coverage under the section on 
legitimacy, autonomy here is to be understood as autonomy vis-a-vis management. 
In terms of operationalisation we are primarily interested in capturing autonomy 
along two fronts; thematically these frame the structure of the discussion that 
follows. Our initial focus is the autonomy of the representative structure, i. e. the 
extent to which the terms of reference, constitution, and overall representative 
framework are determined by employees and/or their representative agents. 
Secondly, consideration is given to the autonomy of the resultant representative 
process and agenda. Theoretically the problem of this mode of autonomy may be 
further sub-divided; one issue is whether representative agents are subject to explicit 
and/or implicit pressures that function as signposts curbing and/or sanctioning 
specific modes of behaviour. More subtly, we return to the theme of ideological or 
6 
mental resources' and explore the extent to which attempts are made by 
management to shape representative preferences a priori. It is clear that particularly 
within the latter context no straightforward objective test may be imputed, and 
ultimately again there is a need for a thorough and detailed qualitative analysis. 
5.3.1 MediCo 
The application of the concept of autonomy to the MediCo ECC exposes a number 
of rudimentary fault lines. Perhaps the most problematic is the classical notion of 
`self-rule' articulated above. The constitution of the body is very much a managerial 
creation; hence, the terms of reference, machinery of election, tenure, code of 
192 
conduct and composition are all managerially ordained, rather than the creation of 
the institution's core representative actors or the wider workforce. The inherent 
contradictions presented by such a system when inserted into an espoused pluralist 
employee relations model was neatly summarised by one supervisor: 
Whether it is a self managing group or whether there is a senior manager in the 
plant that is responsible for the ECC I don't know, but if that is the case we 
have got a conflict of interest. The senior management team have got to put in 
place objectives for the plant; at some stage whether it is disciplinary, 
negotiation or pay incentives the ECC will get involved. If that same person 
that is in overall control of the ECC is the same one issuing the objectives and 
then dealing with the ECC, that is trying to challenge those objectives, then we 
have a conflict of interest. 
Such a `conflict of interest' is played out at its most absurd level during the pay 
`negotiations' where the HR director - very much the architect of the body - is 
contemporaneously the main managerial protagonist; effectively the prime 
managerial combatant is both adversary and patron. 
Management may be very much the instigator and engineer of the representative 
model, setting out the parameters and rules of engagement, but this need not 
necessarily result in the total emasculation of voice. Employee representatives 
potentially have a residue of autonomy to shape their own strategy and agenda of 
demands - albeit within a specification of managerially prescribed 
legitimate 
interests. Indeed, the HR director was anxious to suggest that within the confines of 
the body's specific remit, the representatives acted autonomously of management: 
Being an employee rep is an absolutely no win situation, you get beaten up 
by the management; you get beaten up by the workers. You know we do 
some hard talking and they certainly are not management puppets, that would 
be the fastest route for the whole process breaking down. We have been 
through that scenario where people thought that they had been management 
puppets. 
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So, to what extent do the elected representatives at MediCo function free from the 
interference of their managerial sponsors? It is of note that while many employees 
were critical of the body's lack of power, minimal disquiet was expressed with 
regard to the autonomy of the group. The disparaging metaphors of puppets, stooges, 
placemen etc that often accompany such studies were very much absent. There was 
little evidence to suggest that representatives consciously sought favour and 
patronage via their ECC position, or were subject to related pressures, either implicit 
or explicit, to adopt a specific stance on issues. As will be discussed, this contrasts 
markedly with the position at FinanceCo. Nevertheless, as will become evident, 
interference does occur at a more subtle level - the very representative process 
imbuing delegates' consciousness with managerial interpretations of given situations. 
In chapter 3 the paternalistic style of management, driven by the US parent was 
depicted. A further facet of the centralised influence upon HR policy is the very 
strong emphasis placed upon top-down communications. For example, employees 
are kept abreast of both local and wider corporate matters via weekly team briefings 
(Staff Notes). Additionally, the plant manager conducts a quarterly brief, or State of 
the Nation Address, wherein over a 24 hour period presentations are given to all 
departmental groups outlining the financial position of the plant and future business 
objectives. Because of their important function for domestic management as 
workforce intermediaries, representatives are exposed to a further mantle of media 
provision. Especially during pay talks, a heavy emphasis is placed on labour costs 
and plant efficiency, with the linkages to continued inward parental investment made 
explicit. Delegates are routinely reminded that both sides ultimately derive their 
rewards and job security from ongoing parental support. The sum total of such 
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exposure is a tacit acceptance that participation must not be pursued too vigorously, 
and so impinge upon managerial prerogative. One representative's observations were 
fairly standard: 
The decisions are made by them which is possibly as it should be, I mean they 
see the whole picture, I suppose we just see our little bit. 
The outcome is an ideological dominance manifest in a situation where any rigorous 
questioning of managerial judgment is deemed illegitimate. This was graphically 
demonstrated during the imposition of the lump sum payment where a more militant 
core of representatives, all later to resign, briefly questioned the cogency of the 
course of action proposed by management. The current chair rather embarrassingly 
recalled this breakdown in the norms of micro-social convention: 
He (ex-chair) would not let it go - he would not let certain things go. He kept 
on about financial [things], the price of the product, working out how many 
millions we filter, how much money we have got and how much they can give 
us, this type of thing - we were going into it too deep. 
The final comment emphasises the chair's belief that a clear protocol had been 
breached leading to discomfort within the wider group; the managerial prognosis not 
being open to question. The resultant reluctance to forcefully press issues was 
acknowledged by the newest recruit, interestingly the only representative with any 
previous trade union involvement: 
The problem that I have got with the rest of the committee members [is], I think 
they do a very difficult job, they are in a very difficult position, but I think that 
possibly they don't push as hard as they could. 
In sum, it may be concluded that the lack of co-ownership of the representative 
machinery problematises the concept of autonomy vis-a-vis management when 
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applied to the ECC. Given that the parameters of the ECC-management relationship 
are pre-determined by managerial fiat, this fundamentally subverts the autonomy of 
the body and in turn mediates the scope of potentially attainable outcomes. Although 
a residue of autonomy exists, representatives are nevertheless heavily and 
systematically exposed to the notion of management's right to manage and 
competitiveness and efficiency consideration. Such norms, once internalised, very 
much circumvent the ability of the representatives to muster a response to the 
managerial agenda, particularly in strategically important areas where the process is 
at its most intense. 
5.3.2 FinanceCo 
As within the above study the notion of autonomy is immensely problematic when 
applied to the FinanceCo PC. Firstly, with regard to the autonomy of the 
representative structure the constitution, terms of reference, procedural guidelines 
and the body's very funding are all managerially derived, rendering the notion of 
`self government' antithetical to the representative model. Indeed, this lack of 
procedural independence and sovereignty was graphically demonstrated during the 
introduction of the most significant constitutional amendment to date: the 
appointment of the first full-time representative. As previously discussed, following 
the workforce ballot on trade union recognition a variety of procedural and structural 
changes were invoked to the PC format, including the creation of the above post. The 
position is very much that of a lynch-pin within the representative apparatus. The 
move was viewed widely as a positive step towards a more effective voice 
mechanism with incumbents seconded to the post for a period of one year. 
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While the successful appointee was elected via a workforce ballot, wider procedural 
aspects underscore the managerial dominance and control of the representative body. 
Aspiring candidates had firstly to attend a series of pre-selection interviews with the 
head of group HR and other senior managers, ostensibly to ensure that candidates 
had the necessary skills and competencies for the position. It became strikingly 
evident in interviews, however, that the incumbent had a conception of the institution 
that conformed very tightly to the normative managerial model, with the office 
holder rehearsing the integrative goals reviewed in the previous chapter. For 
example, the appointee claimed that her main achievement to date had been the 
assimilation of the representative process into the performance management system; 
the performance of representatives in their PC duties is now a component of their 
annual salary review! At present the scoring of this merely amounts to an assessment 
of the number of meetings attended and `evidence of onward communication'. 
However, she was keen that more qualitative elements such a `productivity at 
meetings' should somehow similarly be included within the annual appraisal. The 
intrinsic incongruity of a representative's performance being managerially evaluated 
as a component of their salary review had clearly not been identified and is 
symptomatic of the unitary outlook of this key player. 
As at MediCo problems centred on autonomy were likewise seen to mediate the 
effective functioning of the day-to-day representative process. In this instance, 
however, it was the apprehension of managerial censure and the enduring 
implications that was corrosive of autonomy, particularly evident within the head 
office council setting, rather than any systematic a priori shaping of attitudes. 
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The inclusive nature of the representative model has been tracked in some detail. It 
will be recalled that formally the PC covers all employee grades up to - but not 
including board level - with the subject matter being predominantly integrative in 
nature. To be sure, the various documentation appertaining to the body implicitly 
concedes a potential divergence of employer and employee interests3. However, the 
institutional emphasis is on non-distributional issues and the potential points of 
fissure are consequently downplayed. The terms of reference similarly talk up the 
need to `maximise the quality of decision making' imbuing the goals with a 
managerialist tenor. Especially within a head office context, this attracts a distinct 
cadre of representatives keen to utilise the apparatus for careerist motives; the 
process of becoming a representative was very much viewed as a useful adjunct to 
career development. It was conceded unashamedly that a history of PC involvement 
was a desirable addition to any FinanceCo CV, with a term of office demonstrating 
clear and unequivocal commitment to the organisation. Likewise, given the inclusive 
nature of the institution it was seen to afford a vehicle through which to catch the eye 
of senior personnel and network within the organisation more generally. In sum, for 
many delegates PC duties were undertaken for reasons of fairly aggressive 
individualism rather than any sense of altruism or collective idealism. The following 
comments drawn from both current and ex-representatives are demonstrative of this 
blatantly functional approach: 
It's good for a couple of reasons; one it is good for personal profile because if 
you make yourself available to do things, first of all you get noticed. 
Secondly, you can get involved in things like forums where you are talking to 
senior managers or whatever. If you are showing an interest in the business 
they will show an interest in you - you become noticed. 
It does a number of things for you, it looks good on your CV because it looks 
as though you are committed and you play your part - you care. It is good 
because you build up a network of contacts very quickly. 
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It was sold as a way of getting to know people outside of where you work, so 
I suppose it was almost career development, although that sounds a bit mean. 
I left because once you have done it for a year or so you personally have 
nothing to develop. 
Such a calculated stance has direct implications for the autonomy of the 
representative process. In particular anxiety was expressed, by both representatives 
and employees more generally, that delegates were on occasion reluctant to press 
sectional demands; stepping over the border into the terrain of a more antagonistic 
combative stance might clearly be prejudicial to career enhancement. Blockages in 
the voice process were seen to occur at two distinct levels. Firstly, on the ground at 
the constituent-representative interface it was evident that at times issues become 
either filtered out, or were not aggressively pursued, given that the motivation of 
certain representatives was more coldly utilitarian than altruistic. Employees were 
conscious of certain representatives not wishing `to rock the boat' -a theme detected 
within the IPA survey. Two examples demonstrate the point: 
Too many representatives see it as a climb up the ladder - more interested in 
their career, than truly representing their constituents. 
PC reps do not represent staff views. It is used to further people's careers 
and for them to network. 
The desire not to be seen as too vociferous also acts as a filter at an output level. 
Disquiet and anxiety expressed by employees on specific topics, it was noted by 
representatives, was sometimes not escalated in a robust manner due to a reluctance 
amongst their number to take ownership of issues. In other instances within PC 
meetings more understated pressure had been brought to bear upon one of the few 
more forceful representatives: 
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The chair has looked at me a couple of times in the council, but he has got to 
realise that we have got to be able to say what we need to say. (Representative, head office council) 
The overall bashfulness of representatives dictates that typically it falls on the 
shoulders of the PC chair to pursue specific topics. However, questions were raised 
amongst representatives with regard to how forcefully the chair went in pursuit of 
constituency interests. The impression was that at times the activity was somewhat 
perfunctory - one long standing delegate summarised the chair's dilemma thus: 
If I start making waves I have got my annual appraisal, I have got my salary 
review next month; I really have to tread very carefully here. So I will talk to 
somebody - but I will soft pedal almost. 
It is evident from the above account that the potential for both patronage and subtle 
forms of intimidation serve to undermine the utility of the body as a conduit for 
collective voice, in contrast to the problem solving functionality to which the 
inclusive consultative format is perhaps best suited. It is noteworthy that certain 
senior mangers were nevertheless defensive of the wider organisational culture 
suggesting that the right to challenge was respected, downplaying such concerns. 
Nevertheless, within the annual in-house survey for 2001, only 37% of the lower 
grades (C-E) agreed with the statement that: `it is safe to speak up and challenge the 
way things are done in FinanceCo', lending credence to the disquiet catalogued. 
Within the context of the retail council such pressures were less apparent. The 
espoused motivation for undertaking representative duties was markedly more 
concerned with furthering constituency interests rather than crude careerism. Thus, 
when asked the question: `why did you decide to become a PC representative? ', 
while one newly appointed delegate conceded that: 
I think that if you have PC representative on your CV it does show that you 
have got awareness, 
the following comment was far more typical: 
The same old things kept cropping up - staffing levels: you were expected to 
come in and do work over and above your working day, and it wasn't just my 
branch, you were hearing the same thing. I was thinking well why doesn't 
somebody do something about it; so it was about time somebody told them, 
and being the sort of person I am I thought well if nobody else is I will. 
Such espousals were reflected in a more uniform critique of senior managerial 
decision making, albeit one confined largely to general housekeeping issues such as 
security, heating, uniform and staffing levels. Criticism of corporate policy within 
these areas was routinely itemised in the minutes and escalated to the second tier 
gathering of the retail chairs. A plausible interpretation of the forthright stance taken 
by the retail delegates is that this is a reflection of their perceived position of being 
on the corporate periphery - reflected in feelings of relative deprivation - allied to 
the nature of the work and lower career aspirations. As alluded to in chapter 3, such 
representatives are all clustered amongst the lowest two gradings, typically female 
and often part-time returnees. The perceived potential long-term costs and enduring 
repercussions of challenging corporate policy are thus less marked. Furthermore, the 
compression of delegates into the bottom gradings by definition precludes a 
significant managerial presence, reducing any potential for subtle intimidation at 
council gatherings. 
201 
5.3.3 Frid eCo 
As within both other organisations the classic notion of self rule is again problematic 
when applied to the FridgeCo company council. Any basis for formal autonomy is 
rendered fictional given that the mechanisms of governance and procedure are solely 
managerially derived. Indeed, in a similar manner to the MediCo study, the inherent 
contradictions are at their most visible during pay discussions where again the key 
managerial actor - the production director - is similarly responsible for the drafting 
of the council constitution and terms of reference. His role is therefore paradoxically 
positioned at such times as both combatant and benefactor. Notwithstanding the 
absence of the formal autonomy of the representative structure, the terms of 
reference remain sufficiently wide to facilitate the crafting of an autonomous 
representative agenda. Again, however, mirroring the position at MediCo, 
ideological pressure and the utilisation by management of `mental resources' is 
directly corrosive of autonomy. 
The genesis of the body has been tracked in some detail; as will be recalled, it was 
from the outset driven and sustained by two broad rationales. On the one hand it 
replaced the trade union as a means of employee representation. Conversely, in line 
with the production director's manufacturing philosophy it simultaneously formed 
part of the TQM software alluded to in the last chapter. One corollary to the latter 
aspect is that while the softer paraphernalia of TQM was being wound down, the 
council structure nevertheless continued to be imbued with a heavy educative tenor - 
a means of communicating the problems faced by management to the wider 
workforce via the agency of the representative body. Again echoing the position at 
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MediCo, this was complemented by other top down initiatives, most notably team 
briefings, although their use had latterly become increasingly sporadic. 
Thus within council gatherings a marked feature was an unremitting focus on the 
financial plight of the company, the mainstay of which was a summary of the year to 
date profit and loss, and a synopsis of various production problems. Interestingly, 
notwithstanding the erosion of their earnings in recent years, amongst representatives 
generally the sense of grievance was markedly low and such `pragmatism' was 
applauded by management. Ultimately the focus on market imperatives fed into a 
resignation amongst most representatives regarding the necessity for sacrifice. The 
perilous state of the company was perceived as a legitimate rationale for the tight 
financial policy being followed by management; to again borrow from McArdle et 
al. (1995: 167), this represented `the use of the logics of the market to legitimise 
managerial action'. The following comments from delegates demonstrate the point: 
I don't think that they [management] can do a lot about it [wage levels] if the 
money is not there. I mean in the last meeting somebody said something 
about a 35 pence [per hour] pay rise because we haven't had one in about 6 
years - that works out about half a million per year; well 
if you're not making 
any you can't give it out. 
There is only so much we can do, and I think to be fair there is only so much 
that the management can do because, their hands are tied as well. The main 
bone of contention in any factory is wages and unfortunately there is only so 
much leeway that they have with regard to giving people more money. They 
have got a restricted budget and have to stay within that. 
A point of departure from the other studies, however, was that management's version 
of reality, while generally conceded, was accepted less uncritically. Unlike the 
former studies, the body was very much a forum where the domestic management 
were vigorously, and at times brutally, held to account. Key management strategies 
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such as shift working and an over-reliance on agency employees were a common 
theme. As will be recalled, two of the representatives were ex-shop stewards. One 
had originally boycotted the body, but subsequently stood for election at the request 
of the union district secretary `to find out what was going on'. In contrast to both the 
MediCo and FinanceCo studies, therefore, a modicum of ideological sustenance was 
operative. Interestingly, the lexicon of trade unionism was widely invoked by these 
ex-shop stewards who referred to constituents as `their members', demonstrative of 
an ongoing divergent set of interests that served to legitimise robust challenges to 
managerial authority. Thus, in broad terms there was a bifurcation within the council 
grouping. While many delegates were outspoken during meetings, perhaps reflecting 
a range of pent up frustrations, in periods of reflection the business case for various 
managerial decisions, such as the introduction of shift working and the wage freeze, 
was generally accepted. Conversely, there was a more independently minded small 
inner core of three representatives, including the two ex-shop stewards, actively 
resistant to such incorporative tendencies. Various initiatives were regarded with 
cynicism, such as kaizen: `people putting ideas forward to cut each others throats', 
and team briefings: `to me they select the information they give you - they don't tell 
you the whole picture'. Similarly, the wage freeze was viewed as a manifestation of 
managerial incompetence, rather than the mix of bad luck and external shocks that 
characterised the accounts of the more `on message' representatives: 
We could be better informed. They could give us a real proper answer as to 
why we can't have a pay rise instead of going around the houses and saying, 
`we can't afford it'. They have spent nearly £14 million up there now [on the 
new plant] and we should have been up and running three years ago, so 
somebody is to blame for that. In another company the directors and 
management would be out on the road. 
In the old days if the company did not make any money they did not buy new 
cars ten a penny. Not just senior managers, even right down to junior 
204 
managers, it all costs money. That's just one thing, there are lots of other 
things - money going down the drain. 
Save this sub-grouping, however, management had largely been successful in having 
its own version of reality internalised by the majority of representatives who, while 
not uncritical, largely accepted the need for sacrifice. Distinct pockets of autonomy 
did exist, as highlighted by the concessions gained following the introduction of shift 
working. Save this one incident, however, the ideological hegemony of management 
was a consummate force. This was graphically demonstrated during January 1999 
when the company announced 84 redundancies just prior to the move to the new 
factory. This decision was accepted by the majority uncritically, notwithstanding the 
fact that by this time managerial strategy was becoming somewhat idiosyncratic - 
six months later the organisation was seeking authority from Malaysia to recruit 50 
new staff as demand again rallied (Council Minutes: July, 1999). 
Such uncritical acceptance of the managerial position on this, and wider issues, 
renders the notion of the autonomy of the representative process problematic. News 
management through team briefings, albeit increasingly intermittent, and the further 
educational thrust of council meetings aimed at attitudinal structuring, had largely 
been effective in muting any widespread collective challenge to managerial 
capability - and certainly its ultimate organisational prognosis. 
In summary to this sub-section it is apparent that across all three organisations the 
representative structures lack the necessary autonomy for effective voice. At a 
formalised level the three bodies constitutionally represent exclusively managerial 
emanations; this serves to delineate the admissible points at which any employee 
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challenge to managerial decision making is regarded as legitimate. Over and above 
such constraints, more subtle forces were seen to be in evidence, in effect cultural 
pressures emphasising unitary norms and values. At both MediCo and FridgeCo 
representatives were subject to a systematic attempts by management to shape their 
perceptions and interpretations of various situations. There was a clear desire to 
imbue delegates with managerial interpretations of reality and so vitiate the necessity 
for the potentially destabilising reference to managerial prerogative. At FinanceCo 
such crude ideological engineering was less apparent; here more subtly it was the 
inclusive nature of the representative structure with its perceived potential to benefit 
internal career development that was corrosive of autonomous behaviour, notably 
evident within a head office setting. The outcome was a tendency among 
representatives to disavow the furtherance, aggressive or otherwise, of narrow 
sectional interests, as to pursue such an agenda would be to challenge the integrative 
and unitary philosophical basis of the consultative model. 
5.4. Competence 
The competence of a representative body is a further important antecedent variable 
impacting upon the effectiveness of voice. It is a commonplace within the field of 
industrial relations to posit the asymmetry of the employment relationship. The 
competence of the managerial and employee protagonists within the 
negotiation/consultation arena is potentially a significant facet of such a lack of 
parity, exacerbated in most instances by management's superior familiarity with 
business discourse, allied to strong information asymmetries. Exploring this theme 
Heller (1992: 153) has argued that managers have developed a range of theoretical 
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schemes and vocabularies derived from economics and related disciplines with 
which representatives are not familiar. It is additionally argued that certainly within 
small and medium size enterprises the choice of representatives is limited, and is, 
therefore, unlikely to cover the range of competencies necessary to engage in 
discussions on complex business issues (ibid). As Heller further suggests (ibid) 
deficiencies are amplified because, 
the range of information on finance, marketing, new manufacturing 
technologies, foreign trade, competitors, etc is not equally available to 
managers and representatives, and the latter rarely have any means of 
engaging experts or consultants to make up for the information they lack. 
Such a lacuna is particularly pertinent to NERs given that they are further 
handicapped in falling outside the provisions of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, that enables independent trade unions to obtain 
certain information for the purposes of collective bargaining (Rose, 2001: 473). 
Heller (1992: 152) defines competence as an `adequacy of experience and/or skill that 
contributes to the resolution of specified problems'. It will be evident that the 
distinction between competence in this sense and the use of `linguistic resources', 
(including rhetoric and argument) explored earlier as subtle manifestations of power, 
is potentially abstruse. Heller, however, has additionally argued that the inequality in 
competence serving to mediate the efficacy of voice provision may be reduced or 
eliminated by closely linking appropriate training with the introduction of 
participative schemes. The focus of the section below is, therefore, upon competence 
instilled formally, or the lack of it, and the resultant implications. Thus, the use of 
training as a medium for the attainment of equipose in managerial-representative 
expertise is evaluated. Principally we are concerned with the inculcation of technical 
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skills that serve to inform the representative process. However, given that the remit 
of the representative bodies at both MediCo and FridgeCo extends to items 
distributional in nature it is necessary in these instances to extend the analysis further 
to procedural matters. As will be seen, particularly within the former organisation, 
incompetent handling of formally tabled managerial proposals and demands has had 
adverse and enduring implications. 
5.4.1 MediCo 
Amongst both current and ex-representatives the issue of training very much 
represented something of a bete noire, notwithstanding a claim by the HR director 
that representatives underwent `a very comprehensive training programme through 
ACAS'. Three of the six incumbents had received no tuition at all in connection with 
their representative duties. Indeed, at the time of the research there had been no 
formal training provision in any of the preceding three years - the training impetus 
appeared to have waxed and waned. The HR director was at pains to point out that 
during the early 1990s he had personally initiated an extensive training programme 
to enhance the skill base of representatives; competencies imparted including 
employment law, elements of negotiation and communication. Training provision 
had subsequently, however, become much more modest in scope, limited to sporadic 
bursts followed by long periods where any semblance of provision was withdrawn. 
Ex-representatives were especially critical of this piecemeal approach, indeed the 
absence of training provision was cited by two former delegates as a cause for 
resignation. 
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While the ECC representatives perform a range of tasks, they are generally most 
associated with the key set piece event of the year: the annual pay review. The 
importance of this event to employees places representatives, albeit briefly, under the 
critical gaze of their peers. This serves to expose in employees' eyes the inherent 
deficiencies and contradictions of the representative model, representative 
competence being to the fore with the aptitude of delegates routinely derided. 
Indeed, within the survey undertaken only 33% of employees agreed with the 
statement that: `I am happy that my representative has the appropriate skills and 
experience to consult effectively with management in areas such as pay and 
conditions'. Two shortcomings were seen as being particularly pertinent: insufficient 
procedural awareness and a lack of financial acumen. 
A dearth of training and experience in financial matters is very much crystallised 
during the pay talks where the specialist knowledge brought to bear by the 
managerial team manifests itself in a much broader repertoire of argument than can 
be mustered by the lay representatives. It will be recalled from chapter 4 that the 
`negotiation' process involves representatives being subjected to a barrage of data 
e. g. internal cost projections, plant financial variation to budget, international labour 
rates, local pay data and length of service profiles, i. e. a variety of data sourced from 
a range of specialist managerial disciplines. It was evident, however, that the lexicon 
of cost accountancy, and to a lesser extent, personnel management, represented alien 
discourses to the representative team - graphically captured in the following 
comments: 
It is sometimes a bit mind blowing when you get all these facts and you think 
I can't grasp this you know. (ECC representative) 
209 
A lot of it was over your head. One chap in particular would throw facts and 
figures at you, year to date and waste, straight over your head. And in 
negotiations he would throw defects per million and this costs this, and this 
costs that. (Ex-representative) 
The plant accountant would give you the financial thing [in wage 
negotiations] - double Dutch most of it. (Ex-representative) 
Such failings in training provision were acknowledged amongst various employees. 
The following offering crisply summarises the various elements of concern: 
They haven't got the training or the ability to do the job as it should be done. I 
don't think that they are given the support that they need, especially when it 
comes to the pay talks. We have got very clever people here, people in senior 
management posts who have been here for 25 years. They are very clever 
people - there have been times when they have mutilated the ECC and because 
they know what to say and what to do they can pull one over on the workforce 
in one way or another. The reps that I have come into contact with don't seem 
to have the experience or the knowledge to do the job, that is no fault of their 
own, but I have always expressed that opinion. (Tankroom operative) 
It was evident that deficiencies in training provision were manifest in a total lack of 
parity in terms of financial sagacity; the impoverished skills base of the 
representatives routinely precluding a critique of managerially imposed definitions of 
reality within the financial field. This is a phenomenon encountered by Kirkbride 
(1986b: 23) in his own non-union case study and he argues somewhat colourfully that 
this enables management to play the game on their pitch, using their ball and set of 
rules. Indeed, this ability of management to structure the reality of the pay review 
process had not gone unnoticed by the representative team. One veteran member 
commented on how the conventions and techniques of cost accountancy are used to 
screen the issue of profit: 
We keep asking about profit at MediCo and MediCo UK don't make a profit 
according to them. It is all part of the wider scheme of things you know. But we 
are sure that this plant does make a profit, but they won't actually tell you how 
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much because [we would say] `well if you are making that much money you can 
offer us a little bit more', it is something that we are kept in the dark with. 
Ultimately, as discussed in the last chapter, the ability of management to impose and 
shape the parameters of the debate results in a tendency for the pay discussions to 
become little more than afait-accompli. 
Deficiencies in training and ergo competence extend beyond a lack of financial 
expertise, however. Interviews with both current and former representatives 
demonstrated an element of procedural ineptitude mediating the ability of the ECC to 
defend existing favourable arrangements. Three of the representatives had been on a 
L 
workshop' course comprising Elements of Negotiation facilitated by a local 
consultancy firm some years previously. Nevertheless, they evinced difficulty in 
recalling precise details of any skills and competencies imparted. In contrast, the 
main protagonist on the employer side, the HR director, is both an ex-shop steward 
and an extremely experienced managerial player. This juxtaposition of a highly 
astute managerial actor set against a relatively unversed set of representatives had 
been skilfully utilised by the former, having the impact at times of leaving ostensibly 
concluded deals nevertheless subject to managerial veto. It could be argued, given 
the power imbalance catalogued earlier, that ultimately management has the ability 
to eschew agreements at will. This would be to miss a key thesis of chapter 4; the 
capacity to exploit apparent loopholes, rather than resort to crude unilateralism 
affords management with the ability to at least pay lip service to the pluralist 
pretensions catalogued, so avoiding recourse to potentially destabilising managerial 
prerogative. This tactic was most recently invoked during the May 1999 pay review. 
As will be recalled from chapter 4, two years prior to this a three year pay deal had 
been struck providing for an annual increase of 3.75%; a settlement that was viewed 
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increasingly as untenable by the senior management team due to a worsening cost 
posture, ultimately resulting in management buying off the workforce with a one off 
lump sum payment set against the 1998/99 financial year. As one ex-representative 
observed: 
We had a three year pay deal, got to the third year and we went to pay talks. I don't even know why we went to pay talks because as far as I was concerned 
there was a three year deal that was cut and dried - then they wheeled out the lump sum ... It was sneaky, we didn't want it, we got it forced on us. Give `David Smith' [the HR Director] his due, he pulled a fantastic fast one and he 
got away with it. 
The HR director's account reveals how an apparently `cut and dried' deal was 
adeptly side stepped: 
At the very start it [the mooting of a lump sum payment] took them a bit by 
surprise because it was not expected, because the pay increase had already 
been established for that year. What we had never done was to establish the 
mechanism for giving that amount of extra money. So there was never any 
agreement that it would be an increase in basic pay, because it could have 
been an increase in loyalty bonus, it could have been an increase in shift 
premium. 
Given that the accustomed format prior to 1999 was for such a pay increase to indeed 
go on basic pay the accounts of both current and ex-representatives suggesting that 
the lump sum was imposed by stealth appears an accurate summary. Ultimately, the 
failure of the representatives to conclude a watertight pay deal afforded management 
with a window of opportunity to introduce the lump sum as a codicil to the previous 
pay round, notwithstanding the damaging long-term impact that it would have on 
both pension contributions and cumulative pay in forthcoming years. 
Employee rancour in certain quarters was compounded because a similar level of 
procedural naivete had been in evidence just two years prior in and around the 
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issue of the loss of `average earnings'. Average earnings may be viewed as a 
holiday bonus that was introduced during the early 1980s when the company was 
finding it difficult to obtain employees due to tight labour market conditions. The 
bonus was specifically targeted to encourage the working of overtime. During the 
two week summer shutdown workers who had undertaken overtime during the 
previous 12 months would, in addition to basic pay, be awarded a percentage of 
their annual overtime payment. Due to a clerical oversight it appears that the 
amount became miscalculated strongly in the employees' favour with additional 
factors being inadvertently built into the calculation. 
The supplementary costs invoked through such a payment in changed economic 
and labour market circumstances had become a point of concern amongst the 
management team, who subsequently brought the issue into the 1997 pay 
discussions, notwithstanding the absence of the topic from the previously agreed 
agenda. The springing of the subject onto the representatives at the 11th hour 
served to disorientate the group, inhibiting a considered collective response - the 
outcome being that the bonus was traded for a 0.5% across the board increase. The 
managerial argument was that market conditions dictated that overtime would be 
far less prevalent; hence the quid pro quo was sold as more than generous. In the 
final event, however, the level of overtime remained unchanged. This remained a 
source of resentment amongst a very significant constituency of male employees. 
That management's recourse to stealth had effectively been smoothed by a lack of 
representative sophistication similarly remained a source of embarrassment to the 
body, especially amongst those members whose constituents were directly affected: 
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They had to find a way of taking it out of the equation. I didn't know, and I 
don't think that anybody else did, that if you see that on the agenda and you 
say that it is not up for discussion, then it can't be discussed. But us being 
naive we didn't realise, so once it came up for discussion that was it; so that 
is why it was lost, and several people on the shopfloor will never forgive us 
for that. (ECC representative) 
To summarise, it is evident that a distinct lack of competence severely compromises 
the effective functioning of the institution. Thus representatives lack the technical 
skills necessary to muster a coherent assault on the managerial interpretation of 
given situations. Similarly, an absence of procedural knowledge and skills has 
resulted in less than watertight drafting of concluded agreements, allowing 
management to eschew the provisions with relative impunity. 
5.4.2 FinanceCo 
Given the relative sophistication of the representative infrastructure outlined in 
chapter 3, a somewhat surprising finding of the FinanceCo study was the almost total 
lack of formal training provision. As at MediCo representatives were often critical of 
the scant resourcing applied to their development. The only formal training provision 
had been a half day overview of employment law facilitated by an outside law firm. 
One delegate's comments were fairly standard: 
They [representatives] need much more training. I have a document dated 
1994 that said you have been elected onto the PC and you will receive 
training, but do you know the first training that I ever went on was about 
three months ago. 
The lack of training provision, feeding into deficiencies in representative 
competence, was likewise a commonplace employee criticism and a core 
theme in 
the IPA survey, a typical response being: 
214 
They [representatives] should be given the time, training and resources 
needed to effectively represent employees, which at the moment is not given by the company (emphasis in original). 
Notwithstanding the above critique it would be wide of the mark to label all 
representatives as being devoid of the requisite skills and competencies necessary to 
forward the interests of employees. In contrast to MediCo, where representatives are 
exclusively drawn from non-managerial grades, the representative architecture and 
the preference for an inclusive-integrational format, result in pockets of extremely 
competent and articulate representatives most notably, within a head office as 
opposed to retail context. Dealing firstly with the former, here a typical quorum 
contains representatives from a range of specialist business disciplines e. g. HR, 
marketing, IT and law. Within such gatherings the very generic skills that such 
representatives bring to bear from within their everyday functional capacities 
potentially serve to inform their representative role; indeed, as noted, ostensibly 
`closed' decisions have been re-visited and subsequently withdrawn as a direct result 
of considered technical PC input. 
The lack of formal training provision, however, ensures that there is a tendency for 
such competence to be unevenly distributed. Many representatives complained that 
because of the dearth of training they found it difficult to contribute to discussions 
due to a lack of detailed knowledge of the policies being reviewed. While 
documentation relating to important areas under review would be submitted to the 
PC - albeit sometimes belatedly - the subject matter was often very technical in 
nature and beyond the grasp of the non-specialist, detracting from the efficiency of 
the voice process. A typical instance related to the consultation in and around the 
replacement of the profit related pay scheme, as one representative noted: 
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If you are trying to argue that something isn't particularly good you have got 
to argue on the basis of this is what we think there ought to be in place. I 
don't think enough people on the PC knew enough about the financial 
structure to actually come up with a workable alternative. It maybe goes back 
to the training issue, that people on the whole don't know enough about HR, 
HR law, tax law and salaries etc. There isn't enough of that kind of 
background knowledge about HR issues internally and HR issues out there. 
Moving on to consider the retail council, this is distinct to the head office body in 
that, with the exception of one area manager delegate, the 15 representatives all fall 
within the lowest gradings of D and E. This is seemingly reflected in the agenda 
which is parochial in nature and generally restricted to less specialised retail, often 
housekeeping issues. An interesting facet of the study was the extent to which group 
wide matters that were routinely discussed at head office (e. g. health care and 
employee appraisal) attracted minimal input within the retail body. Indeed, several 
representatives acknowledged their inability to engage with the more technical 
aspects, as one delegate argued: 
The major problem I have with the job is my lack of knowledge. Not because 
I am an unintelligent person, but because I have not been exposed to 
executive type meetings, [so] I can't possibly be expected to know the impact 
of X, Y and Z on the company and its staff. 
The lack of specialist knowledge plausibly dictates that there is less of a tendency to 
engage critically with more technical areas rendering the overall coverage of voice 
somewhat partial. 
At FinanceCo, then, as at MediCo it is evident that the representative body has been 
handicapped due to a lack of formal training provision. Due to sparse tuition a 
collection of representatives within both councils considered themselves ill-equipped 
for the representative function. Nevertheless, within the head office council other 
delegates, characteristically those with a professional background, were seen to have 
the ability to bring to bear a range of relevant skills by virtue of competencies 
gleaned within their functional capacity. Indeed, within this group there is a 
familiarity with a range of specialist business discourses that has served as a basis to 
intelligently question executive decisions, a skill manifestly lacking within the 
MediCo ECC. 
5.4.3 FridgeCo 
Any evaluation of competence at FridgeCo is in many senses problematic because 
the potentiality for tangible employee gains was so circumscribed. The parameters of 
the attainable were compressed due to the financial plight of the company, 
juxtaposed against tight and less than sympathetic overall parental control. The latent 
power base of the body was likewise under severe erosion due to a shift in the 
composition of the workforce. Within such a context the most expert and wily of 
actors would no doubt struggle. 
In terms of tuition FridgeCo represents the only organisation of the three that had 
installed significant formal training for representatives relatively close to the period 
of research being undertaken. The focus, however, was restricted to procedural rather 
than technical matters. In late 1999 a team of external consultants delivered a course 
on Effective Consultation. Course notes and representative recollections indicate that 
a great deal of time was spent on theoretical issues such as defining consultation and 
the distinction between consultation and negotiation, along with a review of the 
dynamic legislative context. Due to the abstract nature of the course representatives 
were less than enthusiastic, prompting management to call in ACAS. In early 2000, 
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eight months prior to the research commencing, this body delivered a course on 
Effective Negotiating Techniques. As the title implies this one day course assumed a 
level of manifest power absent on the employee side and was similarly premised 
upon a set of domestic managerial actors possessing sufficient autonomy to 
themselves negotiate outcomes. The major part of the day was taken up with the 
facilitators outlining a standard negotiating model comprising `preparation, opening 
moves, middle and end game'; a somewhat incoherent rubric given the body's 
formal consultative terms of reference. Ultimately delegates were again unimpressed 
at such an ill-tailored training tool, a typical response being: 
He was trying to explain about sort of how to negotiate, but you know the 
company council has got no negotiation [remit] no nothing really, there's 
nothing. So he seemed to spend a lot of time then talking about how company 
councils worked in other places. 
Even within the context of `preparation', the one directly relevant area, while the 
course notes advised delegates to consider pre-meetings and assign team roles there 
was minimal evidence of this occurring in practice at the gatherings attended. The 
tendency was for representatives to articulate individual or departmental concerns. 
Although pay was an area of common concern, there was no co-ordination within 
meetings, with representatives interjecting ad-lib. 
It is noteworthy that in the one instance where a collective `result' was achieved - the 
increased compensation over shift working - the competence demonstrated appears 
to have been partly a legacy of the experience gained through union representation 
on the plant, rather than due to any aptitude instilled formally. As will be recalled, 
the ex-shop stewards were confidently proactive in both skillfully utilising their trade 
union contacts to embarrass management, and in engineering a momentum 
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demonstrative of employee unity to lend support to their position. Ultimately, the 
FridgeCo position echoes the other studies in demonstrating that any representative 
competence is largely instilled not through formal training provision, but derived 
from beyond this frame. 
By way of summary to this section it is useful to recall that our starting point was 
Heller's observation that training provision can serve to counter a lack of 
representative competence vis-a-vis management. The discussion demonstrated that, 
while this may indeed be the case, the various managerial actors have evinced 
limited enthusiasm for such a proposition. At MediCo training provision had been all 
but withdrawn and the sum total at FinanceCo amounted to one half day session. 
Only at FridgeCo was there any semblance of ordered tuition towards the 
development of representative agents. Nevertheless, here elements of the training 
were ill-suited `off the peg' ACAS solutions giving the initiatives a perfunctory 
tinge. However, the data showed that despite the dearth of formal training individual 
representative agents were not necessarily incompetent delegates. Any competence 
elicited, however, was predominantly a result of functional position (FinanceCo) or 
residual trade union linkages (FridgeCo). The lack of parity in competence was thus 
most striking at MediCo where there was both no history of trade union recognition 
and representatives were similarly drawn exclusively from the shopfloor. Particularly 
during pay talks the occupational role of representatives, predominantly semi or 
unskilled workers, allied to limited financial and procedural awareness, rendered 
them ill-equipped to challenge the interpretations of various managerial specialists. 
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5.5 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a concept fundamental to the notion of voice. However, as argued 
earlier in the introduction to this chapter it demands a sensitive treatment separate 
from the other variables reviewed. Although it is evident that power, competence and 
autonomy represent inputs to the voice process, and influence the terms of exchange 
between institutionalised voice and management, legitimacy has more dynamic 
properties. Developing the systems analogy, on the one hand the legitimacy of a 
representative body may be viewed as a subjectively conferred imprimatur that flows 
outwardly from the very act of representation and its outcomes. As Chaison and 
Bigelow (2002: 6) observe: `legitimacy is a perception or an assumption; it tells us 
how constituencies see the organization', it is hence in Pfeffer and Salancik's 
(1978: 194) terms `a conferred status'. Thus, within the context of systems of 
collective representation the presence of legitimacy (or its absence) may be 
positioned as a derivative or consequence of the substantive outcomes of, and the 
procedures surrounding, the voice process. 
There is, however, an integral feedback loop in operation. Any legitimacy generated 
in turn represents a crucial input to the system. Fundamentally, as Chaison and 
Bigelow, (2002: 100) argue, such legitimacy is central to gaining `critical resources', 
such as workforce mobilisation. As with the other concepts, therefore, legitimacy has 
profound consequences for the efficacy of voice, more particularly there is a tight 
synergy between legitimacy and power. 
This characteristic of legitimacy as both an input to - and output from - the process 
of representation very much determines the structure of this section. The 
first task is 
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one of evaluating the degree of legitimacy possessed by the representative bodies in 
each of the three study organisations, and towards this goal a formal 
conceptualisation and operationalisation is afforded below. As will soon become 
apparent, any evidence of a cognitive belief in the legitimacy of the three institutions 
is very much lacking. Given the positioning of legitimacy as fundamental to an 
institution's access to resources, the section is concluded with some comments 
regarding the implications of such a deficiency for the voice process. This in turn 
allows us to shed further light on one key phenomenon encountered earlier in the 
discussion; the broad absence of latent power resources. 
As highlighted, legitimacy has been described as a `conferred status'. This borrows 
from Weberian sociological precepts where legitimacy is viewed as a condition 
bestowed on the basis that it is right and proper to accept adherence to a specific 
authority (Merquior, 1980: 4). The nub of the problem amounts to whether an office 
holder is believed to possess good title to it. Clearly drawing philosophically from 
Weber, the American industrial relations commentators Greenfield and Pleasure 
(1993: 189) have argued that: 
When we use the term legitimacy to apply to collective voice of a worker 
organization we mean an organization of the workers' own choosing. In that 
sense legitimacy... implies general consent of the workers to the 
representative capacity of the organization carrying the collective voice. 
Thus legitimacy is fundamentally concerned with `belief and inner acceptance' 
(Merquoir, 1980: 209) and `spontaneous consent' (ibid: 208); but how might such 
consent be elicited? Within an industrial relations context theoretically it is possible 
to distinguish two strands of thought as enunciated by Hyman (1997) and Hege and 
Dufour (1995). Although these represent analytically distinct approaches they may 
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coexist. On the one hand Hyman (1997: 3 1) appears to assign primacy to the 
substantive outcomes of the voice process: 
Legitimacy is the pre-condition of the representivity (sic) of the 
representatives ... In part, it is gained and sustained by a record of `delivering the goods' and is lost by a persistent (or sometimes a single) failure to deliver 
- which makes the function of employee representation in hard times 
particularly difficult. 
Conversely, Hege and Dufour (1995) apparently draw inspiration from political 
science, more particularly one of the classical theoreticians, Jean-Jacques Rousseu. 
From this perspective legitimacy is derived when the output of a governing body 
equates with the values of those governed. Thus, from this standpoint legitimacy 
springs from the ability of representatives to interpret the interest of their 
constituents accurately. Hege and Dufour, therefore, replace the substantive focus 
with a procedural bias, i. e. the emphasis is upon process rather than outcomes: 
Legitimacy is founded on the ways in which representatives maintain their 
links with the workforce and are able to express the identity of the workgroup 
in their dealings with management. (ibid: 85) 
Although the above commentators emphasise different aspects, the reality of the 
situation is that there is likely to be a synergistic relationship between substantive 
and procedural elements of voice. This is neatly captured within Suchman's (cited in 
Chaison and Bigelow, 2002: 9) concept of `pragmatic legitimacy', which conveys 
succinctly the essence of how legitimacy might be conferred and maintained by an 
employee voice mechanism. Thus pragmatic legitimacy is, 
derived from the self-interested calculation of an organization and its 
constituencies. The organization is supported because it provides specific 
favorable exchanges; it gives something valuable and receives something 
valuable in return. Either the constituencies expect value from their policy of 
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supporting the organization, or they believe that the organization is 
responsive to their interests (emphasis added). 
This notion of pragmatic legitimacy usefully crystallises the above discussion. 
Nevertheless, in one sense the above conceptualisation remains somewhat confined. 
The implication is that employees base the conferral of legitimacy upon some crude 
recourse solely to cost benefit analysis. One consequence is that insufficient attention 
is paid to democratic principles and the impact that the electoral machinery has upon 
employee perceptions of the legitimacy of their representatives, and the constituent 
body politic. Given the tendency in all three organisations for representatives to be 
`elected' unopposed, the issue of electoral mandate is a further dimension that 
warrants consideration. 
Operationally the task in hand is, therefore, one of evaluating in each of the 
organisations the extent to which substantive outcomes and procedural arrangements, 
both formal and informal, serve to subjectively confer legitimate status on each of 
the NER structures. In a trade union setting such empirical measurement is 
approachable in no small measure via the use of quantitative proxy gauges such as 
the retention of membership; this is a key measure by which the demos, or 
constituents, the ultimate arbiters, can register such legitimisation of union or 
branch. 
Within non-union modes of voice such hard empirics are less routinely available; the 
task is therefore fundamentally one of monitoring consent via an in-depth analysis on 
a case-by-case basis. 
5.5.1 MediCo 
A key empirical finding at MediCo was that strong feelings regarding the 
legitimacy 
of the body were not dispersed evenly throughout the workforce, 
but were closely 
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allied to hierarchical status. As discussed, from a substantive standpoint Hyman 
(1997: 3 1) has argued that legitimacy may be `lost by a persistent (or sometimes a 
single) failure to deliver'. Within the context of the ECC one key event stood out as 
impacting upon the legitimacy of the body: the imposition of the lump sum payment 
in the 1999 pay talks. In relative terms this impacted most severely upon higher 
grade employees and thus anger was concentrated amongst this grouping. These 
were generally longer serving workers taking a considered view of the potentially 
enduring implications of a one off cash payment, as opposed to a salary increase. 
Employees routinely talked of being `sold down the river' by the ECC's inept 
handling of the issue, not least because the imposition was viewed as setting a 
dangerous precedent. Indeed, the spate of ECC resignations (largely high grade male 
employees) that ensued was itself symbolic of a withdrawal of consent to the body. 
One representative recalled the events in the following terms: 
All the higher grade men workers were against it because they were all grade 
11 or 12 and they get a good wage a week. So then to lose your basic pay 
[increase] was serious, and of course you lose it on your pension as well, so 
yes people in the higher grades were against it. 
A characteristic response from higher grade employees was: 
The lump sum affects absolutely everything to do with pay structure; don't 
get me wrong we were paid, but if we don't get a pay rise every year I am 
soon going to lose out in years to come. 
`Failure to deliver' on this occasion had clearly served to undermine the legitimacy 
of the ECC in the eyes of the more senior male employees. Such sentiments, 
however, were strongly correlated with status and ergo gender. The lower grade, 
largely female workforce, were far less vocal in their criticism, indeed many 
welcomed what was perceived as an unexpected windfall. While it would be folly to 
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suggest that the debacle had served to confer pragmatic legitimacy on the ECC in 
their eyes, certainly the lump sum payment was regarded more amiably. A typical, if 
somewhat colourful, comment was provided by one viaflex operative: 
John, my husband works, he earns the bread and butter and I earn the jam. The 
lump sum was cream on top of it. 
Turning to procedural aspects, a range of misgivings were expressed with regard to 
the representative-constituent interface, undermining legitimacy in terms of the 
body's lack of responsiveness. During the research period it was evident that there 
was no systematic procedure in operation enabling representatives to capture 
employee concerns and preferences. Representatives did suggest that briefings had 
taken place intermittently, but these appeared to have fallen into disuse; the only 
formal continuous means of communication in operation being the ECC notice 
board. Overall most employees questioned seemed to find the concept of a 
representative process a somewhat alien notion. Comments summing up the general 
sentiments included: 
The ECC? You never get to hear of it until it comes to the pay talks. 
And more quizzically: 
Are the ECC called to meetings other than pay talks? 
Unquestionably the shortage of delegates was serving to exacerbate the 
representative lacuna, several areas being without a designated representative. This 
disenfranchisement was compounded by the presence of both shift working and the 
nature of the production regime dictating that half of the six representatives were 
effectively `tied to the line'. Furthermore, less than amenable line management 
appeared to make any absence from the representative's production station 
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problematic, be it of an informal or more formal nature. At best production 
imperatives served to afford the representative with the ability of merely servicing 
colleagues within the representative's very immediate working area, provided that 
shift patterns additionally coincided. Ultimately the requirement for shift-working, 
shortage of representatives, haphazard constituencies and production pressures 
feeding into line management antipathy, served to undermine the presence of a 
genuine and ongoing dialogue between representatives and constituents. 
The above shortcomings are for the most part hidden from view. However, the key 
event within the ECC calendar: the annual pay review, serves to graphically expose 
the fault lines of the representative mechanism. Deficiencies derived via the inability 
of the representative infrastructure to collate and express `the will' of employees 
feed into a marked legitimacy gap. Especially amongst more senior employees a 
contentious aspect was the extent to which they were involved via the agency of their 
representatives in the process. Deficiencies were seen to exist both in terms of the 
solicitation of employee input and the ratification of the output of talks. A key 
criticism was of a perceived reluctance of representatives to consult or involve the 
base in deliberations at both stages of the representative process. Such autonomous 
behaviour of course is not illegitimate per se, and much depends upon the discretion 
awarded to the representative group, i. e. the terms of the representative mandate. 
4 
While the constitution was silent on the matter, the general opinion of employees 
was that the body had no authority to act beyond that of a communications channel. 
One employee's account of the 2000 pay talks summarises neatly the key areas of 
concern: 
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They [the ECC] don't seem to know where they stand with regard to employee 
representation. They are a consultative committee and to me they don't consult. 
[During the last pay talks] between a small core of them in the plant they 
agreed with management the pay packet, now to me that is not consulting, they 
haven't got the authority to agree something for me, or the rest of the 
workforce. (Tank room operative) 
Similarly when pressed on the issue, the representatives did not seek to defend their 
behaviour in terms of any explicit or implicitly bestowed mandate of authority. 
Indeed, one of the newer recruits expressed unease at the whole process: 
I don't see any way it being my job to accept a pay agreement on behalf of 
three or four hundred people. I mean it is peoples' livelihoods - it is not for 
me to decide on peoples' livelihoods. All I can do is the best job I can to get 
the best deal for the employees. But it is up to them to decide, that is my 
opinion. But if I had a meeting with the people and they said you the reps just 
go and get the best deal you can and when you have got it accept it, and come 
and tell us, then fair enough. 
A somewhat surprising finding, however, was that such direct and indirect references 
to the issue of representative `authority' were not explored by representatives or 
constituents though the lens of electoral mandate. Given the tendency for 
representatives to be `elected' unopposed, it might have been expected that such a 
democratic deficit would have figured more centrally within a critique, a situation 
mirrored interestingly within the other organisations. 
In summary, it is evident that both a `failure to deliver' in instrumental terms and 
deficiencies in responsiveness serve to undermine the ECC as a legitimate mode of 
voice provision - at least for certain functional groups. A key 
facet arising from the 
data was the bifurcation in responses, the more vociferous criticism in terms of both 
deficiencies in substantive output and procedure emanating from the more senior 
male group, while the mood of the more junior, predominantly female employees, 
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was generally less critical. A plausible interpretation, given the paternalistic 
managerial style catalogued in chapter 3, replete with relatively good terms and 
conditions, is that the issue of voice in such settings is rendered less relevant, the 
prevailing mood being captured in the following comments: 
Don't get me wrong this is a good company to work for, without a shadow of 
a doubt. There isn't many companies giving the benefits that you get. 
(Viaflex operative) 
Locally people regard them as a good employer with a good track record - 
well paid in comparison to some of the other firms. Yes I think they have 
quite a good name in the area. (Viaflex operative) 
In such situations the pitfalls of positing a crude dichotomy based around legitimacy 
and illegitimacy becomes evident. As Merquior (1980: 7) has cautioned `legitimacy 
and illegitimacy are only exceptionally an either/or matter'. If one were to more 
satisfactorily replace the polarity with a continuum, these employees occupy a 
middle terrain, being broadly indifferent to the issue of voice. 
5.5.2 FinanceCo 
In several respects the situation at FinanceCo echoes the MediCo findings in that the 
position regarding legitimacy was somewhat variegated. On the one hand strong 
feelings were expressed by pockets of employees very critical of the body, 
demonstrative of its non-legitimate status. In terms of the ability of the body to yield 
tangible benefits there was an element of concern expressed with regard to the 
modest substantive gains recorded. For example, within the open section of the IPA 
survey many employees expressed the opinion that the PC structure had indeed 
`failed to deliver': 
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I do not believe that the PC has achieved anything of great significance - 
only minor changes. 
PC as it appears is a toothless tiger. It is good at sorting out little issues e. g. 
uniform. But when it comes to big issues e. g. branch closures and 
redundancies it makes no difference at all. 
PC has had 6 years to get its act together and it has failed. Employees regard 
its inability to change anything that really matters as evidence that it is the 
mouthpiece of the company. 
Conversely, my own interviews demonstrated that while pockets of employees 
adversely affected by certain managerial decisions (most notably branch re- 
structuring) were indeed critical, the prevailing mood of constituents under both 
councils under review was again one of indifference. A typical response was: 
For me it does not exist. If I have got a problem I go to my line manager. 
Basically the PC rep is someone who just leaves policies for review on the 
table, and that is about it. (Data entry clerk, branch control) 
At a procedural level there were likewise a range of deficiencies apparent within the 
representative process. This was captured within the 2001 in-house survey where 
only 23% of employees company-wide agreed with the statement that: `There is 
effective employee involvement through PCs'. If we try to probe beneath this raw 
figure it is evident that within the head office setting there was no systematic 
mechanism in place allowing representatives to gather employee feedback and 
concerns - most delegates appeared to take a fairly passive role leaving constituents 
to bring issues to them. Out at retail level, the geographical dispersal of the branches 
renders constituent-representative contact especially problematic. Some 
representatives utilised a `Pal' system where a designated person in the branch would 
act as an interface to feed back employee concerns - but implementation of the 
system appeared patchy, and the success or otherwise of the process was not in any 
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way monitored. Likewise, none of the representatives actively visited their 
constituency branches to engage in face-to-face discussions - business pressures 
precluding such a response. Within both councils there was a heavy reliance on 
electronic mail, notwithstanding acceptance that this was a `bland' and `cold' means 
of communicating. Ultimately as in the MediCo study, the notion of a representative 
process was somewhat alien to most employees. This was again noted within the 
IPA report: 
Have never been told what has happened at any of the PC meetings or asked 
my views, therefore, I cannot believe that the PC truly represents the views of 
all the members of the company. 
Changes to the branch working practices, soon to be announced, have 
supposedly been formulated following consultation with staff; but which 
staff? Certainly not me, which makes a nonsense of the two way process. 
While there was indeed a palpable lack of involvement, and employees did not 
perceive the body as responsive to their interests, the broad mood was nevertheless 
very much one of overall apathy, and certainly the inadequacies of the voice 
process did not appear to undermine employee motivation. Indeed within the 
annual survey 82% of employees agreed with the statement that: `I am committed 
to my work'. Mirroring the position at MediCo, the tendency for representatives to 
be elected unopposed likewise attracted minimal comment. Again it is suggested 
that the phlegmatic stance of employees towards the topic of voice is a function of 
broad employee satisfaction engendered by satisfactory term and conditions, 
framed within a broader paternalistic style of management. Thus characteristic 
employee comments were: 
The company is quite a good employer within `West-Town', it is a very 
reasonable employer and it is recognised as that. So employees don't need 
to be well represented by a separate independent association because the 
company actually does it already. (IT manager) 
I see it as a very caring organisation about its people and one that very 
much wants its people to aspire to do well. It is about supporting the 
individual, and if there are hard times it is about trying to find ways to 
support the individual through these. I see it as a very good welfare state. 
(Key accounts manager) 
Once you have been here and you are settled you become involved in it, it 
is very family orientated in a way. Somebody mentioned to me a few 
months ago actually that it has a strange hold over you - and it does. I have 
never harboured views to leave in 10 years. (Customer service advisor) 
Indeed, most representatives, both at head office and out in the branch network, 
viewed the absence of employee interest in matters relating to voice as a demand 
side issue, a typical response being: 
Once you have done a mound of photocopying and sent it around a few 
times and got absolutely nothing back, you tend to think OK this is not so 
important to people, and when people start correcting spelling mistakes and 
doing nothing else that becomes extremely irritating. (Representative, head 
office council) 
At FinanceCo, then, the overall picture was one of widespread employee 
indifference towards the issue of voice, with the myriad deficiencies un-reflected in 
strong employee opinion, some isolated pockets aside. Indeed, such a position was 
captured within the IPA ballot into the future of representation within the bank that 
attracted a middling response rate of 56.15%. We may again, therefore, position 
most employees within the middle terrain where legitimacy is neither conferred nor 
retained. 
5.5.3 FridgeCo 
As argued in the introduction to this section, legitimacy is a subjectively conferred 
state flowing from both the substantive and procedural aspects of voice. Informal 
discussions with employees at FridgeCo demonstrated that deficiencies on both 
counts obviated any sense of employee consent to the body as a representative agent. 
At a rudimentary level the inability of the council to deliver a pay increase over the 
preceding 5 years undermined any sense of credibility in the eyes of production 
workers. The following comments are demonstrative: 
There used to be regular pay rises but we haven't had a pay rise for over 5 
years, as you can appreciate everything has gone up, but we just don't seem 
to get anywhere. We have our own rep, although we can approach him, we 
all feel it is a waste of time. (Sheet metal worker) 
The company council doesn't represent the employee's interests does it? It 
is more like they just turn up and they [management] listen and that is the 
end of it really. There is no negotiating body, they [management] just say 
no, that's it. (Cell worker) 
Indeed representatives largely conceded that in the eyes of their constituents the 
body had become an irrelevance. The following response is illustrative: 
I don't think they [employees] really care at all to be honest with you. I 
come back from the meetings, I say the same thing, they [management] 
report back an X loss, and that is it. 
The integrity of the body as a tool for employee voice, however, had been further 
discredited for reasons beyond the inadequacy of the cash nexus. Many employees 
expressed concern at the arbitrary treatment of temporary agency workers, and the 
absence of a credible check on what was perceived as the abuse of the foreign 
contingent, despite the fact that such employees fall outside the formal terms of 
reference of the body. Employee disquiet related firstly to the induction and 
training of temps that was widely viewed as inadequate, leading to high turnover; 
as many as 50% of new recruits were reported to leave within three days of 
commencing. Those that remained had often been attracted to the plant by the 
232 
promise of overtime; the working of `double shifts' was a contentious issue at the 
time of the research, the provision of which was necessitated by both the level of 
employee attrition and the tightness of the labour market. This reliance on foreign 
employees was widely viewed as exploitative: 
They are almost killing people in there, most of the foreign workers do it 
[double shift working]. (Cell worker) 
I don't agree with it. You have got people doing double shifts which I think 
is all wrong. They do a six til' two and two til' ten. To me they should not 
be allowed to do it. You will see individuals that are on a double shift and 
by 8 o'clock fatigue is setting in -a man can't concentrate for that amount 
of hours. There must be something in the law that says they have got to 
have two hours rest or something. (Cell worker) 
The general view was that the council had `failed to deliver' for the core domestic 
workforce, and to a lesser extent, had been lacking in the protection of the 
periphery migrant employees. 
In terms of the representative process any provision was somewhat sparse at both 
an informal and formal level. Day-to-day links with the workforce were tenuous. 
Notice boards containing the list of representatives and relevant constituencies 
related to the old factory and were, therefore, several months out of date, often 
resulting in confusion amongst employees. Likewise, in several departments the 
minutes were clearly not posted regularly, and those in place often related to 
meetings held several months previous, giving rise to comments such as: 
The company council? I haven't heard about them for some time. (Cell 
worker) 
And: 
I get most of my information from the local paper. (Cell worker) 
The overall tenor was of an increasingly ritualistic, rather than functioning 
institution, reflected in elections being uncontested, a factor which again passed 
without significant comment. 
With regard to the clerical workers, the body was largely viewed as an irrelevance 
given that it was dominated by production issues and the tendency here was to 
pursue issues through the line management chain. Many employees were unaware 
who their representative was, even though the clerical constituencies had remained 
stable and there were in any case only two delegates. The palpable lack of interest 
was reflected in the representatives bringing few issues to the table, as the council 
secretary observed: 
I find that the people representing the office workers don't speak much. 
There is hardly anything said about the office workers, they are very quiet 
and very rarely have points or bring questions from their constituents - it is 
really more to do with the factory. 
By way of summary, in contrast to the position at both MediCo and FinanceCo, the 
company council at FridgeCo was widely viewed as a non-legitimate mode of 
representation. Certainly amongst the production workers, by far the majority 
constituency, the wage freeze had fatally undermined the credibility of the body - 
amplified by the perceived exploitation of their foreign colleagues. Context here is 
all important. The financial plight of the company served to graphically expose the 
deficiencies of voice provision more acutely that in the other companies, wider 
employee dissatisfaction seemingly triggering concerns regarding the perceived 
utility of voice and hence feelings of non-legitimacy, rather than the indifference 
noted in the other organisations. 
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5.5.4 Legitimacy as Resource 
This section commenced with the strong proposition that legitimacy represents an 
essential pre-requisite for effective voice. The above discussion demonstrated 
unambiguously that the three representative bodies lack recourse to this particular 
resource. At MediCo two broad groupings were identified: for the more senior, 
largely male workforce, there was a strong credibility gap given that the body was 
widely perceived as having been ineffectual in protecting such workers' long-term 
interests. While the more junior, predominantly female, employees were seen to be 
largely indifferent to the subject of voice, this fell far short of positive cognitive 
consent to the institution. The latter position likewise captured the prevailing mood 
at FinanceCo. Conversely at FridgeCo the effective five year wage freeze had 
served to instil a belief in the non-legitimate basis of the company council. As will 
be argued in the concluding chapter, this absence of legitimacy has highly 
ambivalent ramifications for management. At this juncture, however, we are more 
narrowly concerned with conceptualising the impact of such a lack of legitimacy 
on the efficacy of the voice process. 
Theoretically the implications of an absence of legitimacy are neatly captured 
within Chaison and Bigelow's (2002: 100) aforementioned proposition that 
legitimacy represents an important element of institutional access to resources, 
particularly within the context of mobilisation. Earlier in the chapter reference was 
made to the importance of leadership. Leadership behaviour was seen to 
be crucial 
in instilling both a collective awareness and a sense of injustice, important pre- 
cursors in generating a willingness amongst employees to engage 
in collective 
action, and hence the realisation of significant latent power resources. 
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Representatives and embryonic leaders, however, function under the aegis of the 
wider collectivity, and its record as a representative entity must be viewed as an 
important conditioning factor influencing the potential for emergent and successful 
leadership behaviour. Suchman (1995: 574) has argued that: 
Legitimacy is generalised in that it represents an umbrella evaluation that, 
to some extent, transcends specific adverse acts or occurrences; thus, 
legitimacy is resilient to particular events, yet it is dependent on a history of 
events (emphasis added). 
One corollary to the above is that a chronic inability to deliver tangible gains by a 
representative body may serve to leave any aspiring leadership potential somewhat 
hamstrung. The most concise demonstration of this was the MediCo lump sum 
payment debacle, which represented the only evidence within the research of an 
explicit attempt by a representative to mobilise his or her workforce towards 
collective action. It was noted that while the present representative incumbents 
took a largely passive stance vis-a-vis their constituents, during this particular 
episode a former representative had attempted to mobilise the setters; a small but 
strategically important work group. As will be recalled, despite appeals for 
collective action, i. e. an overtime ban, this group of employees were unresponsive. 
Although this particular representative was apt to castigate such workers as 
`toothless', another interpretation is that the ECC's lack of a legitimate base, 
derived largely through its inability to deliver tangible gains or protect existing 
favourable arrangements, frustrated any mobilisation. Klanderman (cited in 
Metochi, 2002: 88-89) has argued that an individual's willingness to engage in 
industrial action rests upon the underlying principles of value expectancy theory, 
i. e. the calculated costs and benefits of taking part. Given the representative body's 
inept handling of various key events, such a decision to eschew the advice to 
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mobilise suggests a considered and rational response, ultimately fashioned from a 
lack of belief in the legitimacy of the institution. One implication of Suchman's 
(1995: 575) proposition that legitimacy is ultimately dependent upon a history of 
events is that such representative bodies, lacking credibility in the eyes of the 
workforce, appear to be caught in a vicious cycle frustrating the creation of a latent 
power base. This does not of itself preclude mobilisation in such an organisation; 
however, successful leadership would appear to presuppose that aspiring leaders 
distance themselves from such fatally tarnished institutions rather than seeking to 
act from within. 
The absence of legitimacy, however, has implications beyond the issue of 
mobilisation. Effective employee representation assumes a degree of institutional 
autonomy as between a representative body and its constituents. In the words of 
Hege and Dufour (1995: 93), `a differentiation from the rank and file is necessary 
for the process of representation itself. Similarly advancing this thesis Hyman 
(1997: 3 1) has argued that: 
The articulation of a coherent employee `voice' requires the filtering and 
prioritising of multiple, fragmentary and often contradictory grievances; 
successful interest representation requires a strategic perspective on costs and 
benefits, risks and opportunities, which in turn often seem to presuppose a 
certain institutional distance. 
Such freedom to manoeuvre, in a word mandate, however, is premised significantly 
upon employee confidence in the competence of the representative body, i. e. the 
legitimacy engendered not least through the track record of the institution. Again 
within this context the MediCo data is particularly illuminating in that there was an 
attempt by the majority of the ECC group to lever such `institutional distance' 
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during the pay review discussions. Nevertheless, there were countervailing 
pressures with employees critical of the practice and calls for the body to be kept 
on a much shorter tether. Clearly the outcome of this dynamic is uncertain, but at 
the very least it would appear that key constituents are increasingly loath to grant 
the body the space necessary for autonomous deliberation in view of the body's 
previous inept handling of important issues. 
5.6 Discussion 
The principal theme examined in this chapter has been the utility of NER voice 
provision. More particularly we have been concerned with evaluating the extent to 
which such representative structures serve to effectively articulate the interests of 
their constituents. Early in the chapter, drawing on the extant literature and wider 
learned comment, the contours of the voice construct were plotted. It was argued 
that the notion of effective voice presupposes the presence of a basic set of 
resources or requirements; inputs that were captured through the development of 
the concepts of power, competence and autonomy. The importance of a fourth 
component, legitimacy, was additionally stressed. Drawing on a systems analogy it 
was argued that this represents both an output from and input into the 
representative process, and hence demanded a distinct treatment. This four 
dimensional framework was used to navigate the case study data. The resultant 
analytical clarity afforded a systematic evaluation of the relative merits and de- 
merits of the representative structures across the three case study organisations. 
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At a basic level of analysis the chapter has served to corroborate the findings of the 
previous micro-level research highlighting the shortcomings of NERs as conduits 
for collective voice provision. In line with such data the institutions were seen for 
the most part to represent largely unavailing vehicles for the articulation of 
employee interests. An evaluation of the structures at a rigorous theoretical level, 
however, allowed us to move beyond this somewhat bland conclusion. 
A feature of the extant literature is the deterministic nature of the accounts. 
Commentators depict a collection of ineffective and seemingly impotent 
institutions devoid of any ability to modify managerial action, in all but the most 
anodyne of areas. This position was not entirely borne out by the research data, 
however. A fundamental analytical contribution of the chapter has been the 
tracking of the decision making process through the lens of a thorough and 
systematic modelling of power, facilitating a sensitive evaluation of managerial- 
representative power dynamics. To be sure, at a formal level the bodies were seen 
to possess minimal manifest power, itself tracked to a broad absence of mobilising 
leadership (see below). The chapter demonstrated, however, that the institutions 
could exert some influence upon management, not least via their ability to mobilise 
counter argument. 
Broadly a bifurcation in findings emerged. On the one hand the position at MediCo 
echoed the deterministic tone of the extant literature. While somewhat 
paradoxically this was the only council with a formal negotiating remit, it 
nevertheless proved to be the least able of the trio at applying any sort of check on 
managerial prerogative. On the other hand the evidence within the other study 
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organisations was less absolute. Data was provided of both significant amendments 
being made to managerial proposals (FinanceCo), and of representative agents 
securing tangible managerial concessions (FridgeCo), notwithstanding a lack of 
any conspicuous latent power resources with which to confront management - such 
gains were tracked largely to the use of `linguistic resources'. At FinanceCo this 
understated component of power was evident during the re-structuring of the 
organisation into autonomous business units where representative actors used their 
specialised functional skills to argue cogently for the maintenance of a particular 
department earmarked for closure; representatives interceded utilising the 
managerially seductive `legitimising principle' of efficiency to maintain the status 
quo. At FridgeCo representatives being largely drawn from the shopfloor were less 
familiar with the lexicon and theoretical frameworks of business discourse. 
Nevertheless, they were effective in achieving a concession over the introduction 
of shift work; in rejecting the original managerial offer representatives were adept 
in tactically exploiting managerial insecurity and concerns in and around tight 
labour market conditions, emphasising the potentiality for widespread employee 
exit. A further aspect of this incident was the somewhat speculative attempt made 
at workforce mobilisation by the two former shop stewards, one of the few 
examples of leadership traits being exhibited within the study. It is difficult to 
gauge the impact of this. However, at the very least it might be suggested that the 
symbolically novel gesture of a pugnacious duo of representatives requesting the 
shutting down of production cells to brief employees, was an influential factor in 
management deciding to draw a line under an episode that was increasingly 
spinning out of control. Taken together the above data represents a useful 
corrective to the somewhat blunt impression afforded by extant accounts of a 
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powerless and impotent collection of institutions; a conclusion typically forged 
from an unrefined conceptualisation of power. 
As was demonstrated, however, such incursions remain relatively rare phenomena. 
While an evaluation of power afforded a lucid tool towards a fuller understanding 
of the efficacy of such structures, it remains but one conditioning factor. An 
illuminating insight was afforded by the importation of the concept of autonomy 
into the theoretical schema. If the section on power demonstrated some amplitude 
for NERs to influence managerial action, notwithstanding the lack of recourse to 
collective sanction, what came through strongly subsequently was that the space 
for such persuasive moments was very much mediated by the limited independence 
of the structures. 
An obvious starting point in our critical assessment of autonomy was the derivation 
of the formal constitution of the NER structures -a critical area given that Batstone 
et al. (1977: 108) have argued that `rules often constitute the routinised means of 
applying the dominant ideology to particular situations and problems'. In all 
instances such terms of reference were seen to be managerial emanations, serving 
to tightly delineate and confine the legitimate areas of engagement. The application 
of a second test that sought to evaluate the extent to which the already restricted 
agenda was substantively independent of management served to further qualify the 
notion of institutional distance. At both MediCo and FridgeCo we saw how the 
councils were very much fora for the communication of management's version of 
reality, ideology and values - components of a wider ideological armoury neatly 
captured in Poole's notion of `mental resources'. Interestingly, 
both bodies were 
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ensconced within wider strategies of systematic top down information provision. 
During council gatherings representatives at both organisations were additionally 
subjected to a further profusion of business related data building upon the generic 
exposure of the wider workforce, and this served to further conflate the goals of the 
organisation with the interests of representation. Such a barrage of top-down media 
was seen to mediate the degree of independent challenge mustered by the bodies. 
This typically rendered the managerial interpretation of key events, and certainly 
its ultimate prognosis, beyond censure. 
In a similar fashion, although for different reasons, a lack of autonomy was seen to 
compromise the effective functioning of the FinanceCo head office PC. It was 
strikingly apparent that this body served to lure into its ranks a clique of ambitious 
career-minded employees anxious to colonise the structure for self-centred 
occupational reasons, rather than the furtherance of wider constituency interests. 
Careerist motivation was seen to render many representatives loath to push 
employee demands. Such behaviour was explicable firstly in terms of the inclusive 
nature of the representative body. A presence on the PC was seen to afford 
ambitious employees high profile managerial access; the forum therefore provided 
a useful shop window for the more enterprising junior members to impress their 
more senior colleagues and to network more generally. Secondly, given that in line 
with the wider corporate ethos the body is marketed philosophically as an 
integrational tool, the representative leaning is to play down the pursuit of a narrow 
and distinctly employee-orientated set of interests. If we follow this line of 
analysis, however, a seeming contradiction emerges. It will be recalled that the 
head office councils was credited with the tenacious pursuit of constituency 
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interests during the recent restructure of the organisation, wherein the senior 
managerial team reversed the decision to abolish the internal communications 
department. A closer look at this episode, however, demonstrates its congruence 
with the above account. The institutional emphasis is upon mutually beneficial 
outcomes rather than the pursuit of distinctive constituency interests. It is of note in 
the above example of an apparent employee `win', that while the outcome 
benefited a discrete group of employees ultimately this was somewhat 
epiphenomenal. As discussed the `legitimising principles' proffered by 
representatives related to corporate efficiency considerations. It was the integrative 
nature of the subject matter that marked this as a legitimate area of representative 
challenge, tempting representatives to put their head above the parapet. Such bold 
behaviour was far less evident in and around more distributive zero-sum issues. 
In contrast to the head office body the retail council was seen to be less prone to 
such incorporative tendencies. It might be conjectured that this is a function of the 
lower career aspirations of most retail employees serving to vitiate the perceived 
long-terms costs of challenge. Any dissent, however, was typically restricted to 
day-to-day housekeeping issues rather than the more technical topics that often 
engaged the head office council. 
Clearly within the above account there are some implicit linkages between power 
and autonomy that warrants some further exploration. The point was made that the 
relative absence of manifest power is itself a function of a lack of significant latent 
power resources. Within the case studies the explanation for this state of affairs 
focussed on the absence of visible mobilising leadership, as in wider trade union 
circles such a trait is viewed as the sine qua non for collective action 
(Kelly, 
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1998: 4-35). Such an inference begs the question of why leadership behaviour fails 
to develop in such settings -a point hitherto neglected. The lens of autonomy 
provides a useful vehicle through which to speculate upon this issue. A plausible 
interpretation is that the norms of corporate culture, reinforced and transmitted to 
representatives via the heavy use of `mental resources' and targeted at the a priori 
structuring of attitudes, mediate the potential for leadership to emerge. Within all 
three organisations there is an element of cultural management, powerful 
ideological influences operate and heavy pressure is placed on representatives to 
conform to the managerial norms and values which are predominantly unitary. This 
process may be conceptualised in terms of a representative career during which 
delegates are exposed to a socialisation process that characteristically feeds into 
moderate demands and responsible behaviour in the eyes of management. Within 
such a setting, headstrong behaviour is apt to be interpreted as disloyalty, rendering 
any aspiring activists potentially estranged from both their mainstream colleagues 
and managerial sponsors. 
It warrants comment that one important corollary to this want of leadership is that 
employees rarely enter as a visible presence directly shaping outcomes as a 
collective entity or resource. One exception was the FridgeCo shift working 
scenario where the financial situation of employees became so intolerable that there 
was an element of spontaneous workforce dissent, the momentum being maintained 
not just by the ex-shop stewards but among a similarly disaffected wider group of 
representatives emboldened to undertake the role of malcontents in the 
mobilisation of argument. It is only, however, seemingly in such circumstances of 
extremis, that give rise to a groundswell of rank and file dissent amongst a critical 
mass of employees, that workers finally enter as a differential influence visibly 
shaping events. The introduction of the lump sum payment at MediCo, and the 
planned abolition of internal communications at FinanceCo provided similar 
examples of rank and file vexation triggering a representative response. Such 
instances aside, where there is an element of extemporaneous employee objection 
directly prompting representative action, the absence of proactive leadership for the 
most part is decisive in neutralising employees as influential third party actors. 
Turning now to consider the third dimension of our analytical schema this concerns 
competence. It was suggested above that the absence of externally derived 
ideological sustenance severely compromises the effective functioning of such 
structures. By similarly isolating competence as a variable the chapter again 
demonstrated the inherent difficulties faced by such atomised islets of employee 
voice. What came through strongly was the insularity of the structures. The 
inability of the bodies to look externally for information, expertise, advice and 
guidance and - more germanely - training provision, was seen to 
further limit any 
scope for tangible gains over and above the more obvious constraints imposed by 
scant power resources and limited autonomy. 
The section opened with the strong proposition that a priori representative agents 
are disadvantaged in their dealings with management because the dominant 
discourse and theoretical schemas utilised routinely in discussions represent 
managerial tools. Furthermore, not only are managers generally more 
familiar with 
the lexicon, but specialist personnel such as accountants, lawyers and personnel 
staff are likewise routinely at hand to support, bolster and lend credibility to the 
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managerial position. There are clear linkages to the utilisation of `mental resources' 
explored above, as such a disparity is a potentially powerful ideological tool 
serving to underwrite managerial prerogative by demonstrating its genesis in 
expertise and competence. 
The central theme explored was the extent to which management had sought to 
restore some semblance of balance through formal training provision. A broadly 
similar pattern emerged, training was either negligible (MediCo and FinanceCo) or 
present but ill-conceived (FridgeCo). Thus, at MediCo, any attempts by 
representatives to temper managerial prerogative were clearly restricted by their 
limited grasp of both financial and procedural matters. Likewise, at FridgeCo a 
dearth of pertinent technical training ensured that the quite widespread business 
information disclosed to representatives was treated in a fairly passive manner - the 
corollary being that the business decisions that ensued were rarely subjected to 
informed analysis. At FinanceCo, by contrast, the position was far more varied. 
Within the head office council, despite a dearth of training, the functional status of 
many employees dictated that the senior managerial position on key issues was 
potentially open to far more vigorous challenge. That this routinely failed to 
materialise, notwithstanding constituency concerns at various managerial 
initiatives, for example alterations to profit related pay and the removal of health 
care benefits, is explicable in terms of the questionable autonomy of the body. 
Interestingly, it is clear, therefore, that the oecumenical nature of the consultative 
infrastructure has ambivalent ramifications for the voice process; the inherent 
inclusivity serves to enhance the competence of the body while the potential for 
careerist aspirations seemingly neutralises any potential gains. Interestingly within 
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the retail council the converse applied; discussions characteristically were fairly 
parochial in scope, the more restricted range of generic skills allied to the absence 
of training serving to preclude engagement with the more technical matters. 
This FinanceCo data clearly serves to emphasis the need for circumspection with 
regard to Heller's thesis stressing the importance of training to the successful 
introduction of schemes of employee participation; it is all to easy to talk up the 
significance of competence per se. Deficiencies in autonomy can clearly serve to 
diminish the extent to which any enhanced competence is automatically and 
necessarily translated into greater efficiencies. 
It is evident from the above discussion that deficiencies in all three areas of 
resource provision, power, competence and autonomy, serve to undermine the 
efficacy of voice provision in each of the study organisations. Nevertheless, despite 
these broad similarities in pattern some interesting differences emerged in 
employee responses tracked under the section on legitimacy. The concept was 
operationalised predominantly in terms of employee perceptions regarding the 
procedural arrangements and substantive outcomes of the voice process. It will be 
recalled from the preamble to the chapter that a central theme of the research 
relates to whether employees under such structures feel empowered in having the 
ability to formulate and shape the decisions affecting their working lives. In view 
of the earlier analysis it was unsurprising that for the most part employees felt 
alienated from the important decisions impacting upon them. Paradoxically, 
however, while generally employees did not feel a sense of empowerment and 
positive cognitive belief in the legitimacy of the representative bodies nor, 
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FridgeCo aside, were they uniformly disdainful of the voice process. At both 
MediCo and FinanceCo this is explicable largely in terms of factors beyond voice 
provision per se. Taking MediCo first, the paternalistic nature of the benefits 
package was reviewed in chapter 3. On top of wage levels that are deliberately 
positioned by management within the local upper third for equivalent work, 
employees have access to a range of benefits including share ownership, profit 
share and health screening. The corollary was that for many employees there was 
broad satisfaction with `bread and butter' issues such as wages and benefits. While 
it was often acknowledged that the voice process was ineffectual, set within this 
organisational context many employees were not unduly concerned, the majority 
mood being one of indifference to the topic of voice. Certainly strong feelings were 
additionally elicited, demonstrative of perceptions of the non-legitimate status of 
the ECC. This was, however, confined to pockets of senior male staff vexed at the 
failure of the body to veto the imposition of the lump sum payment in the 1999 pay 
round, and the earlier withdrawal of average earnings. Within this broad context 
Patricia Findlay's (1992: 88-89) comments, based on her own research into non- 
union organisations in the Scottish electronics sector, are apposite: 
It can be argued that employee performance and attitude in non-union firms 
was more influenced by other components of company manpower policy, 
such as good conditions, high wages and good benefits, than by the 
companies' approach to representation. This is not to argue that employees 
are uninterested in representative structures, but simply to concede that other 
factors may be more important in determining their level of satisfaction. 
Where companies can convince employees that they are looking after 
them. . . then the need 
for more rigorous representative channels may be less 
pressing. 
The MediCo position was broadly mirrored at FinanceCo, the topic of voice being 
most singularly marked by an air of dispassion. Again, an important contextual 
factor was broad satisfaction with the unilaterally imposed terms and conditions of 
employment - salary levels being benchmarked against the industry norm. 
Conceivably, however, other factors were at work undermining the relevance of a 
collective body within this organisation. We saw in the previous chapter how the 
company had brought into play a number of `progressive' HR practices that are 
commonly associated with the HRM rubric - an approach that seeks to emphasise 
the individual dimension of the employment relationship. For example, in terms of 
pay structures and formulae a recent innovation had been the introduction of broad 
banding allied to regular appraisal and assessment - individual employee pay 
progression is dependent upon the successful outcome of such reviews. This form 
of initiative clearly serves to de-collectivise core components of the employment 
relationship. Given such a scenario it is perhaps unsurprising that the topic of 
collective voice often met with an indifferent response. 
In contrast to the other two organisations, at FridgeCo it was evident that 
shortcomings in the utility of the voice mechanism coalesced strongly into a belief 
in the non-legitimacy of the institution. While in the other case studies deficiencies 
in the voice process were cushioned by the more favourable economic context, 
rendering the legitimacy of the institutions somewhat ambiguous, the FridgeCo 
council was more nakedly exposed. The financial context dictated that management 
was stripped of the headroom to `buy off employee dissent as at 
FinanceCo and/or 
engage in fairly painless rent seeking through the representative group as at 
MediCo. 
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Ultimately, while the overall position in the three organisations was somewhat 
variable, it was demonstrative of an absence of a positive cognitive belief in the 
legitimacy of any of the institutions and it is ultimately in terms of the lack of 
legitimacy that the ineffectual nature of these institutions must be understood. For 
the most part the absence of this resource was masked, given that the use of mental 
resources precluded any concerted challenges to management. In one of the few 
examples of leadership behaviour surfacing, however, at MediCo, we saw how the 
absence of this crucial resource mitigated against collective mobilisation, rendering 
the ECC devoid of the sustenance from which any sort of latent power base could 
be derived. 
The above discussion has highlighted the shortcomings in the efficacy of voice 
provision within each of the study NERs. It will be recalled that the previous 
chapter addressed the topic of managerial motivation. Hitherto these two broad 
areas of research have been treated as discrete themes. The remaining task is one of 
synthesising the above areas of analysis and placing them upon a broader 
theoretical canvas - it is to this exercise that we now turn 
in the concluding chapter 
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Notes 
1. This is a computerised version of viaflex production that was being piloted. 
2. In a follow up visit to the plant in March 2002 - 16 months later - the wage freeze 
was still in place. 
3. For example, the preamble to the employee ballot on trade union recognition 
commenced in the following terms: 
Why do we need formal structures for consultation? As stakeholders in the 
development and success of the organisation in which they work, employees, 
like others, have their own interests and perspectives and look for a means to 
express their `voice' individually or collectively. 
4. In their study of shop steward behaviour Batstone et al. (1977: 29-32) draw a 
useful distinction between delegates and representatives. The idea of a delegate is 
that he or she should seek a mandate on each issue from his or her membership and 
do no more than carry out their wishes. In contrast, a representative is often 
expected to adopt much more of a leadership role taking initiatives in the 
development of policies and their execution. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Within the introductory chapter it was emphasised that the study of non-union 
industrial relations remains something of a blindspot within the discipline. 
Although strides have been made over recent years to address the lacuna, the 
emphasis has characteristically been upon non-union exemplars of the fashionable 
concept of human resource management. Since the orthodox approach is to 
conceptualise this as an individual approach to the management of the employment 
relationship, the study of NERs has consequently remained somewhat limited and 
attracted relatively scant academic comment. It was argued that the presence of 
these structures in a significant minority of organisations renders the present 
position untenable, more so in view of recent legislation extending the coverage of 
non-union consultation. This evident empirical and theoretical vacuum created the 
context for the thesis. Further to exploring the impact of this mode of managerial 
intervention upon the workplace two core themes were examined. Firstly, attention 
was given to the managerial logic underpinning the presence of these structures. 
Secondly, from a workforce perspective, the efficacy of the various institutions as 
theatres for the provision of collective voice was evaluated. Despite the recent 
attention of a small number of scholars, these are themes that have been largely 
devoid of analysis. 
Hitherto within this thesis these thematic areas have been presented, both 
empirically and analytically, as self contained fields of study. If we are to offer a 
coherent and integrated account of these structures in the final analysis it is 
necessary to transcend such compartmentalisation and to amalgamate the salient 
findings from the two data chapters. Accordingly, this chapter initially sets out to 
explore the inter-connections between the two substantive data sets. The underlying 
premise is that the shortcomings in voice, catalogued in chapter 5, are only 
explicable with reference to the wider managerial logic and motive underpinning 
the presence of these structures, outlined in the earlier chapter. In order to lend 
articulation to the above themes we again draw upon the contours of the voice 
construct modeled in chapter 5. Through these four spheres, or dimensions, of 
voice, it is possible to conceptualise the implications of a fundamentally 
defensively orientated managerial intent upon the voice process. Further refining 
the analysis the notion of tension is introduced. It is argued that there are a medley 
of contradictions within this mode of managerial intervention that serve to delimit 
the potential for successful outcomes, not simply for labour but also for capital. 
Pursuing this topic managerial outcomes are likewise reconsidered, and more 
specifically the non-legitimate status of the councils is seen to have ambivalent 
ramifications. Most significantly, given the absence of legitimacy, it is argued that 
the non-union status of the three organisations can only be understood with 
reference to factors beyond the presence of the representative bodies. Exploring this 
proposition the analysis moves on to account for the factors giving rise to the lack 
of widespread trade union interest within the constituent workforces. 
253 
In the second half of the chapter we further probe the topic of tension, and in this 
instance the focus is exclusively upon managerial designs. The emergent theme is 
that the industrial relations and market participatory goals pursued via the agency 
of these structures are driven by rival `logics of action'. Such logics emanate from 
business pressures upon management to both maintain prerogative, and activate 
employee commitment and co-operation through workforce involvement in the 
very decision making process that it wishes to control. It is again argued, therefore, 
that there are inherent contradictions at work, giving rise to a marked institutional 
dysfunctionality. This is not to suggest that such bodies lack any meaningful 
corporate purpose - indeed their utility as a managerial tool is further considered - 
but rather that they are ineffectual tools for delivering the primary managerial goals 
highlighted in chapter 4. In the final section we close with a synopsis summarising 
the implications and contribution of the thesis with regard to the key theoretical 
debates, as enunciated in the introductory chapter. In order to provide a firm 
context for the above analysis, however, the discussion firstly commences with a 
brief recapitulation of the key emergent themes from within the two data sets. 
6.1 Principal Findings: Issues of Commonality and Divergence 
A marked feature of the existing literature is that it treats employee outcomes in 
isolation from managerial goals. Consequently, even though a variety of 
deficiencies are noted, such studies actually explain little in terms of the underlying 
processes underpinning the empirical observations catalogued. As a corrective 
within this thesis the theme of managerial motive was placed centre stage, 
occupying the first data chapter. If we consider the analytical 
framework derived 
from the generic participatory literature it is evident that elements of both industrial 
relations and market participation were depicted at various junctures. However, 
what was essentially common across all three organisations was the former 
rationale. The bodies were positioned as tools of union avoidance which the 
analysis subsequently moved on to track to wider corporate priorities. Towards this 
goal the thesis adopted a variant of the contingency approach utilised by Ackers et 
al. (1992), drawing upon Freeman and Medoff's (1984) modelling of the purported 
4 monopoly face' of trade unionism. The latter schema was seen 
to contain components relating to both the alleged union `mark up' and issues 
appertaining to restrictive practices. Within the case studies the latter concern was 
largely to the fore, as the benefits of non-unionism were predominantly conceived 
in terms of organisational flexibility and the ability to operationalise change 
without reference to a potentially obstructive independent external body. 
Although previous studies have alluded to the use of NERs within a policy of union 
avoidance, albeit en passant, a marked deficiency has been the absence of rigorous 
attention to the modus operandi of the evasion strategy, a reflection of 
circumscribed research design. This represents a significant oversight because, as 
will be argued, at a theoretical level this can be linked to discussions regarding the 
various shortcomings of this mode of representation. Two variants were posited for 
analysis: substitution and acculturation. Despite being useful points of entry these 
were seen to be bi-polar theoretical constructs that failed to convey the complexity 
and fluidity of the situation. In fact, to differing degrees strands of both variants 
were seen to coexist. MediCo conformed most tightly to the substitution model 
with management going to great lengths to suggest that the annual pay review was 
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the outcome of vigorous contest. Nevertheless, in such discussions management 
simultaneously sought to `enlighten' representatives with regard to business 
imperatives, in particular the significance of labour costs for the real politik of 
inward investment was given heavy and detailed coverage. At FridgeCo the remit 
of the de-recognised trade union had been transferred laterally to the company 
council, again indicative of a substitution or surrogate role. The outstanding feature 
here though, was the systematic provision of very extensive business data that 
sublimated into the attempted utilisation of the representative group as a means of 
educating the wider workforce as to the cogency of managerial action, and the 
ongoing need for financial sacrifice. At FinanceCo acculturation was at its most 
subtle. In this setting there was an overriding desire for a consensus culture. This 
was pursued, however, not via direct education, but more symbolically through the 
very structure and terms of reference of the partners' council. Management sought 
to prevent an `us-and-them' scenario developing by the construction of an 
integrative body that comprised a mix of both managerial and non-managerial 
grades. In terms of the council's remit senior managers sought to avoid the 
potential for conflict by eschewing the traditional agenda of collective bargaining, 
with consultation purposely steered towards an agenda consisting predominantly of 
less contentious HR policy issues. Nevertheless, even this situation was far from 
static or absolute; the employee ballot that demonstrated significant minority 
support for trade union recognition (32%), served to question the cogency of a 
union evasion strategy pursued singularly through the `ideology of consensus' 
(Broad, 1994: 29), and was reflected in a move to bring pay issues more squarely 
into the consultative arena, i. e. tentative moves to a substitution format. 
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So far we have re-emphasised what was essentially common across the three case 
studies. Plainly, however, when the analysis moved on to consider goals targeted 
at market participation significant differences emerged. It is here perhaps that the 
contingency derived approach was at its most useful in outlining the factors that 
had resulted in a difference in emphasis. In terms of the two manufacturing 
organisations, at FridgeCo, in contrast to MediCo, it was evident that the 
involvement and engagement potentially afforded via the representative body was 
conceived as complementing and dovetailing into the more demanding cellular 
format of production. Similarly, at FinanceCo concern with regard the increasingly 
competitive terrain, and the potentially destabilising impact of perennial 
organisational change, generated a desire to elicit employee `buy-in' or co- 
operation through the legitimacy afforded via consultation. The latter examination 
in particular served to re-connect the study of NERs with managerial 
preoccupations relating to - if not the full circuit of capital - certainly wider facets 
of the valorisation process, pace existing accounts that implicitly borrow from the 
Ramsayesque thesis in focusing exclusively upon issues relating to the control of 
labour. 
Within the subsequent chapter, however, it was the uniform emphasis noted earlier, 
with regard to the retention of control through the maintenance of managerial 
prerogative, that was predominantly reflected in the outcomes of the voice process. 
In none of these instances was employee empowerment ever seriously on the 
agenda. Echoing the existing data sets, the bodies were seen to be broadly 
unavailing vehicles for the furtherance of employee interests. Management strove 
to retain the initiative in all key areas of the decision making process, with 
management's right to manage afforded privileged status. 
Consider, for example, MediCo. Here it was evident that even though the annual 
pay review was billed as a process of negotiation, management was attentive in 
ensuring that the process conformed very tightly to its own interpretation of what 
was considered expedient, reducing the ensuing discussions to an act of non- 
participation. Similarly, the representative body repeatedly proved itself impotent 
in resisting the managerial reigning in of various arrangements viewed favourably 
by significant constituencies. 
FinanceCo was distinct from MediCo in that management was far more 
circumspect with regard to the consultative agenda, the aim being to project a 
unitarist view of the firm through the very agency of the structure. In view of this 
fact, unlike MediCo, management would not have countenanced extending the 
remit of the body into such an obviously divisive area as wage determination. One 
outcome was that the evident shortcomings of the partners' council were less 
wantonly exposed. In fact, the case study evidence suggested a collection of 
favourable outcomes had been secured by the representative body; e. g. the 
maintenance of the internal communications department at head office and the 
continuation of a coaching function at retail level. These instances, however, were 
less examples of the protection of employee interests per se, than the furtherance of 
those of the enterprise. Employee input was taken on board because of its 
perceived contribution to efficiency goals, and such outcomes were consonant and 
compatible with the unitary philosophical basis of the body that management 
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sought to emphasise. Generally management was successful in cocooning the body 
from a more potentially discordant subject matter. However, more distributive 
matters did surface, and in these instances the partners' council was no more 
successful at tempering managerial prerogative than its MediCo counterpart. In 
short, the body was more a component of ideological armoury, a means of 
operationalising the unitarist perspective, than a mode of consensual decision 
making that served in any way to further the interests of employees sui generis. 
Within our third case study organisation, FridgeCo, the same findings relating to 
the inefficacious nature of the voice process were again mirrored, graphically 
captured in an effective five year wage freeze. The emergent theme was that of a 
somewhat wearisome discourse between delegates and management with 
the former group's petitioning for a pay increase systematically neutralised by 
managerial depictions of an ongoing financial crisis. Significantly, employees, their 
frustrations lacking a conduit of influential collective expression, were apt to resort 
to a more individually framed sanction - that of exit. 
6.2 Conceptualising the Linkages Between Managerial Motive and the 
Functioning of Voice 
It is clear from the above account that two substantive findings were fundamentally 
common across all the case studies. On the one hand defensive goals in and around 
the maintenance of managerial prerogative, through a strategy of union evasion, 
formed some element of the milieu of motive, while on the other, the bodies were 
seen to be broadly ineffective modes of voice. This section seeks to lend 
articulation to these important themes. The central proposition is that the attempted 
realisation of defensive goals relating to the maintenance and/or sharpening of 
prerogative seriously undermines the utility of these structures from a workforce 
perspective. The analysis again borrows from the conceptualisation of voice 
provided in chapter 5. 
A common finding across all three organisations was the presence of constitutions 
and terms of reference that were exclusively managerial emanations. 
Unsurprisingly, in view of managerial preoccupations relating to issues of 
workplace control, at their inception the bodies were lacking in formalised power. 
Indeed, one would not expect a management so pre-occupied to subsequently gift 
significant manifest power resources to a representative body crafted by itself; any 
radical attempt at employee empowerment would clearly serve to undermine 
managerial authority, rather than protect or bolster it. Consider, for example, 
FridgeCo where the company council was created following the de-recognition of 
the then AEU. Although the union had enjoyed full negotiating rights, management 
were attentive in ensuring that upon its creation the competence of the company 
council extended no further than consultation. This gave rise to a shift in 
organisational power dynamics to a situation more conducive to immediate 
managerial goals relating to widespread and radical organisational change. At 
FinanceCo the `scope' of discussion similarly did not extend beyond consultation, 
but a further finding here though was that the `range' of influence of the partners' 
council was significantly compressed, with management from the outset debarring 
obviously distributive matters such as discussions over wage issues. In the one 
instance, MediCo, where the terms of reference of the representative body extended 
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into the terrain of negotiation, management went to great lengths within the pay 
review process to subsequently disarm the body through the heavy and structured 
use of `mental resources', a theme developed below. 
Within the above context of manifest power the inter-connections between 
managerial goals and the contours of voice are conspicuous; there is an evident 
linearity between defensive intent and the genesis of institutions formally `soft' on 
power. The articulation between motive and voice, however, operated at a more 
subtle level, undermining the autonomy of these structures and ultimately their 
latent power resources. A commonality across the three studies was that, to varying 
degrees, the goal of union evasion was pursued through a strategy of acculturation, 
i. e. `the internalisation of the organisation's objectives at the individual level' 
(Bolle De Bal, 1992). FinanceCo was distinct in that this was manifest 
symbolically in the very framework of the representative body. Its inclusive format 
captured and radiated the unitary culture and `community of interests' (Cressey et 
al. 1985: 161) that the organisation was keen to project. The emphasis on consensus 
dictated that the overriding focus of the body was that of a delivery mechanism for 
a range of integrational outcomes; this was seen to detract from the effectiveness of 
the voice process, particularly within a head office context, as it attracted a clique 
of representatives predominantly concerned with career enhancement. The 
structure was a tool that might allow these delegates to ostentatiously offer 
expertise or network more generally, behavioural traits that served demonstrably to 
undermine the autonomy of the voice process. 
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Within the MediCo and FndgeCo settings the acculturation process was similarly 
evident. Nevertheless, these instances differed in that the representative 
frameworks, at least outwardly, were suggestive of the trappings of organisational 
pluralism. Within both organisations the range of discussions encompassed more 
distributive, potentially antagonistic issues. MediCo was further distinct in that the 
key set piece event, the annual pay review, was ostensibly a negotiating process. 
Given the greater potential procedural latitude for employee challenge in these 
settings the process of acculturation was more directly educational, a practice that 
at times served to qualify considerably the parameters of what were considered 
legitimate areas of employee dissension. In both organisations management sought 
to educate delegates as to the cogency of managerial action and similarly immerse 
them heavily in corporate definitions of success. Thus, at MediCo during the 
annual pay talks representatives were reminded of the necessity for `favourable 
variations to budget', while at FridgeCo, ongoing emphasis was placed on 
operational metrics such as market share, turnover and profit and loss. This use of 
`mental resources' was directly corrosive of the autonomy of the representative 
process, as in both organisations it operationalised representative responsibilities to 
both constituents and management. Further clouding the issue, explicit (MediCo) 
and implicit (FridgeCo) linkages were made between such metrics and plant 
viability, with ideological pressure brought to bear that sought to legitimise 
managerial action via `the logics of the market' (McArdle et al. 1995: 167). In sum, 
the core obligations and accountabilities of the delegates were somewhat blurred as 
the terrain of perceived common interests became an expansive penumbra. The 
example par excellence was the situation at FridgeCo, where somewhat remarkably 
the majority of representatives stoically accepted the ongoing 5 year wage freeze. 
It is additionally significant that the restricted latitude for autonomous 
behaviour visited upon the representative bodies via the use of mental resources re- 
connects into the issue of power. It was argued in the previous chapter that the 
absence of autonomy was a crucial antecedent, neutralising the opportunities for 
workforce mobilisation, in those few situations where a distinctly workforce set of 
priorities struggled to the surface. Despite the outwards trappings of pluralism in 
two of the organisations, pervasive unitary influences were operative within the 
sub-structure of all companies. In the face of the heavy imposition of managerial 
norms and values the pressures for conformity are immense, undermining 
leadership behaviour and the potential for employee mobilisation. The process of 
acculturation is thus decisive in eroding the creation of a latent power base, and an 
effective platform from which to challenge management. The maintenance of these 
institutions as detached islets of voice, devoid of extra organisational ideological 
sustenance reinforces such normative control. 
It is clear that evidence can be found linking the defensively motivated intent 
harboured by the various management groupings to deficiencies within the voice 
process. In a similar vein a further intriguing issue concerns the theme of training 
provision. A common finding across all three organisations was the absence of any 
sort of systematic and ongoing developmental programme for representatives. 
It will be recalled from chapter 5 that Heller (1992: 152) has argued that the 
inequality in competence, serving to mediate the efficiency of voice provision, may 
be reduced or eliminated by providing appropriate training alongside the 
introduction of participative schemes. Since management had gone some way to 
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remove the problem of information asymmetries, at least within two of the 
organisations (MediCo and FridgeCo), where there was very extensive provision of 
business information, the obvious correlative was the tuition that would enable 
delegates to make sense of the data and theoretical schemas within which it was 
ensconced. Within both of the above organisations, however, even though 
extensive information was made available, various important decisions were 
devoid of any technical critique, with representatives ultimately lacking the 
expertise to either seriously challenge management's interpretation of events, or 
proffer alternative courses of action. 
The absence of systematic training provision would appear to connect with a 
management preoccupied with the maintenance of managerial control and 
hegemony. Specifically, the absence of formal tuition in technical areas 
complements the acculturation process alluded to above. It is far easier to argue 
that there is a convergence of interest over particular issues if representatives lack 
the skill to seriously challenge management's interpretation of market signals. In 
such instances the depiction of management as a neutral technocracy pursuant of 
common goals becomes the more credible. This much having been said, the extent 
to which the dearth of training provision represented deliberate managerial strategy 
must remain a matter of conjecture. Certainly at FridgeCo the vicissitudes of the 
final crisis and the incumbent necessity to `trim wherever possible' was not a 
situation conducive to the resourcing of external customised training provision. 
More notable, therefore, was the MediCo situation where the representative body 
was situated within a less pressing financial setting. Here the absence of significant 
training provision was cited by ex-delegates as a cause for resignation, but still 
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significantly management failed to take corrective action, notwithstanding an acute 
shortage of representatives. Unique amongst the three study organisations here the 
terms of the representative body formally extended into the terrain of negotiation, a 
process nevertheless tightly micro-managed to stifle potentially destabilising 
representative dissent to managerial interpretations of what was affordable. It will 
similarly be recalled that the presence of a set of relatively callow representatives 
had during various significant episodes yielded tangible procedural benefits for 
management. Ultimately within the context of such a parody of pluralist industrial 
relations it is plausibly in management's best interest to preserve the mystique in 
and around managerial ideas, theories and concepts. Not only does this diminish 
the possibility of robust employee challenge, and, therefore, underwrite the sanctity 
of managerial prerogative; it additionally serves, by omission, to emphasise the 
especial skills and competence of management, and hence its ultimate legitimacy 
and right to manage. 
It is evident, therefore, that to varying degrees goals relating to a defensively 
orientated intent crucially condition the aforementioned components of the voice 
construct. Additional to the dimensions of voice considered above, in chapter 5 
legitimacy was positioned as fundamental to any conceptualisation. It was argued 
that ultimately this was the barometer and criterion on which the health and vigour 
of voice must be assessed. The inherent failure of the structures `to deliver the 
goods' was viewed as pivotal in undermining any claims to such legitimate status. 
Drawing upon a systems analogy legitimacy was conceptualised theoretically as 
both an outcome of, and an input into, the voice process. Indeed within this latter 
context it was positioned as the sine qua non of effective voice. In the final analysis 
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it is through its corrosive impact upon the legitimate status of these structures that a 
managerial intent pursuant of the maintenance and/or furtherance of prerogative 
must be understood and conceptualised. Ultimately, as argued in chapter 5, in the 
long-run it is this resource that is crucial in determining the willingness of 
employees to pursue a collective response. In view of the straightjacket of 
managerial domination and direction under which these bodies function, such a 
shortcoming was largely hidden from view. However, notably, in the one instance 
(MediCo) of workforce leadership behaviour surfacing, where there was a call for 
an overtime ban, the absence of legitimacy frustrated any attempt at employee 
mobilisation, undermining the utility of the representative body as an effective 
conduit for the articulation of employee interests. 
6.3 Incongruent Goals and the Dynamics of Tension 
While a core managerial driver was the maintenance of prerogative through union 
evasion, a priori for employees the primary purpose of collective voice centres on 
its ability to shape and influence the decisions affecting their working lives. 
Philosophically the above proposition derives from the notion of the inequality in 
bargaining power between capital and individual workers, and the inherent 
potential for the economic coercion of an atomised workforce (Dickman, cited in 
Greenfield and Pleasure, 1993: 174). Within the case study organisations, 
if management sought to privilege its hegemony and authority via these structures, 
employees inevitably wished to temper this to varying degrees. The significance of 
this tension for management is that employee frustrations could find expression in 
demands for external representation. For certain, as discussed in all three of the 
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organisations, management had sought to square this circle and strongly influence 
the terms of the resolution of this tension through the process of acculturation. This 
was manifest in an expansive hinterland of a community of purpose, compressing 
the potential for the emergence of clashes in outlook. The process of acculturation, 
however, was not absolute and from time to time delegates articulated a distinct set 
of priorities and sought to resist management in a deliberate and purposeful 
manner. In particular the more extreme examples of managerial autocracy at both 
MediCo and FridgeCo met with resistance. Hence, we saw at MediCo how the 
imposition of the lump sum payment in 1999 was both vetoed by the ECC and 
resulted in the effective collapse of the body. Similarly, at FridgeCo the original 
pay offer that accompanied the introduction of shift working was roundly rejected. 
This notion of contradictory values and goals is not novel; indeed, the potential for 
such tension is acknowledged within the wider generic literature on participation: 
The ultimate problem in adjudging the `success' of participation is to be seen 
in the values and subjective nature of the exercise. Participation, as the term is 
used by managers, is very different from what it means to workers (Anthony, 
1977: 254). 
A distinct feature of this thesis, however, is that the nature of the fine grained 
micro-level research was able to identify manifest expressions of the evident 
tensions unleashed, rather than simply rehearsing issues of theoretical 
irreconcilability that are too often a feature of the wider participatory literature (cf. 
for example, Bolle De Bal, 1992; Loveridge, 1980; Ramsay, 1977). Contradictory 
pressures ensured that there was no stable equilibrium within any of the three 
settings, the phenomenon of non-union representation was seen to be fluid and 
dynamic, moving in response to a range of interacting factors derived from often 
incongruous aims. Previous studies by Broad (1994), Gollan (2001) and Watling 
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and Snook (2001) have implicitly demonstrated the presence of this tension in 
somewhat spectacular fashion, through the demise of the non-union structures 
under scrutiny. This study stands as an empirical corrective in that the strains can 
be mapped to the level of more workaday social relations. 
At a fundamental level the tensions unleashed are present at the very inception of 
these institutions. For the most part the constitutions gave rise to a consultative 
format. This embodies a realisation on the part of management that a minimum 
level of effectiveness is necessary to placate any employee demands for external 
representation, while the absence of veto enshrined within this concept is 
nevertheless a means of coming to terms with the desire that voice should in no 
way impinge upon management's right to manage. While the constitution sets out 
the formalised terms of reference, once established the management-delegate 
interface takes on a dynamism of its own. There may be immense asymmetries in 
power and influence, but the position is nevertheless far from static. There is an 
`ebb and flow' in social relations derived from conditioning factors both external 
and internal, ultimately manifest in tactical adjustments by management. On 
occasion exogenous influence intervenes, in other instances employees enter as 
forces influencing the interplay of contrary pressures. The most significant findings 
in the former respect emerged at FinanceCo, where management was responding 
in a measured and strategic fashion to the recognition legislation, anxious to damp- 
down any demand for trade union representation. Subtle but significant micro-level 
adjustments were being made to the consultative agenda, with plans afoot to extend 
consultation into wage areas. Important procedural adjustments had likewise taken 
place, most significantly, the appointment of the first full-time representative, with 
management clearly looking at the issue of voice afresh. 
This theme of course returns us to Ramsay's (1977) depiction of managerial 
interest in participation being a function of threats to managerial authority, giving 
rise to `cycles' of interest. Ramsay's notion of cycles, however, is suggestive of 
managerial interest being of a more secular than fluid nature, a derivative of the 
author's macro-focus. Conversely, the depiction here is of management as an ever 
vigilant actor, constantly responding to both external and internal stimuli. This 
more dynamic scenario is better captured in a `wave' metaphor, subsequently 
developed by Marchington et al. (1993), noted in chapter 4. The core thesis is that 
at a micro-level the shape of participation varies over time and is subject to a range 
of forces, giving rise to waves of managerial interest (ibid: 553-554). While the 
authors focussed on the career aspirations of managers as driving the `waves', the 
contention here is that, as the above tension centring on issues of workforce 
empowerment becomes more marked, this is reflected in a subsequent re- 
emergence, or wave of interest in the representative structure. 
The waves metaphor captures admirably the marked rejuvenation of interest at 
FinanceCo in the representative format, following a legislative shock. Crucial for 
current purposes is the wave dimension of centrality, which is the adjudged 
significance of the participatory initiative `among the multiple concerns and 
activities in an organisation' (ibid: 559). As the authors note, participatory 
structures are not necessarily an `add-on', and may be viewed as a complementary 
means of assisting other accomplishment. Given the focus on the PC as a 
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component of a union avoidance strategy, its increased `centrality', or high profile, 
following the legislation may be viewed as a natural and predictable managerial 
response. 
If FinanceCo provided the sharpest example of deliberate and purposeful 
managerial re-balancing of interests giving rise to a distinct `wave', the situation 
was nevertheless fluid within the other study organisations. At FridgeCo it was 
evident that there was a perception that the issue of unionism required attention 
given continued union interest in the firm. However, the increasing reliance on 
non-contract agency staff dictated that the dynamics were the reverse of that 
encountered at FinanceCo, and the situation had moved on considerably from the 
consultation that surrounded the introduction of shift work that became, de facto, a 
process of negotiation. 
MediCo was distinct in that this was the only example of a body with a purported 
negotiating remit. Following Ramsay the process was depicted as essentially 
pseudo or phantom in nature. Ramsay's conceptualisation, however, is perhaps 
again ultimately too blunt an instrument to capture this element of organisational 
reality. Ramsay's suggestion is of decisions being made unilaterally, with 
ideological justification afforded unwittingly via the representatives' imprimatur. 
Management does not, however, function in a corporate vacuum and employees 
occasionally intervene to influence the interplay of conflicting pressures. The 
process may be pseudo in so far as the outcome is ultimately fixed by management, 
but the MediCo case suggests that the range of `apparent concessions' is not static, 
but rather a barometer of micro-level tension. It is noteworthy that the two pay 
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review processes tracked gave rise to markedly different results: a fixed lump sum 
payment derided by much of the workforce in 1999, followed by a more favourably 
received 3.5% cumulative increase the following year. One interpretation is that 
these differing outcomes simply reflected swings in the financial fortunes of the 
plant. However, given the antipathy with which the lump sum payment was greeted 
in certain quarters, the 2000 outcome is similarly suggestive of a tactical re- 
adjustment, management being aware of the need to imbue and invest the voice 
process with renewed and enhanced credibility in view of the earlier debacle. 
To pause and take stock, the principal axis for the analytical organisation of the 
summary so far has been the linking theoretically of managerial motive to 
discussions of the effectiveness of voice. The central contention has been that 
defensively inspired motive is manifestly corrosive of the voice process. It was in 
turn argued that the overriding desire for the maintenance or extension of 
prerogative unleashes a tension in that, despite management's best endeavours, 
employees do not necessarily accept the constraints imposed upon them in a 
passive manner and seek on occasion to influence the decision making process. 
This gives rise to the perceived need for at least minimum levels of outward 
effectiveness if representation is to remain in-house. The presence of this tension 
was seen to be given manifest expression in the ebb and flow or `waves' of 
managerial interests in the representative structures, shifts in the formal terms of 
reference and the sometimes variable nature of purported managerial concessions. 
To date, while we have considered the incongruous nature of managerial and 
employee goals and the resultant impact upon the voice process, we have not 
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considered managerial outcomes - it is to this task that we now turn in the second 
half of the chapter. 
6.4 Union Avoidance and the Coherence of the NER Response 
Within the introductory chapter criticism was levelled at the restricted scope of the 
NER literature that has focussed predominantly on the consequences for 
employees. Given that such participatory structures represent managerial 
interventions it was argued that a limited evaluation of the implications for the 
workforce of this mode of representation to a degree misses the point. The 
emergent proposition was that such bodies could conceivably be successful from a 
managerial perspective, while failing to satisfy tests relating to organisational 
pluralism. Prima facie the continued non-union status of the three organisations 
would suggest success, at least in terms of the defensive set of goals mapped in 
chapter 4. A closer probing, however, indicates that while intuitively plausible, 
such an interpretation is problematic. 
The litmus test of a strategy of union substitution is that `employers create an 
alternative mode of employee representation which employees will prefer to union 
forms of representation' (Gollan 2001: 382, emphasis added). A core theme of this 
chapter, however, has been taken up with demonstrating that defensive managerial 
intent impacts directly upon resource provision, disarming the effective functioning 
of such institutions. Management was not of course blind to such a contradiction 
and attempts were made to correct this anomaly through the process of 
acculturation. In all three organisations resources were deployed to suggest the 
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mutuality of employer and employee interests. If employees could be schooled as 
to the cogency of managerial action in the furtherance of essentially common goals 
(MediCo and FridgeCo), or more subtly inculcated with a unitary mindset 
(FinanceCo), symbolised by an integrative inclusive representative structure, issues 
of the operational effectiveness of a distinctly employee body clearly become less 
pressing. However, in none of the companies was this wholly successful. In point 
of fact, management failed to develop the strategy to its logical conclusion. In all 
three of the organisations the principal and most visible relationship was that of 
representatives vis-a-vis management; there was conversely an absence of 
systematic delegate-constituent interaction. Consequently, particularly at MediCo 
and FridgeCo where acculturation was based upon the process of education, it was 
difficult for this to permeate to the wider workforce. If there was a feeling amongst 
employees that the bodies had `failed to deliver', under the logic of the managerial 
position this derives from the inability of representatives to provide sufficient 
context on key decisions. However, even directly within the representative 
grouping, acculturation was less than absolute, and inevitably divisive issues 
became topics of debate. In the final analysis, despite attempts by management to 
use such structures to either emphasise the integrative aspects of the employment 
relationship (FinanceCo) or as educational vehicles (MediCo and FridgeCo), 
considerations in and around the efficacy of voice emerged as the currency by 
which such bodies were judged by employees. The comments of Marchington et al. 
(1992: 30-31) are apposite within this context: 
Workforces almost inevitably interpret, evaluate and react towards 
managerial initiatives and change, and in their own way `audit' their 
introduction and operation. 
273 
It is evident that, for the most part, across all three organisations any such `audit' 
was predominantly framed in terms of the ability of the representative structures to 
influence the decision making process, returning us again to the theme of tension. 
The structures are positioned as tools of union avoidance; however, any strategy 
that seeks to eschew union presence through the creation of an alternative 
collective forum must ultimately face scrutiny in terms of its ability to deliver 
tangible employee benefits, i. e. efficiency considerations. The latter requirement 
demands a set of resources that management are unwilling to cede given that this 
might compromise the very prerogative and control it most values. This explains 
why the non-legitimate status of these structures is a fundamentally ambivalent 
outcome for management. To be sure, on the one hand the low esteem in which the 
bodies are held neutralises and enfeebles any potential for collective employee 
challenge, rendering prerogative intact. On the other hand, however, the absence of 
legitimate status afforded to the surrogates by employees cannot ultimately be 
reconciled with the logic of union evasion, the process of acculturation 
notwithstanding. The following comments from Greenfield and Pleasure 
(1993: 173) warrant repetition: 
When we use the term legitimacy to apply to the collective voice of a worker 
organization, we mean an organization of the workers' own choosing. In that 
sense legitimacy... implies general consent of the workers to the representative 
capacity of the organization carrying the collective voice. 
Legitimacy is therefore both essential for effective voice and the fulcrum on which 
the union evasion strategy must turn. The absence of `consent', denoted by non- 
legitimate status, gives rise to a representative vacuum within the three study 
organisations; a potentially unstable situation. Significantly within other research 
in 
this area (Broad, 1994, Gollan, 2001 and Watling and Snook 2001) similar 
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structures have failed to survive; the evident voids ironically being filled by the 
very institutions they were created to neutralise, viz. orthodox trade unionism. 
6.5 Explaining Non-Union Status 
The above line of analysis gives rise to a major sub-question: given the suggested 
incoherence of NERs as a union avoidance strategy, how might the continued non- 
union status of these organisations be explained? The data suggest that this is a 
fundamentally demand side issue, after all none of the workforces were without 
trade union contact. It was observed that MediCo had been the subject of a trade 
union recruitment drive, albeit some years previously. At FridgeCo the de- 
recognised union maintained a de facto presence on the plant via the ex-shop 
stewards, the local branch being particularly active in briefing against the company 
during the at times acrimonious introduction of shift working. Most significant, 
however, in this respect was the FinanceCo situation. Based on leaked data, the 
company viewed themselves a prime targets for the TUC's Organising Academy. 
Such concern was not without objective empirical support: BIFU, and latterly, 
UNIFI were closely tracking events within the organisation, picketing the head 
office both during the branch closures and the head office re-organisation. 
Nevertheless, if there was, or had been, union interest in relation to these 
companies, in none of them was it substantially reciprocated by employees. 
Only at 
FinanceCo, where in the ballot 32% voted for trade union recognition, was there 
any evidence of serious union sympathies. An appropriate means of 
exploring muted receptiveness to trade union overtures 
is to draw upon the 
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modelling of antecedents of union joining behaviour undertaken by Kochan (1980), 
and modified by McLoughlin and Gourlay (1994). Drawing on this work Lloyd 
(2001) has explored why people join trade unions and how a non-union council 
could influence these factors. The wider utility of these models, however, is that if 
collapsed they suggest that employee behaviour is not narrowly concerned with 
issues of voice, shedding light upon how wider aspects of managerial strategy may 
condition employee responses to union representation. 
Kochan's (1980) model posits two `critical determinants' of union joining 
behaviour: employee dissatisfaction with economic aspects of the job ('bread and 
butter' issues such as wages, benefits and working conditions) and positive 
instrumental belief about a union's ability to have an effect upon pay and 
conditions. In seeking to explain non-union status in three case study organisations 
McLoughlin and Gourlay (1994: 94) refine the model by additionally invoking the 
need for employees to have a negative view of the utility of the non-union voice 
mechanism, moving on to explore how various organisational factors and 
managerial strategies might serve to stifle the above `triggers'. There are, it is sure, 
certain weaknesses within both the model and McLoughlin and Gourlay's 
subsequent analysis: social processes are overlooked and the treatment of 
managerial strategy is restricted to the more benign aspects of policy (e. g. HRM) at 
the expense of cruder tactics of suppression (see below). Nevertheless, the 
framework has the undeniable virtue of parsimony and consequently provides a 
useful point of entry at least, within which to organise the data. Given that the 
ineffectiveness of voice as a constant across the three organisations has been 
established, suggesting a prima facie propensity to unionise, it is upon the other 
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two necessary conditions for unionisation, or `critical determinants', that attention 
is focussed. 
Turning firstly to FridgeCo, here the most notable facet was the widespread level 
of job dissatisfaction. The dire financial position of the company had resulted in a 
five year wage freeze giving rise to a groundswell of disaffection amongst the vast 
majority of employees. There was similarly discontent expressed with regard to the 
treatment of temporary employees, who by the close of the research period 
comprised some 25% of the total production workforce. Somewhat surprisingly, 
notwithstanding an apparently fertile environment for trade union recruitment, non- 
union status was maintained relatively comfortably; a contradiction directing our 
attention to the second critical determinant - instrumental trade union beliefs. 
Ironically much of the explanation here for the ongoing non-union status relates to 
the previous history of union organisation on the plant. It will be recalled that, 
unique amongst our case study organisations, the introduction of the FndgeCo 
company council followed the de-recognition of the then AEU. As noted, the 
subject of the earlier de-recognition was most singularly marked by indifference, 
not least because the erstwhile active membership were widely viewed as being 
`hand in glove' with management. The production director's description of a 
largely ineffectual and quiescent body was echoed within wider workforce 
accounts where there was little support for a return to the status quo ante. That 
non-union status was maintained by the management team without significant 
difficulties, despite deep seated dissatisfaction with the non-union voice 
mechanism and increasingly derisory terms and conditions, is broadly explicable in 
terms of the earlier employment experiences. These served to strongly augment 
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negative instrumental beliefs about the union as an effective means of furthering 
the collective interests of the workforce. Indeed, a striking facet of the FridgeCo 
study was the widespread belief that one non-legitimate voice channel had been 
superseded by another. Interestingly, the large scale exodus of employees that 
followed the introduction of shift working is indicative that `exit' was viewed as a 
more attractive response than seeking to challenge management through the 
council format, or via support for the return of the union that maintained a de facto 
presence on the plant. 
Moving on to consider the situation at MediCo and FinanceCo, here the position 
was quite distinct. If at FridgeCo non-union status was delivered in part by an 
element of fortitude, these organisations had instigated deliberate and purposeful 
strategies directed at quelling both employee dissatisfaction and instrumental trade 
union support. If we take the variable of job satisfaction first, the outstanding 
finding in this respect was the evident similarities between these two companies; 
notwithstanding the markedly different characteristics of the workforce, employees 
were broadly content with `bread and butter' issues. It will be recalled that within 
both organisations there were a range of initiatives in place falling under the rubric 
of paternalism; commonalities included a share ownership scheme, profit share, 
pension provision and elements of health care open to all grades of staff. Within 
MediCo this practice of paternalism was driven at a corporate level directly by the 
US parent. Conversely at FinanceCo such a strategy is best viewed as a legacy of a 
similar approach widely employed within the UK finance sector prior to 
intensification of competition in the 1990s; automatic cost of living and 
incremental pay increases based on length of service, buttressed by an array of 
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welfare benefits being the norm (Cressey and Scott, 1992: Storey et al. 1998). 
Within both organisations the ability to pay at the market rate allied to the 
associated practice of paternalism - `the pursuit of consent through contentment' 
(Hyman, 1987: 43) - was reflected in broad employee satisfaction, largely 
disengaging this particular trigger. We might once again remind ourselves of 
characteristic employee responses: 
When you hear about other companies like where my brother works - they don't pay sick pay and you know stuff like that - it does make you realise 
that MediCo isn't a bad company to work for; and the bonuses are quite 
good. I think they are quite a good company. (MediCo, compounding 
operative) 
I see it as very much a caring organisation. I have worked for a number of 
organisations and I have to say that this is probably the best organisation I 
have worked for. They [employees] are really well looked after. Being 
financially minded I know how good it is because I looked around and 
compared it. (FinanceCo, key accounts manager) 
Significantly, however, within both these organisations strides had additionally 
been taken to de-activate any instrumental belief that unions could further advance 
the economic position of workers. It should be noted that a defect within 
McGloughlin and Gourlay's original exposition is that they fail to seriously 
interrogate this theme of instrumentality, or explore how issues of both employee 
mobilisation (see below) and managerial behaviour might serve to colour such 
perceptions. With regard to the latter theme, managerial strategy is treated as only 
impacting upon issues relating to employee satisfaction and voice. In Gregor Gall's 
(2003: 86-96) terms these scholars focus on relatively benign policies of union 
`substitution', at the expense of more hard nosed strategies of `suppression'. The 
case study data presented in chapters 4 and 5, however, points to a strategy on the 
part of management aimed at stifling the generation of positive instrumental trade 
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union support. Taking FinanceCo first, here the banking union (BIFU, and latterly 
UNIFI) had over the years closely tracked events within the organisation, with the 
company striving wherever possible to frustrate direct and informed dialogue 
between the union and its workforce. At times this had resulted in the union 
resorting to somewhat clandestine tactics e. g. speculative contact via facsimile. 
Notable in this ongoing standoff was the employee ballot into the future of 
representation in the company that was held in the shadow of the recognition 
legislation. While one of the balloting options open to employees was trade union 
recognition, the procedural keynote was the ongoing debarring of trade union 
access to company premises during the run up to the poll, depriving the union of a 
bridgehead from which to explain the potential benefits of external representation. 
The impact upon the final result remains a matter of conjecture. Nevertheless, it is 
plausible to suggest that the inability of the union to directly articulate the potential 
financial advantages of professional representation to an audience where recent 
changes to compensation and benefits had caused concern, was a factor in 
restricting union support to 32%. Indeed in the resultant confidential report the IPA 
cautioned that: 
It is dangerous to suggest that the survey's results could be translated into a 
`mock' [recognition] ballot as it was not accompanied by trade union access 
to the workplace that would be the case prior to a formal recognition 
ballot. 
Less subtly at MediCo it was a commonplace for management to directly 
link non- 
union status to subsidiary viability. As mentioned, the senior managerial 
team very 
much viewed the plant's health and profitability as significantly a 
function of its 
ongoing non-union status. Set within such a context there was a mood amongst 
some of the workforce that management would `close the plant 
down' rather than 
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accept trade union recognition, another fairly obvious blocking tactic directed at 
quashing unceremoniously any nascent instrumental trade union support. In sum, in 
both these organisations the hegemonic position of management was utilised in a 
fairly straightforward manner to initiate counter mobilisation through two standard 
forms (cf. Gall, 2003: 81-90) of trade union suppression. 
Further building upon this theme, as noted, at various junctures there are strong 
ideological forces operative within these organisations. The instilling of 
instrumental trade union beliefs into a critical mass of employees is unlikely to 
arise spontaneously, with mobilisation theory pointing specifically to the need for 
`opinion formers' to invoke the `cognitive liberation' (ibid: 238) of employees, to a 
position whereby any nascent grievances are internally acknowledged. Such social 
processes are notably sidelined by McLoughlin and Gourlay who implicitly treat 
instrumental trade union beliefs as a mental state arising extemporaneously. As 
argued in chapter 5, there are pervasive unitary forces at work in these companies 
directly corrosive of leadership behaviour, and such normative control conceivably 
undermines the potential for the mobilisation of trade union support. This was 
particularly evident at FinanceCo, where there was a mood that taking the stand of 
a malcontent might not be conducive to career enhancement. In sum, these two 
studies lend support to Gall's (ibid: 82) invocation of the need to consider both 
employer activities that `provide benefits for non-union membership in order to 
reduce the propensity to unionize' (substitution), and various suppression 
techniques. These instances similarly support Gall's (ibid) contention that there is 
no `Chinese Wall' operating between the two strategies and that `a single employer 
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may use both at the same moments across space and time', in effect to neutralise 
the triggers modelled above. 
Ultimately the above evidence is instructive in cautioning that the presence of 
NERs directed towards the goal of union avoidance will often be situated alongside 
the widespread use of other practices; indeed the utilisation of an NER may not be 
the dominant component. Certainly at both MediCo and FinanceCo the overall 
approach represented an admixture of policies; a somewhat piecemeal managerial 
experimentation driven by forward international diffusion of HR practices, 
competitive pressures and the legacy of the preference of individual managerial 
actors. The evidence likewise is suggestive that, in terms of an explicit union 
avoidance policy, paternalism and more crudely, tactics of suppression, represent 
the more coherent strands of policy, given that these do not pre-suppose any re- 
alignment in organisational power dynamics. To briefly reiterate the inherent 
tension unleashed by the NER response; union avoidance through alternative 
modes of voice, nevertheless requires that voice carries some semblance of 
effectiveness. This presupposes an array of resources that management are loath to 
concede given that this might potentially engender and precipitate an unstable 
environment threatening the hegemonic control that management is ultimately 
striving for. This perforce renders NERs inherently unstable structures in situations 
where management lacks the resources to deactivate triggers relating to job 
dissatisfaction and instrumental union support. Indeed, as noted, within the wider 
literature the tendency is for such institutions to be ousted and superseded by trade 
union recognition agreements (Broad, 1994; Gollan, 2001; Watling and Snook, 
2001). 
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6.6 The `Rival Logics' of Managerial Action 
The foregoing account has posited the notion of tension, a condition arising due to 
a divergence in management and employee expectations surrounding the presence 
of the representative structures. A second set of tensions, however, derives from 
within the managerial function. Across all organisations there were common 
pressures for flexibility and responsiveness giving rise to goals centred on trade 
union exclusion. Additionally, however, in two of the organisations (FinanceCo 
and FridgeCo) senior managerial motive was seen not to be solely industrial 
relations centred. The evolving nature of the labour process fed into the desire for 
production and service delivery benefits, delivered through the aegis of the self 
same bodies. In sum, management was pursuant of rival logics, relating to the 
maintenance of prerogative on the one hand, and the generation of employee 
engagement and commitment though the `full' (FridgeCo) and `structured' 
(FinanceCo) involvement of the workforce in elements of the decision making 
process it sought to control on the other. That the goals pursued through 
participatory interventions are not necessarily congruent, and may give rise to 
antithetical pressures, has been characterised eloquently by Ackers et al. 
(1992: 277): 
A participation set-up conceived in one scenario may, over time, be adjusted 
or revived for another. Sometimes two or more scenarios may co-exist, like 
multiple personalities, pulling a participation programme in potentially 
contradictory directions. 
Thus, at FndgeCo the company council was originally positioned by the production 
director as a component of a total quality management culture; a means of getting 
`employees fully involved in the organisation'. As the financial crisis deepened, 
however, these more proactive managerial goals were clearly being frustrated, with 
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employees feeling broadly alienated from the important decisions affecting their 
working lives. Workers spoke of the process being a `waste of time', and 
management `just saying no' to employee requests. It was clear that the 
contradictory pressures referred to above - the desire that participation be very 
much subordinate to firm overall managerial prerogative - rendered consultation an 
increasingly marginal exercise, mediating any potential gains in engagement and 
co-operation realised through this channel. 
The outstanding findings in this respect, however, emerged at FinanceCo. The 
greater discretion of the workforce dictated that the successful completion of tasks 
critically presupposed an engaged and co-operative workforce. In this setting the 
ability to release and apply intellectual effort in an effective and co-operative 
manner was vitally important, especially transparent at retail level where customer 
service advisors were responsible for generating the sales leads pivotal to future 
business growth and development. Accordingly managerial motivation 
encompassed both a defensive desire to maintain managerial control through union 
avoidance and, conversely, a desire to use the forum as a high involvement tool to 
release the talents of an educated and capable workforce. 
This bold attempt by management to use the NER format both for defensive and 
more proactive reasons may be seen as an effort to confront `the fundamental 
tension of management' (Crompton cited in Thompson, 1993: 151), i. e. `that of 
attaining maximum control over activities, at the same time as achieving a measure 
of voluntary compliance'. MacInnes (1985: 107) makes the point succinctly, 
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[the] translation of formal managerial prerogative into real managerial 
control, the transformation of the letter of the employment contract into the 
reality of efficient production, depends on management securing the co- 
operation of the workforce and establishing the legitimacy of its control in 
their eyes. 
Thus NERs may additionally be positioned as a managerial response to the need to 
generate employee co-operation through the `negotiation of legitimacy' (ibid: 108), 
to reinforce the authority derived from its hierarchical position. This is neatly 
encapsulated within the following FinanceCo documentation: 
Why do we need formal structures for consultation? As stakeholders in the 
development and success of the organisation in which they work, 
employees, like others have their own interests and perspectives, and look 
for means to express their `voice', individually or collectively. Arguably 
decisions on matters of mutual concern, that have been reached after 
consultation with an informed workforce, have a degree of legitimacy which 
cannot be achieved without it. (Preamble to Workforce Ballot Document, 
emphasis added). 
Ultimately the partner's council was positioned by senior management as a means 
of safeguarding key areas of managerial control and prerogative through union 
avoidance, while a simultaneous goal was the desire to release the intellectual 
efforts of employees towards business goals by involving them in the very decision 
making process it sought to monopolise. The yielding of the latter more benign 
outcome relating to co-operation, or as articulated by managers, as the need for 
employee `buy-in', presupposes some tempering of managerial power, or at the 
very least a high degree of receptiveness to employee input. Given the pre-eminent 
desire for control, however, management were reluctant to qualify in any way their 
command of power and overall right to make key business decisions, manifest in a 
failure to cede any significant formalised power resources to the body. 
Furthermore, as noted, management strove wherever possible to debar contentious 
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issues, as this would undermine the unitary organisational culture that it was keen 
to project. Ultimately, the cocktail of a body both soft on power, and dealing 
predominantly in a deliberately crafted agenda of largely anodyne subject matter, 
served to undermine interest in the institution and the generation of consent and 
legitimacy through this particular channel. As Cressey et al. (1985: 170-171) have 
argued, based on their own study of participative structures in six organisations, 
two of which were non-union: 
They [management] may be concerned with authority and the legitimation 
of their power, but that legitimation has very definite limits to how far it can 
go. 
Cressey et al. (ibid: 172) rationalise this reluctance on the part of management to 
share control on the basis that there is no guarantee about the ends that will be 
pursued by the other side with increased `freedom to manoeuvre' - management 
are ultimately fearful of swapping power for productivity (ibid). 
The 2001 in-house survey graphically demonstrated the failure of the PC to engage 
and capture the interests of employees with only 23% of employees agreeing that 
`there is effective involvement through partner's councils'. Nevertheless, this was 
not of itself corrosive of service delivery, indeed as was also noted in the same 
chapter 82% of employees agreed with the statement that: `I am committed to my 
work'. Given that the PC was clearly not acting to generate employee co-operation 
or `buy-in' through the legitimisation of the decision making processes 
how might 
this be accounted for? Hyman (1987: 30), in addressing the contradictory nature of 
capitalist enterprise and the difficulty of harmonising different managerial 
interventions, has forcefully and famously concluded, `there is no "one best way" 
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of managing these contradictions, only different routes to partial failure'. While 
accepting the intellectual consistency of such an account, certain managerial 
strategies appear to afford a greater margin and potential for failure than others. 
Within the context of FinanceCo one plausible interpretation is that employee co- 
operation and the legitimisation of managerial authority - like non-union status - 
was delivered by the concomitant strategy of `consent through contentment'; i. e. 
facets of paternalism, a far more internally consistent stratagem in that, to reiterate 
again, no re-orientation in organisational power dynamics is assumed. 
In view of the above critique how are we to account for the enduring presence and 
resilience of these institutions and their not insignificant managerial resourcing? 
Any such explanation centres on two core strands, the first drawing heavily on the 
above account. The thrust of this is that senior personnel perceive that there is a 
tangible competitive advantage in the creation and continuing presence of the 
above structures, but ultimately their impressions are at least partially incorrect. 
Such an assertion inevitably leaves the researcher open to charges of hubris; the 
data is nevertheless indicative that, in terms of both the explicit goal relating to 
issues in and around employee engagement, and similarly the implicit linkages to 
trade union avoidance, the three councils make a minimal contribution. This 
suggests that such an interpretation has validity. 
However, if the bodies are ill-suited tools for the core managerial goals outlined 
they do plausibly serve a subsidiary function; this relates to the process of 
environmental scanning alluded to in chapter 4, i. e. the extracting of 
information 
from employees on various corporate matters. Thus, it was argued, for 
instance, 
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that at MediCo certain production managers used the representative group as a 
means of sounding out the workforce with a view to predicting the impact of 
various corporate decisions on such matters as absenteeism and turnover. Similarly, 
given that at both MediCo and FridgeCo such forums embodied the sole means of 
bottom up communication, they would appear to serve as a useful means by which 
senior managers can take the temperature of the workforce, providing some sort of 
context for managerial decision making and similarly allowing management to 
predict the downstream consequences of various initiatives. 
An intelligence gathering function came through particularly strongly in the 
FinanceCo study. Notwithstanding the fact that the company carry out a very 
comprehensive annual survey, the PC was nevertheless viewed as a further means 
of canvassing employee opinion and obtaining feedback. While the annual survey 
demonstrated that the body was failing in the more ambitious goal of engaging 
employees, the council nevertheless represents a potential tool allowing 
management to capture the mood of the workforce and predict the knock on 
consequences of various unilaterally imposed decisions, such as branch re- 
structuring. Of course the effectiveness of this functionality ultimately presupposes 
that the opinions of representative agents are authoritative, i. e. both representative 
in opinion and unconstrained. The FinanceCo findings were notable 
in this respect. 
Certainly senior managers viewed the body as a vehicle for extracting employee 
opinion in an undiluted manner, noting that messages get `filtered' 
in the ordinary 
course of events. Nevertheless, as observed in chapter 5, there was a tendency 
for 
the PC itself to act as such a filter, especially at head office given the potential 
for 
patronage and subtle forms of intimidation. Consequently, 
in this setting, it is 
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reasonable to conclude that even this more modest functionality was performing at 
a far from optimum level 
It is important to distinguish such intelligence gathering from goals in and around 
employee involvement and engagement, in that it ultimately implies a much lower 
degree of managerial receptiveness to bottom up employee input. Thus employee 
feedback is rarely utilised to significantly inform the decision making process, 
particularly with regard to matters distributional in nature, where such input is 
characteristically treated in a fairly passive manner by management. The exception 
to this, however, is that ultimately in extremis the monitoring procedure may give 
rise to a signal that all is not going according to plan; the `oil pressure light' to use 
Quinn's (1996: 384) graphic metaphor. This was perhaps best demonstrated at 
FridgeCo during the introduction of shift working where the managerial team were 
forewarned that there had been a miscalculation on their part over the strength of 
feeling, with matters escalating to dangerous levels. 
At a more concrete level of analysis a further increasingly important function of the 
institutions is that of affording a legally compliant consultative body. All the 
representative fora predated the consultation edicts, most notably the redundancy 
provisions. However, in all instances the remit of the bodies now encompasses that 
of satisfying the legal provisions. This extension of the terms of reference into 
redundancy consultation may be seen to be a shrewd move on the part of 
management. Firstly, the utilisation of the standing bodies avoids the transaction 
costs of assembling and disbanding bodies on an ad hoc basis. More subtly, a 
notable finding was the broadly quiescent posture of the representatives during 
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ensuing consultation periods. One interpretation is that, given the educative thrust 
of much council business, systematic news management, particularly in the build 
up to redundancy notification, allows management to inculcate into representatives 
the cogency of its organisational prognosis. This seemingly allows management to 
discharge its legislative burden to seek ways of avoiding dismissals with some 
impunity. Again the assembling of ad hoc vehicles of representation, with 
delegates absent the ongoing contact and systematic exposure to management's 
interpretation of business realities, might conceivably prove a less accommodating 
and receptive audience. 
6.7 Summary and Implications 
The main message of this concluding chapter has related to themes in and around 
the inherent tensions unleashed by this mode of managerial intervention. In 
contemplating this and related issues a significant amount of ground has been 
covered. This closing section, therefore, provides a more narrowly focussed 
synopsis, summarising the implications and contribution of the thesis with regard 
to the principal theoretical debates surrounding non-union representation, as 
originally outlined in the introductory chapter. 
Much of the study has been preoccupied with building upon earlier work by Broad 
(1994), Gollan (2001), Lloyd (2001) and Watling and Snook (2001), evaluating 
employee outcomes and the influence of non-union representative structures vis-a- 
vis management. Overall the thesis reinforces the findings of this earlier literature 
in emphasising that the organisational structure of authority is little altered by the 
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presence of NERs. A distinct point of departure, however, is that although previous 
accounts have provided a broad sweep of descriptive analysis, they have suffered 
from being atheoretical in their approach rendering generalisation or extrapolation 
of the findings difficult. Significantly, while the shortcomings have been 
predominantly articulated in terms of an absence of power, the construct has been 
applied in a fairly unsophisticated manner. This thesis has advanced knowledge in 
this area, both by exploring the theme of voice through the lens of a more thorough 
conceptualisation of power, and by demonstrating that the absence of significant 
influence is ultimately a symptom of more fundamental difficulties. To be sure, the 
above studies additionally touch upon wider issues appertaining to independence 
and credibility. However, these themes are presented as loosely defined 
description, rather than components of a theoretically informed overarching 
analysis; consequently complex synergies and inter-relationships have gone 
undetected. Most significantly, the debilitating implications of the managerial 
ownership and control of the representative process are afforded cursory treatment 
and the ramifications are not adequately captured. In the final analysis these 
represent managerially imposed representative structures, a factor that has critical 
implications for their legitimacy and autonomy, and hence effective functioning. 
This may seem an obvious point - indeed axiomatic. However, this theme has been 
subject to remarkably little scrutiny. This contrasts markedly with the American 
literature where the topic of company unionism or `employer dominated' (Grenier 
and Hogler, 1991: 316) representative fora has long been the subject of informed 
discussion (cf. also Greenfield and Pleasure, 1993; Jacoby, 1997). Conversely 
within the UK, formal conceptualisations of NERs (cf. Gollan, 2001: 378) have 
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failed to emphasis the primacy of management as both architect and sponsor and to 
similarly explore the implications. 
Correcting this oversight the thesis has demonstrated that `employer dominance' 
seriously undermines the efficacy of this mode of voice. Two principal causal 
processes have been highlighted. Firstly, characteristically the formal terms of 
reference are purposefully constrained, depriving the bodies of recourse to 
formalised manifest power resources. More insidiously, the ideological hegemony 
of management, manifest in the process of acculturation, is influential in eroding 
the development of a latent power base. A marked deficiency within the earlier 
studies has been the failure of scholars to account for the apparent reluctance of 
employees to bring collective pressure to bear in such settings, notwithstanding the 
presence of a formalised infrastructure that potentially provides a collective 
platform from which to formulate strategy and hold management to account. The 
analysis contained here has indicated the important role that `mental resources' 
play, functioning as social barriers to mobilisation, not least through the stifling of 
leadership behaviour. The thesis has thus moved the discussion beyond the terrain 
of an empiricist conception of power, delineating the subtle resources at 
management's disposal. Ultimately the absence of mobilisation can only 
be 
understood within the context of wider organisational norms, understandings and 
assumptions, i. e. the cultural pressures that representatives labour under. 
A related contribution has been the linking thematically of issues appertaining to 
both voice and managerial strategy. The insular focus of the aforementioned group 
of studies (Broad, 1994; Gollan, 2001; Lloyd, 2001; Watling and 
Snook 2001) on 
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employee outcomes, at the expense of a parallel account of managerial strategy, has 
ensured that this body of literature is again deficient in that it actually explains 
little in terms of the ultimate genealogy of the ineffective nature of the voice 
process. In chapter 4 it was argued that management was in essence pursuant of a 
`best fit' approach to collective representation, i. e. the institutionalisation of voice 
in a manner complementary to wider corporate priorities. In the final analysis, 
however, the managerial ownership of the representative process is so corrosive of 
voice because of its privileging of a defensively inspired set of aims centring on 
matters of workplace control, over those more proactively formulated goals. 
The current study has, therefore, gone beyond existing accounts in tracing the well- 
springs of the inefficacious nature of voice provision, plotting a clear link between 
defensively inspired managerial designs and the impotence of NER voice. 
As such it demonstrates the need for both an empirically grounded and 
theoretically informed account, closely synthesising themes relating to both 
managerial goals and employee outcomes, if the dynamics of non-union voice 
provision are to be satisfactorily unravelled and comprehended. 
Throughout the study various references have been made to the role that NERs play 
with regard to statutory consultation. Within the introductory chapter the dynamic 
legislative context was alluded to; specifically the imminent introduction of the 
Directive on information and consultation was afforded coverage. An outstanding 
area that warrants comment, therefore, concerns the implications of the study for 
the new provisions. 
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The transposition of the above Directive into UK law has been portrayed as a 
useful corrective to `the failure of voluntarism' (Sisson, 2002: 2), and hence 
implicitly as a tool for the extension of effective voice into the non-union sector. 
Superficially, at least, there are grounds for optimism. Certainly the legislation will 
be of use in regularising the information that must be provided to non-union 
consultative bodies, correcting the present situation where the extent of data 
provision is subject to managerial whim. Furthermore, the regulations will likewise 
serve to formalise the precise points of managerial-representative engagement; 
while by definition the `scope' of employee participation is restricted to 
consultation, range is possibly far reaching, potentially extending into strategic 
matters (Sisson, 2002; 14). Perhaps the most significant provision, however, is that 
the regulations stipulate that consultation should take place `with a view to 
reaching an agreement' in the case of `decisions likely to lead to substantial change 
in work organisation or contractual relations' (ibid: 10). As Sissson (ibid) observes: 
`the clear implication is that management will not just ask for the views of 
employee representatives and take them into account, but also seek to reach 
agreement' -a definition of consultation bordering on negotiation. Furthermore, the 
Directive affords that sanctions for non-compliance be `effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive' (Sisson, 2002: 4). It could be speculated, therefore, that the potentially 
punitive nature of the Directive might serve to afford non-union representatives 
with a legally derived latent power base to back up their rights under the new 
provisions. 
The evidence presented within this thesis, however, particularly the unitary and 
ethnocentric managerial style exhibited, suggests that it would be grossly naive to 
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assume that non-union employers will be willing to cede their traditional 
prerogative to decide the future strategic direction of their businesses, or their right 
to unilaterally determine key issues. As Lewin and Mitchell (cited in Greenfield 
and Pleasure, 1993: 192) have cautioned `it is one thing to mandate voice... but quite 
another thing to mandate effective voice' (emphasis in original). Hyman (1996: 81) 
is certainly correct in asserting that the utility of such structures must depend partly 
on the efficacy of the mechanisms of enforcement. However, the case study data is 
suggestive that the dominance and ideological hegemony of management, serving 
to routinely privilege managerial interpretations of given situations, is likely to 
present a more formidable difficulty. To be sure, the regulations will invoke a 
formal element of `institutional distance', given that the terms of reference and 
various procedural matters will have external legal backing and authority. 
However, set within an often pervasive unitary organisational culture, the lack of 
an ideological counterweight of the sort traditionally afforded by an independent 
trade union may crucially undermine the effectiveness of the consultation process, 
rendering the managerial position again devoid of independent scrutiny. 
Ultimately, the evidence presented within the thesis lends credence to Kelly's 
(1996: 60) pessimistic assertion that `[legally mandated] works councils are likely 
to prove ineffective at best, and ideologically disarming at worst' (emphasis 
added). 
Finally we need to consider the implications of the above analyses vis-a-vis the 
original intellectual starting point for the study - the `representation gap'. How are 
we to best understand the ramifications of the thesis within the context of this 
debate? Superficially the conclusions might seem self evident. Given that currently 
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these structures exist under the sufferance and bidding of management they cannot 
approximate voice as afforded by traditional trade union structures. This would 
suggest that they must be viewed as at best a palliative, contributing to, rather than 
ameliorating any representative lacuna. Based on the findings, it is difficult 
similarly to offer an optimistic prognosis for the nascent statutory model of 
workforce consultation. We should remain cautious, however, in the inferences that 
are drawn; ultimately an awareness of the complexity and reality of non-union 
employment relations is necessary if we are to avoid drawing overly pessimistic 
conclusions. 
American commentators refer to the phenomenon of the representation gap as the 
difference between the rights that employees want and the rights they actually have 
(cf. Freeman and Rogers, 1993; Weiler, 1993). This is a useful reminder that when 
considering this theme it is necessary to evaluate both the demand and supply side 
of the equation, rather than simply positing an a priori demand for rigorous 
representative channels. It is notable that within a UK context the focus has 
predominantly been upon supply side issues, i. e. the topic of trade union decline, 
allied to an exploration of alternatives or complements to traditional collective 
bargaining (cf. for example, Towers, 1997). When expressed in both demand and 
supply side terms, however, accurate measurement of a putative representation gap 
becomes somewhat problematic. It is clearly empirically unsound to make 
judgements regarding the extent of untapped demand for collective representation 
simply on the basis of quantitative data sets relating to various indices of trade 
unionism and collective bargaining coverage. The corollary to a parallel focus on 
demand side issues is that the magnitude of any representation gap will be 
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differentially shaped by aspects of organisational employee relations policy and 
practice beyond narrow issues appertaining to voice. 
As has been argued within this chapter, the use of NERs as a means of union 
avoidance is often located within a wider portfolio of complementary policies. For 
certain, this may involve suppression tactics. However, other facets may not 
necessarily be inexpedient to the welfare of employees. Indeed, where resources 
allow, the strategy may entail sufficient benefits to make non-union employees 
unresponsive or indifferent to the theme of voice. The findings presented here 
suggest that there is plausibly a significant non-union hinterland where the 
representation gap is not the daily experience of employees, although they may 
well lack recourse to effective voice. This reinforces the observations made by 
Findlay (1992: 88-89) that in certain settings the demands for rigorous 
representative channels may be less than pressing. Given that Findlay's work 
focussed exclusively on managerial perceptions the importance of such 
confirmation should not be underestimated. To the extent that the findings here 
replicate the assessment of this less rigorous methodology, Findlay's arguments 
can be more firmly grounded. Likewise, as identified earlier in the chapter, even in 
settings where there is an absence of effective representation, management does not 
function in a corporate vacuum: there is an `ebb and flow' in social relations. In 
point of fact, if management is pragmatically vigilant in its wish to remain union 
free, arms length accommodation and managerial restraint is a logical outcome of 
the de facto trading of rigorous voice for wage and non-wage benefits. 
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None of this is to gainsay that there is an `ugly' or `bad' face of non-unionism 
(Guest and Hoque, 1994), where the absence of an effective representative agent 
has serious repercussions. It is simply to argue that the whole debate in and around 
the representation gap needs to be re-positioned to a terrain encompassing a far 
more qualitative research agenda, one capable of appreciating the complexity of the 
employment relationship within the non-union sector. Although there is now a 
sizeable literature on firms that represent exemplars of `soft' HRM, less is known 
about organisations that eschew the heavy costs in managerial time of an 
atomisation of the employment relationship, but nevertheless engage in `the 
anticipation of conflict' (Follert, cited in Jacoby, 1997: 25) through the payment of 
wages at the market rate or better, allied to other non-wage benefits. It is 
noteworthy that this cohort of workers has been largely invisible to industrial 
relations scholars. Within this context the thesis has demonstrated that, while NERs 
represent fatally tarnished modes of voice, the implications for employees, and thus 
the magnitude of the representation gap, will ultimately be differentially shaped 
by 
a wider array of organisationally specific contingencies. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Medico (30 in Total) 
Management 
Plant Manager 
Human Resources Director 
Manufacturing Accounts Manager/Plant Accountant 
Engineering and Development Manager 
Viaflex Production Manager 
Bottling Production Manager 
LVC Production Manager 
Engineering and Development Manager 
Personnel Manager ** 
Training Manager 
Supervisory Staff 
Production Supervisors x3 
Representatives 
Current ECC Representatives x6 
Ex-Representatives x6 
European Works Council Representative x1 
FinanceCo (35 in Total) 
Management 
Head of Group HR 
Head of HR Shared Services 
HR Manager Shared Services 
Training Manager Shared Services 
Head of Internal Communications 
Head of Borrower Services 
Head of Organisational Development Consumer Division 
Head of Compliance/ Company Secretary 
Head of Eastern Retail 
Supervisory Staff 
Team leaders Finance Department x2 
Retail Customer Service Managers x2 
Representatives 
Full Time Representative 
Current Professional Services Council Representatives x 10 
Ex-Representatives x3 
Current Western Retail Representatives x6 
Ex-Representatives x2 
(Continued overleaf.. ) 
315 
FridgeCo (20 in Total) 
Management 
Personnel Manager 
Training Manager 
Production Director 
Plant Engineering Manager 
Production Engineering Manager 
Production Control Manager 
Sppervisory Staff 
Cell Leaders x2 
Representatives 
Current Company Council Representatives x 10 
Ex-Representatives x2 
* Denotes two interviews 
** Denotes three interviews 
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APPENDIX 2: MEETINGS ATTENDED 
MediCo 
Employee Consultative Committee, Plant Level Meeting, Tuesday May 15th, 2001 
Employee Consultative Committee, Plant Level Meeting, Tuesday August 21St, 
2001 
Employee Consultative Committee, Fluids and Support Departmental Meeting, 
Thursday July 12th, 2001 
Employee Consultative Committee, Fluids and Support Departmental Meeting, 
Thursday September 6th, 2001 
FinanceCo 
Partners' Council Consumer Western, Tuesday January 15th, 2002 
Partners' Council Consumer Western, Tuesday February 5th, 2002 
Partners' Council Professional Services, Wednesday November 7th 2001 
Partners' Council Professional Services, Wednesday December 5th, 2001 
FridgeCo 
Company Council, Thursday 28th September, 2000 
Company Council, Thursday February 7th, 2002 
Company Council, Thursday March 7th, 2002 
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APPENDIX 3: MEDICO QUESTIONNAIRE 
In total 227 survey sheets were distributed with 68 returned, representing a crude response 
rate of 29.95%. The scale used was a five point Likert scale (1= strongly agree, 5= 
strongly disagree); percentage agreement is defined as the aggregated responses for 1 and 2 
only. 
Statement % 
. -1 green! ent 1. My EEC rep actively consults with me before attending Committee 29 
meetings 
2. The existing ECC system achieves wins for employees 16 
3. Overall I am happy with the performance of my ECC rep 30 
4. Wherever possible I always vote at ECC elections 
5. The existing ECC system fails to protect employee interests 
6. The ECC, fails to consult effectively on behalf of employees 
40 
49 
42 
7.1 am confident that my rep has the ability to help me with personal 36 
work related problems 
8. I am happy that my rep has the appropriate skill and experience to 33 
consult effectively with management in areas such as pay and conditions 
9. My representative always acts in the best interest of employees 34 
regardless of the managerial stance on issues 
10. The ECC receives satisfactory support from the supervisory staff 18 
1 1. The ECC serves to indirectly involve all plant grade employees in the 28 
important decisions affecting them 
12. Management are committed to the consultative process 
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23 
(Continued overleaf... ) 
Statement 
A. -I'eell1 e/ll 
13. The ECC has insufficient power to seriously influence the way decisions 58 
are made at Medico, such as those relating to terms and conditions 
14. The balance of power between management and employee representatives 76 
on the existing ECC is too heavily in favour of management 
15. The Company always follow agreements reached at ECC gatherings 24 
16. Management genuinely take into account the deliberations of the ECC 21 
when reaching final decisions on matters concerning employees 
17.1 have no idea who my ECC rep is 16 
_ 18. I care very much who is elected as my representative 
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APPENDIX 4: FINANCECO BALLOT DOCUMENT 
Employee Representation at FinanceCo. Tick only one of the three 
auestions. 
Would You Prefer FinanceCo to: 
Fo-ption 
Continue with employee representation through the existing 
partners' Council, elected by all employees? 
Recognise a Trade Union and consult and negotiate with 
representatives elected by Trade Union members? 
Broaden the remit of the Partners' Council to include a role in 
consultation on issues such as pay, but not recognise a Trade 
Union 
Please add any comments you wish to make.... 
Tick 
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